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












THE LIFE  
OF  
HENRY JOHN TEMPLE  
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.

1846-1865.

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VOLUME I.









VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.

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# THE LIFE

OF

HENRY JOHN TEMPLE,

# VISCOUNT PALMERSTON:

1846-1865.

WITH SELECTIONS FROM

His Speeches and Correspondence.

BY

THE HON. EVELYN ASHLEY, M.P.

VOLUME I.



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
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## PREFACE.



THE period reached by Lord Dalling's work forms the starting-point of the present volume, and my object in the pages which follow has been to chronicle the events of the last twenty years of Lord Palmerston's life, with his policy, opinions, and acts, in a plain but intelligible manner, and with a due regard to brevity. It is not easy to convey a truthful knowledge, and impossible to convey a full knowledge, of so near a past while present susceptibilities still exist and demand consideration. Nor could proper brevity be secured except by omitting much in the way of explanatory statement which some may look for, but which ought not to be needed; for though, according to Guizot, the history of the day before yesterday is the least known and the most forgotten by the public of to-day, still the general facts of this period must be familiar to the greater number of educated persons. Besides, I have

sought to make contemporary letters and documents, as far as possible, tell the story, believing this mode of conveying information to be most interesting, as it naturally must be most truthful. This is to an unusual degree the case with Lord Palmerston's letters, which are so gay, unaffected, and to the point, and so free from everything artificial, that they very accurately reflect his personal character as well as the impressions of the moment. He had, besides, so practical a mind that his "written talk" about the politics of his day has a real value for men engaged in public affairs. To such I commend it.

E. A.

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# LIFE OF HENRY JOHN TEMPLE,

THIRD, VISCOUNT PALMERSTON, K.G., G.C.B.



## CHAPTER I.

Third Tenure of the Foreign Office—Switzerland—Portugal—  
Annexation of the Punjaub.

LORD PALMERSTON was close upon sixty-two years of age when, in 1846, he went to the Foreign Office for the third and last time. Nearly twenty years elapsed before he died, but death found him still in harness and the working head of a powerful administration. During this long space, with only two short intervals, he was continuously in office—first as Foreign Secretary, next as Home Secretary, and twice as Prime Minister. This is the period over which I propose in these volumes to travel, subject to the inevitable restrictions imposed by the recent character of many of its events.

Of these years the five given up to “Foreign Affairs” were the most unquiet which, with his own country at peace, could fall to any man’s lot, and culminated in his abrupt retirement at the close of

1851. The year which immediately succeeded his taking the seals was sufficiently full of anxious events, such as the Spanish marriages, civil wars in Spain and Portugal, and the disturbances in Switzerland, which, at one moment, seriously threatened the independence of that sturdy little republic; but these formed but a fit prelude to the storm which broke over Europe in 1848, and continued to rage throughout the following year.

To aid, by his countenance and counsel, the triumph and maintenance of constitutional freedom, was Lord Palmerston's desire. He foresaw clearly enough the results of despotic repression. The events of the revolutionary year were, in his opinion, but the natural fruits of the growths planted by the hands of absolute sovereigns. To prune betimes was, as he incessantly pointed out, the only check which kings, ministers, and patriots could usefully apply. In fact, during the whole of 1847, he was bent on giving such aid as was in his power to those governments which were willing and able to "put their house in order." While, however, he recognised the necessity, he was little hopeful in the prospect. History admonishes us, he used to say, that rulers seldom have the forecast to substitute, in good time, reform for revolution. They take no note of changes around them, and forget that it is the pre-existing spirit of slavery in the people that has made tyrants in all ages of the world. No tyrant ever made a slave who was not one already—no community, how-

ever small, having the spirit of freemen ever had a master for long. When subjects change their spirit, they will also restrain or else change their rulers.

The following extract from a circular despatch sent to English representatives in Italy, in January, 1848, gives such a clear compendium of his views and of his previous endeavours in other directions that I here insert it :—

“The situation of the sovereigns of Italy towards their subjects is one of which advantage may be taken by the enemies of both. It is not difficult to convey to the sovereigns false reports that risings are intended, and to create in their minds unfounded impressions that revolutionary plots are in agitation. On the other hand, the same agency may be employed to represent to the people that their sovereigns are insincere in their promises of concessions, and thus the people, being stimulated to use force for the purpose of securing political reforms, the very acts to which they may have been delusively led on may be converted into a pretext for depriving them of the objects of their legitimate expectations.

“It will be your duty to counteract, as far as possible, these sinister efforts. You are instructed to say to the Minister that the direction of the progress of reform and improvement is still in the hands of the sovereigns, but that it is now too late for them to attempt to obstruct reasonable progress; and that resistance to moderate petitions is sure to lead ere long to the necessity of yielding to irresistible demands. That it is better for a government to frame its measures of improvement with timely deliberation, and to grant them with the grace of spontaneous concession, than to be compelled to adopt, on the sudden, changes perhaps insufficiently matured, and which, being wrung from them by the pressure of imperious circumstances, invert the natural

order of things, and being of the nature of a capitulation of the sovereign to the subject, may not always be a sure foundation for permanent harmony between the crown and the people.

“To the popular leaders with whom you may have intercourse, you should use language of the same tendency and arguments drawn from the same considerations. You should tell them that force put upon the inclinations of their sovereigns will produce ill-will and repugnance, which must lead their rulers, on their part, to be constantly looking out for an opportunity of shaking off the yoke which they may have been obliged to bear. That mutual distrust will thus be created between the governors and the governed. That this distrust will break out in overt acts on each side, intended perhaps defensively by those by whom done, but regarded as offensive by the other party. That open discord will thence ensue, and foreign interference may be the ultimate result.”

It was imbued with these sentiments that Lord Palmerston scanned the horizon, and one of the first matters to attract his attention was the state of Switzerland. He naturally viewed with the greatest concern the possibility of any such interference by the great Powers with that free confederacy as might compromise her political independence, or endanger the position which she held as the home and refuge of liberty on the Continent. His influence, as will be seen, contributed very materially to avert any such intervention.

To understand the events which were occurring in that country, it is necessary to remember that, up to the commencement of the present century, the condition of a Swiss canton was like that of a feudal

lord with an aggregate of seigneurial and subject properties. It had two councils, great and small, but the real powers of government were all exercised by the small or executive council, while the great or legislative council had neither initiative, independence, nor publicity of debate. In 1846, of the 2,400,000 inhabitants of Switzerland, about 900,000 were Roman Catholics, and the remainder Protestants, while each canton had an equal voice in the Diet whatever the disparity as to size, wealth, or, we may add, intelligence. In the Catholic cantons the clergy enjoyed great privileges and power, and the people generally were in a state of ignorant submission to their directions.

The French Revolution of 1830 gave an impetus to a movement towards more liberal and popular institutions, and the Radical party became speedily opposed to the Conservative. The Roman Catholic priests and Jesuits in three of the small cantons took, as might have been expected, an active part on the Conservative side, and were incessant workers in a series of counter-revolutions.

The introduction of the Jesuits into the important canton of Lucerne, which had, up to the year 1844, been free from their noisome presence, put the torch to materials which had thus long been piling up ready for the flame. The seven Roman Catholic cantons found it necessary, if they wished to resist the decrees of the rest of the Federation, to form themselves into a separate league—offensive and

defensive. This new Confederacy took the name of the "Sonderbund."

On the 20th of July, 1846, the Federal Diet voted the Sonderbund illegal, and decreed, on the 3rd of September, the expulsion of the Jesuits from the four cantons of Lucerne, Schwytz, Freyburg, and Valais, in which they were established. A civil war was the inevitable consequence.

Meanwhile, however, the French Government had proposed that England, France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia should make a collective declaration recommending the arbitration of the Pope in the dispute about the Jesuits—proposing a conference for modifying the Federal compact, and announcing to the Swiss Diet that if they refused these propositions and proceeded with the war, the five Powers would consider the Confederation as no longer existing—in other words, a proposal to compel the Swiss by force of arms to adopt the views of the great Powers. Lord Palmerston, on behalf of the British Government, refused to accept this proposal. He stood at first alone, because the rights of Prussia over Neuchâtel prompted her to interfere, although, as a Protestant Power, she felt no sympathy for the seceders; and the Austrian, followed by the Russian, was not more with him than the Frenchman. The view that Prince Metternich took was, that the neutrality of Switzerland could only be respected so long as she was one Federal Republic—her neutrality being founded on her Federal constitution; but the

view of Lord Palmerston was, that her independence would be equally necessary and equally right whether she was federated or not. Metternich and Guizot were both jealous of Switzerland becoming a united and, therefore, powerful military state. They, accordingly, secretly aided the seven cantons, and, in the words of Lamartine, almost treated the Diet as a "faction."

The matter was, no doubt, for a time one full of anxieties. Mr. Morier had reported from Berne in October, 1846: "Altogether it may be safely affirmed, that from this time forth the Federal Bund is virtually dissolved, and Switzerland, as a political body, in a state of decomposition;" and Chevalier Bunsen, Prussian Minister in London, becoming at length alarmed, wrote to Lord Palmerston: "Don't let the affair slip out of your hands; it is very serious."

The following letter to Lord Minto, who had gone on a mission to Italy, gives the views of the British Government:—

" F. O., 11th November, 1847.

" MY DEAR MINTO,

" Our last accounts from Switzerland are of the 6th, and no conflict had as then begun, but an attack on Freyburg was expected, and it was supposed it would be successful. If the Diet get possession of that canton and dispose of the Jesuits there, it will go some way towards settling the pending questions, and if the Diet can also get a friendly government established at Lucerne, and by that means drive the Jesuits out of that canton, I should

think that they need not very much care about their remaining in some of the smaller cantons. But the best would be if the Pope would take some step to induce them to evacuate Switzerland altogether.

“ Broglie\* says that there will be no difficulty in getting the Pope to take some steps about the Jesuits, but then he says that they are not the real object, but only a pretence, and that when they are got rid of some other demand will be made which will be found unreasonable. I say, in reply, yield to-day that which is reasonably asked and resist to-morrow that which you will be borne out in resisting, but do not let us put ourselves in the wrong to-day merely for fear that we may find ourselves in the right to-morrow. I send you copies of the communication which we have received from the French Government on Swiss affairs; I am going immediately to write an answer. It will be in substance that we are willing to join the other Powers in an endeavour to put an end to the civil war by an offer of mediation, but not willing to meddle with the revision of the Federal compact. But that before the five Powers make a joint offer of mediation, it seems desirable that they should be agreed as to the conditions of settlement which they would think fair between the parties. That our notion is this: We think that the Jesuit question is a political as well as, and much more than, a religious question, and that it is at the bottom of the whole of the present quarrel. We

\* French ambassador in London.



therefore propose that the Sonderbund cantons should declare themselves ready to abide by any decision which the Pope may make on that question, and that the five Powers should pledge themselves to the Diet to use all their influence at Rome to obtain from the Pope the recall of the Jesuits from the whole of Switzerland, they receiving, of course, compensation for lands or houses which they might be thus obliged to leave. This grievance removed, we should propose that the Diet should renounce all hostile intentions against the seven cantons, and should renew their often-made declaration that they acknowledge and mean to respect the sovereignty of the separate cantons of which the Confederation is composed. This done, the Sonderbund having no further pretence for their union, that union should be dissolved, and then the whole matter is settled. The Swiss would then go to work, in the manner prescribed by the Federal compact, to make any alterations or improvements in that compact which they might wish or want. I do not expect that the five Powers will agree to this scheme; for Austria, France, and perhaps Russia take part openly with the Sonderbund, and Guizot's despatch only repeats the proposition made by the Sonderbund and rejected by the Diet, and any proposal to that effect made by the five Powers would of course share the same fate. Guizot's object, of course, is to try to put the Diet apparently in the wrong, so as to afford him and Austria some kind of pretext for violent measures

afterwards. The draft of note is a paraphrase of the manifesto of the three Powers last year about the extinction of Cracow. I could not possibly put my name to such a paper, and I wonder how Guizot would defend himself to the deputies for having put his name to it.

“ Yours sincerely,  
“ PALMERSTON.”

And on the 17th of November he writes to the same :—

“ Guizot will have to choose between us and the three Powers ; for I conclude that his draft of note was suggested by Austria. Russia will follow Austria ; and the Prussian Government have at once accepted his plan. Broglie, however, says his own personal and private opinion is with us ; and it seems to me that public opinion in France would not go along with Guizot in the course he has proposed to us. We shall lie on our oars till we get an answer from Paris to the despatch which went thither last night. In the meantime, if the Pope would take any steps about the Jesuits, he would increase the chances of peace ; but they have gone too far in Switzerland to admit of a settlement on the principle of the mere recall of the Jesuits from Lucerne. The Diet will have, probably before you receive this, made themselves masters of Freyburg and Lucerne, and of course the doom of the Jesuits is sealed in those two cantons, where a Radical government will

be established, whose first act will be to expel the holy brotherhood."

France having accepted the modifications proposed by Lord Palmerston in the plan of mediation, he writes to Lord Ponsonby at Vienna on the 20th :—

" F. O., 20th November, 1847.

" MY DEAR PONSONBY,

" You will see that the French Government are willing to agree to our proposal as to the offer of mediation between the contending parties in Switzerland. The explanations which they wish us to accept, and to which we have no objection, are, that the Jesuits should be withdrawn, by the joint concurrence of the seven cantons and of the Pope. All we require is, that the foundation of the arrangements should be that the Jesuits should be removed from the whole of the territory of the Confederation, because we are now quite convinced that things have now gone so far, and popular feeling has been so strongly roused against them, that unless they leave Switzerland entirely there is no chance of peace in that country. What we propose, therefore, is, that the Sonderbund should agree to let them go, and that the Pope should recall them, or else that the Sonderbund should, of its own cantonal authority, desire them to go. We think the thing necessary, and care not how it is accomplished. The next explanation of the French is, that they understand the separate sovereignty of the confederated cantons to carry with

it the result, that no change can be made in the Federal compact without the consent of all the cantons, and they hold that this principle ought to be admitted by the Diet. We think this reasonable, and are willing to agree to it as the foundation of the settlement which is to be proposed. The French, thirdly, say that, in agreeing to our proposal that the refusal of the joint offer of mediation, if it should be unfortunately refused, is not to be used as a pretext for armed interference, they must make this reserve, that all parties are to remain after such refusal possessed of all the rights in regard to measures with respect to Switzerland which they at present possess. To this we can, of course, make no objection.

“The French agree to the conference being in London, and we hope that P. Metternich will not object to this. In fact, the conference, as it will not enter into a revision of the Federal compact, will not have much to do; and it will be an advantage to have in it Broglie, who understands Switzerland, and whose opinion will carry weight with the Swiss.

“I do not think that we should willingly consent to join a conference to be held anywhere but here.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

Meanwhile, however, the capture of Freyburg by the forces of the Diet under General Dufour brought the war to an abrupt termination, and obviated the necessity of the proposed mediation. Lord Palmer-

ston's object had been gained, and the delay had been of incalculable service to the cause of Swiss independence.

Sir Stratford Canning, who was on his way to his post at Constantinople, had been instructed by Lord Palmerston to take Berne on his way, where his character and abilities might be of service in enforcing the counsels of the English Foreign Office. On the 18th of December Lord Palmerston writes to him :—

“F. O., 18th December, 1847.

“MY DEAR CANNING,

“Your report is very satisfactory, and shows that we did wisely in sending you on to Berne, notwithstanding the termination of the civil war; and it is clear that you have been able to do much good, and to prevent much mischief. At Berlin, Petersburg, and Vienna they still hanker after a conference; but, in truth, there is nothing left for us to confer about; and a conference is quite out of the question, as far, at least, as the British Government is concerned. I am glad you have been able to mitigate the hostile intentions of the Diet towards Neuchâtel, and I hope the King of Prussia will have sense enough to be content with getting quit of military occupation at the cost of a money payment. I hope you may be able to persuade the Diet to give up their vindictive measures against their opponents at Freyburg and Lucerne. It really would be very disgraceful of them if they made such a bad use

of their victory ; and they might remember that the wheel of fortune has many turns, and that it might happen that, in some future change of things, the measure which they now mete out to others might be measured back again to themselves. At all events, such confiscations and punishments leave enduring resentments and perpetuate party animosities, without any counterbalancing advantage, except to the individuals who thus transfer to themselves the property which rightfully belongs to others. Besides, there is not in this case a shadow of a principle to justify their proscriptions. If a set of Russian, or Polish, or Galician nobles revolt against their sovereign, they are clearly on the wrong side of the law ; and if they fail, they must abide by the consequences. If a Polignac violates the constitution of his country, and fails in his attempt, he may partly be made to pay in person and in fortune the penalty of his illegal acts. But in the case of Freyburg and Lucerne there was no violation of the laws of the canton. There was a decision taken by the sovereign authority of the canton which the Federal Government thought at variance with the Federal obligations and engagements of those cantons ; but this cannot, by any fair construction of words, be called high treason. Treason means the violation of some duty towards the sovereign power of the state of which the accused is citizen or subject ; but such a crime cannot be committed by the government of a sovereign state towards the confederates of that state. Freyburg and

Lucerne were not subjects of the Confederation, and could not be guilty of high treason towards it.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

There being still some danger of an Austrian intervention, Lord Palmerston sent the following to Lord Ponsonby :—

“ F. O., 21st December, 1847.

“ MY DEAR PONSONBY,

“ It seems to me, from Canning’s accounts of his conversations with Ochsenbein,\* that the Swiss will pursue a more moderate line of conduct than at first appeared likely ; and it seems quite certain that they will afford the four Powers no valid reason for interference. At the same time, I wish you to lose no opportunity of endeavouring to dissuade Metternich from any attempt of the kind. He could not interfere without France doing so too ; and, whatever may be the professions or even the sincere intentions of Louis Philippe and Guizot, he may depend upon it, as sure as he is alive, that any interference of France in the internal affairs of Switzerland would turn to the account of France, and would be adverse to the interests of Austria.

“ In fact, if French troops were to enter Switzerland, they would sympathise with the Liberals, and not with the party which Metternich would wish to favour. If there is one maxim of policy which Metternich ought to hold by more than another, it is to keep the

\* The President of the Diet.

French out of Switzerland and out of Italy ; but if Austrian troops enter one or the other, French troops will follow, and Austria will rue the day when she paved the way for such a military movement by France.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

The “ Spanish Marriages ” have been sufficiently discussed in recent histories to warrant their omission without further notice. During the succeeding events General Narvaez had, as will be remembered, caused Sir Henry Bulwer to quit Madrid, and the English Government had been compelled by this open affront to send the Spanish ambassador his passports. I say, compelled, because the recall of ambassadors was a form of protest which Lord Palmerston, as a rule, disliked. In a letter to Lord Howden, he says : \* “ The rupture of diplomatic relations seems to me one of the worst ways of showing displeasure, unless it is meant to be an immediate forerunner of war. The non-intercourse situation as between two states which have political and commercial interests in common is exceedingly inconvenient to both parties, and probably as much to the one as the other.”

It was not till the middle of the year 1850 that the difficulty was overcome, and diplomatic relations renewed with Spain by the appointment of Lord Howden as our minister at Madrid.

\* Sept. 1, 1850.



The civil war which broke out in Portugal between the Queen and the revolutionary supreme Junta was caused by the arbitrary acts of the Royal Government. Lord Palmerston's endeavours, from October, 1846, to the following March, were directed to persuade the Portuguese Government to come to terms with the Junta, and to prevent Spain from interfering by force of arms. In the spring of 1847, he found that the Portuguese Government would not come to terms with the Junta, and that the Spanish Government would interfere, in spite of England, if the throne of Donna Maria should be in imminent danger. None could deny that her throne was in such danger, and that the whole country was going to ruin by reason of the war. The British Cabinet therefore, at last, determined to intervene, and, in conjunction with the naval forces of France and Spain, brought the conflict to an end on the basis of an amnesty and the constitution. By this means, while serving the interests of British commerce, Lord Palmerston was enabled to secure to the Portuguese nation those concessions which would not have been made if Spain had interfered singly at the request of the Absolutist party, and saved the Portuguese Government from that political dependence on Spain which would have been the result of obligations due to her alone.

In 1834 Prince Talleyrand had incidentally remarked to Lord Palmerston that Spain had always been to France in the same relation which Portugal had stood to England. Monsieur Guizot is known to

have repeated the same sentiment in 1847, and, further, to have indicated that such close dependence was one of the principles of French foreign policy. It is not, therefore, a matter of wonder that the prospect of the succession of the Infanta with the Duc de Montpensier to the throne of Spain alarmed English statesmen, the only alternative being Montemolin, son of Don Carlos, symbol of absolute monarchy, and condemned beforehand by the Quadruple Treaty to be expelled the country by foreign forces. Portugal, meanwhile, torn by violent factions, offered a sorry prospect to those who desired her independent stability. Thus it happened that the idea of a union of Spain and Portugal under a Portuguese prince, after the death of the Spanish Queen, found some favour. The view taken, was that a great free state extending from the Pyrenees to Lisbon would in all future times be a counterpoise to France, and thus save Belgium and the Rhenish provinces from the invading propensities of the French democracy. It was also asserted that the Progressists in Spain were ready to hold up their hands for the Prince of Portugal as a successor to Queen Isabella. Lord Palmerston, however, did not at all fall in with this plan, as is shown in the following letter :—

“ Broadlands, 9th August, 1847.

“ MY DEAR JOHN RUSSELL,

“ With regard to the possible union of Spain with Portugal, or, rather, the incorporation of

Portugal with Spain, it may be said that if Spain is not now by itself a great free state forming a counterpoise to France, and securing by that means Belgium and the Rhenish provinces, it is not because Spain is not large enough in territory, population, and natural resources; nor would the acquisition of Portugal give her, in this respect, any means the want of which cripples her at present, neither can it be said that by such incorporation Spain would be freed from controlling dangers in her rear which prevent her from facing France boldly to her front; because as long as Portugal is closely connected with England, Portugal would be a help and not a clog to Spain in the pursuit of such a policy. There seems no reason, therefore, to think that Spain, after having swallowed up Portugal, would be a bit more politically independent of France than she is or will be, without having so absorbed her neighbour, and, consequently, the probable result of such an annexation would be, that some fine day England would not only find Spain become a satellite of France, but would lose all the counterbalancing resources which, in such a case, Portugal, as a separate state, would afford us. Those advantages are many, great, and obvious; commercial, political, military, and naval, and if we were thus to lose them, some of them would not be mere loss, but would become formidable weapons of attack against us in the hands of a hostile power. For instance, the naval position of the Tagus ought never to be in the hands of any power, whether French or Spanish,

which might become hostile to England, and it is only by maintaining Portugal in its separate existence, and in its intimate and protected state of alliance with England, that we can be sure of having the Tagus as a friendly instead of its being a hostile naval station. Only fancy for a moment Portugal forming part of Spain, and Spain led away by France into war with England, and what would be our naval condition with all the ports from Calais to Marseilles hostile to us, St. Malo, Cherbourg, Brest, Rochefort, Corunna, Vigo, the Tagus, Cadiz, Carthagena, Port Mahon, Toulon, and with nothing between us and Malta but Gibraltar, the capture of which would be the bait which France would hold out to Spain to induce her to go to war with us. If, on the contrary, the Tagus were at our command, we should occupy an intermediate position greatly impeding the naval movements of France and Spain. Perhaps, if the scheme of an Iberian Republic could be realised, such a state might be more likely to remain independent of France than a Spanish Monarchy promises to be, but such a republic would soon fall back to be a monarchy, and could not be created without sweeping away two existing dynasties allied to us by treaty engagements, and for which France would certainly take the field.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

The Irish famine occupied so entirely the attention of the country and of Parliament that little else was

debated in the House of Commons during the session of 1847. The subject of education, however, was taken up by the Government, but they had to encounter the jealousy which various Dissenting bodies felt at any further sum being placed under the control of the Established Church.

When, therefore, Lord John Russell proposed an additional grant of £100,000, Mr. Duncombe moved an amendment, not, as he stated, from want of confidence in Her Majesty's Government, but from distrust in the Committee of Privy Council, who were to administer the grant. In spite of strong opposition the vote was carried, and Lord Palmerston comments on this result and on the general state of parties as follows :\*—

“ You will have been as much surprised and pleased as we have been at the division last night about the Education question. It does great honour to the House that, with a general election coming on, and with a combination of Dissenters against our measure, there should have been such an overwhelming majority in favour of it; and it is creditable to the Government that the measure which it has proposed should have been intrinsically so good, that the great body of the House should have braved the displeasure of their constituents from approval of the scheme. I do not suppose that the result of last night will be equally gratifying to Louis Philippe and Guizot.

\* To Lord Normanby, 23 April, 1847.

It must convince them, however, that, for the present, we are the only Government that can be found to stand; and, unless I am much deceived, the general election will not materially alter that state of things.

“Peel seems to have made up his mind that for a year or two he cannot hope to form a party, and that he must give people a certain time to forget the events of last year;\* in the meanwhile, it is evident that he does not wish that any other Government should be formed out of the people on his side of the House, because of that Government he would not be a member. For these reasons, and also because he sincerely thinks it best that we should, for the present, remain in, he gives us very cordial support, as far as he can, without losing his independent position. Graham†—who sits up under his old pillar, and never comes down to Peel’s bench, even for personal communication—seems to keep himself aloof from everybody, and to hold himself free to act according to circumstances; but, as yet, he is not considered as the head of any party. George Bentinck has entirely broken down as a candidate for ministerial position; and thus we are left masters of the field, not only on account of our own merits, which, though we say it ourselves, are great, but by virtue of the absence of any efficient competitors.”

The battles of Moodkee, Sobraon, and Goojerat had given us possession of the Punjaub. The question

\* Repeal of the Corn Laws.

† Sir James Graham had been Home Secretary under Sir Robert Peel.

arose whether we were to annex it. Lord Palmerston's views as to this, and the opinions of Lord Hardinge and the Duke of Wellington, are still interesting, as bearing on the relations of England and Russia in the East.

“Carlton Gardens, 9th June, 1847.

“MY DEAR JOHN RUSSELL,

“I return you Hardinge's letter and the Duke of Wellington's. These two generals are great military authorities; but the Duke is a far greater one than Hardinge, of whose judgment I have no opinion, though his bravery in the field is undoubted. Both seem to agree in thinking that the Russians cannot conquer India, and in this opinion they are clearly right. I do not think, however, that Hardinge has demonstrated that the Russians might not give us much trouble and put us to much expense in India.

“I would observe that Hardinge seems to think Scinde of no value in a military point of view, whereas the Duke considers the possession of it as a great security; and, as regards the Punjaub, Hardinge is evidently against our possessing it, while, on the other hand, he says that the only gate through which an invader could attack India is through the Kyber Pass, which cannot be occupied and defended by us unless we do possess the Punjaub; and he shows the necessity for this, because he says that it is only to the eastward of the Chenab that a large army could find subsistence. It is only there, consequently, that we could station a large army; and therefore, as the

Kyber Pass, being narrow, could be penetrated by only one column at a time, our best means of stopping an invading enemy would be either to occupy the pass with a small force beforehand, or to station a small force at the outlet of the pass, to attack in succession the heads of the columns of march as they might open out into the plain. But, to do this, we must have the country up to the pass; for we could not in such a case risk a small force three hundred miles from our main body through a country which, not being ours, might at the moment become hostile. If the Kyber Pass is the only gate to India, and if it is there we are to defend India, we ought to have, and must have, military occupation of the country up to that gate; otherwise the pass is of no more defensive value to us than any other defile which the invaders would have to pass between Astrabad and Cabul. The advance of a Russian army is, however, far from being as impossible as Hardinge seems to think it. Persia must, I fear, now be looked upon as an advanced post for Russia, whenever she chooses to make use of it. She will command it either by overpowering force or by bribing the state by prospects of acquisitions in Afghanistan. There would be no insurmountable difficulty to prevent Russia from assembling a considerable force at Astrabad. The roads through Persia are good, and the Caspian gives additional facilities. From Astrabad through Afghanistan are very practicable military roads; and the distance from Astrabad to Attock is not much, if



at all, more than eight hundred miles, considerably less than the distance from Attock to Calcutta.

“ A Russian force in occupation of Afghanistan might not be able to march to Calcutta, but it might convert Afghanistan into the advanced post of Russia, instead of that advanced post being in Persia ; and, whatever Hardinge may say of the security of the rest of our frontier, you would find in such case a very restless spirit displayed by the Burmese, by the Nepaulese, and by all the unincorporated states scattered about the surface of our Indian possessions. These things would lead to great expense, would require great efforts, and might create considerable damage. The best method of preventing these embarrassments seems to be to take up such a military position on the frontier, not in *posse*, as Hardinge would do, but in *esse*, as would make it plain to everybody that we could not be taken by surprise ; that the decisive position could neither be snatched from us by a rapid movement, nor be wrested from us by a forcible assault.

“ Of course there are further considerations to which Hardinge does not advert, namely, that while Russia was thus marching on India, we should not be idle in Europe ; but still Russia is strong in her European defences, whether in the Baltic or in the Black Sea, and it is well that we should be able to defend India in Asia, as well as in Europe.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

*Extract from Letter of Lord Hardinge, dated Simla, April 20th, 1847.*

“As regards the intentions of Russia, I am confident no hostile attempt will be made. They are confined to the extension of her trade with China and parts of Central Asia. A Russian force can only enter India through Affghanistan and by the Kyber Pass.

“A Persian and Affghan force intermixed with Russians, on the same principle as in our Indian Army, would be required, on the modern system of war, to be supported by a large and well-equipped field-train of artillery, with all its numerous stores. This modern necessity entails great difficulty in moving an army through a sterile and mountainous country. The more you attempt to make your army efficient in artillery in such countries, the greater becomes your difficulty of rapidly moving forward.

“If Russia could afford the means of getting through the Kyber Pass with a well-equipped army, it must be an operation of time, and could not be disguised. The concentration of our military means would be comparatively easy. We have now 50,000 men and 100 field pieces, and 100 siege guns, with 500 rounds a gun, on this frontier. We should have the choice of meeting this Russian army where we pleased. Peshawur is a very small and poor district; Attock still more; and the country between the Indus and the Jehun, or Hydaspes, is so poor and barren it could not support an army. Between the Jehun and the Chenab, or Acesines, the case is the same, and it is only on this side, between the Chenab and the Sutlej, that a large army could be subsisted, with rivers intersecting the approach at right angles, of which we have no idea in Europe, one, two, and even six and seven miles broad, from June till October, when the snow melts and the rain falls, running five or six knots an hour.

“Look at the map and you will find, from our new frontier

on the Byar at Noorpoor, passing to the eastward along the mountains which now bring us into contact with Chinese Tartary at Spitti, and the Nepaul hills, and thence by the Tennasserim provinces to the Straits at Singapoer, that there is no enemy which can give this Government any uneasiness by an external attack for a distance of nearly 6000 miles of land frontier.

“Passing from Noorpoor to the westward, down to Kurra-  
chee on the sea, the only entrance into India is by the Kyber  
Pass. No general in his senses would attack India through  
the Bolan Pass for the sake of occupying Scinde, having  
then an impassable desert before him, or a flank movement  
of 700 miles through Bhawulpoor before he could reach  
this frontier.

“Consequently, any attack on India is limited to a space  
of about 100 miles on the Sutlej, from Ferozepore to Ram-  
poor. For 1000 miles from Ferozepore down to Kurrachee  
no hostile attack could be made. Our coast, from Kurrachee  
down to the Straits, is between 5000 and 6000 miles. The  
land frontier from Kurrachee to the Straits, about 7000  
miles. Therefore, out of 13,000 miles of sea and land frontier  
by which the Empire is encircled, the only practicable attack  
is confined to 100 miles between Ferozepore and the foot of  
the hills at Rampoor, or, if you please, the Kyber Pass, 300  
miles in advance of the Sutlej.

“If the Indus had turned out to be a navigable river, and  
that our military communications for troops and stores could  
have been secured from Kurrachee by the Indus, the Punjaub  
would have been of some military value; but that route has  
failed us, and there is no real military communication between  
this frontier and Scinde. However, I won't enter into the  
question of the annexation of the Punjaub. I have shown  
you that no external attack of any importance can be made  
except for 100 miles on the Sutlej; and, lastly, I give you  
my opinion that this entrance by the Kyber Pass for a  
Russian army with all the equipments and munitions of war

is very nearly as impracticable as any other of the entrances into India.

“The Affghan war has solved the problem of the possibility of Russian invasion. Affghanistan has no resources: it is by nature too poor to feed a large invading army; and even if such an army could reach the Indus, our British means are at all times ample to overwhelm it.

“The schemes of Russia are restricted, I should say, to the extention of her trading speculations. She now supplies Chinese Tartary, Thibet, Cashmere, and Turkestan with broadcloths, velvets, leather, hardware, &c., and receives shawls and shawl wool, tin, furs, &c., in return. We should, in addition to what Russia supplies, export opium, sugar, indigo, and English cotton manufactures.

“Our first step is to settle our boundary with the Chinese authorities in the Spitti Valley. Through the passes our trade is direct with China; and by abolishing all transit duties, I am in hopes we shall improve our trade; but after all, this trade with the population of Central Asia must be very small. The Himmalayas are eternal barriers of very difficult passage, having a barren country and poverty-stricken population on both sides of the snowy range. Even if the Indus were navigable, there are no people in these wild regions; or the few that exist in these mountains have no money to buy, and no articles to barter in exchange for ours. In the Punjaub, at Lahore, Amritsir and Moultan, silks, shawls, carpets, &c., are made as cheap as we could supply them from England. Still, it is advisable to omit no efforts to compete with Russia on the frontier, and I have shown you that our attention was directed to that object last autumn.

“Here you have no cause for apprehension. Let us get rid of a nine-years’ annual deficit by a surplus; pay off the five per cents.; improve the country—and you may do what you like: but as to a Russian invasion of India, depend upon it, my dear Lord, that it is a political nightmare.”

*Extract of Letter from Duke of Wellington, dated Windsor Castle, June 3, 1847.*

“ Lord Hardinge is quite correct in his account and description of the frontier. You may rely upon it that you have nothing to apprehend from Russia in that quarter. The possession of Scinde is a great security.”

The corrupt system of government, which was ruining the monarchy in France, produced a scandal, to which reference is made in the following letters. General Cubieres was a Peer of France, and M. Teste was Minister of Public Works. In order to obtain a concession of a salt mine for a company in which he was interested, the General had given large bribes to the Minister. In July a state trial took place with reference to these transactions, and the culprits were condemned to fine and imprisonment. Meanwhile, however, M. Teste had attempted suicide by placing a pistol to his mouth, which missed fire. He then discharged a second, so close to his breast that the ball did not penetrate, but fell to the ground, leaving only a bruise. Lord Palmerston seems to have had his doubts about the intensity of M. Teste's desire to die.

“ F. O., 7th May, 1847.

“ MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“ These revelations about Cubieres and Teste will, no doubt, lead to other disclosures of a similar kind, because such exposures follow each other as murders do in this country; and if the system by which majorities have hitherto been obtained is laid

bare, either the Ministry must fall by public disrespect for it, or it will be weakened by the cessation of the abuses upon which it lived. In either way, these things must be a blow to Guizot and the Philippine system.

“What dashing fellows our cousins Transatlantic are! Who would have thought of Ulloa\* surrendering without being attacked? I remember a Greek line which says that ‘silver spears will conquer all things.’ No doubt the fort was a little bombarded with dollars while they were shelling the town. The Yankees will end by becoming masters of the greater part of Mexico. We cannot prevent it without going to war with the United States; and to go to war with them for such a set of people as the Mexicans would not go down with the House of Commons in the best of times, and least of all just now. If the Union becomes very large, it will either split, or else the multitude of conflicting interests which will belong to its various component parts will be an obstacle to any unnecessary war with a great maritime power and wealthy customer like England. Moreover, a great extent of fine land to the south will render the Americans less anxious to strip us of Canada. I hear that they are already become careless about Oregon, satisfied with having the ownership.

“Yours sincerely,  
“PALMERSTON.”

\* The Fortress of St. John d’Ulloa, which commanded the town of Vera Cruz.

“ C. G., 16th July, 1847.

“ MY DEAR NORMANBY,


“ Do you think Teste’s attempted suicide was a reality or anything got up for effect? It looks like the latter. In former times, a Sir Wm. Meadows, in our service, was brought into trouble about some affairs of the same kind which had happened in India, and he discharged a pistol at his own head; the ball grazed his forehead, and friends who heard the report rushed in and found him bathing his forehead in cold water; and he said, in reply to inquiries, that he had had an affair of honour with himself, and having stood the shot, he had declared himself satisfied. But, though Teste has escaped the shot, the Ministry has had one between wind and water, which, sooner or later, must tell; and even if it tells in no other way than by making bribery more difficult because more dangerous, it will in that way weaken a Government which relies so much upon such methods for its support. I get on very agreeably with Broglie, but as yet we have only talked about Switzerland and Greece, in regard to both of which we ‘agree to differ.’ We shall probably wind up by Thursday or Friday of next week, then dissolve, and then comes the tug of war. It is said we are to have in the new Parliament an absolute majority of our own of twenty to thirty out of the whole House. Be this as it may, we shall cer-

tainly win many seats. Accounts from Ireland keep good.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

Parliament was dissolved on the 23rd of July. There was little enthusiasm on either side during the general election which followed. The Free Trade question appeared settled; and though a more vigorous policy was anticipated from a Russell than from a Melbourne administration, no great organic changes were expected from it. On the other hand, the remnants of the Conservative party had nothing to hold out beyond vague professions of attachment to our ancient institutions. In this absence of party feeling the men in possession gained a few votes, although among their nominal supporters were many independent members in no way pledged to go with the Government if they disapproved of its measures.





## CHAPTER II.

## Lord Minto's Mission to Italy—Ireland—Sicily.

LORD MINTO, as has been stated above, went about this time to Italy, on a mission which deserves some notice. The whole land was in a ferment and was clamouring for liberal institutions. Sardinia led the way, despite the unconcealed disapproval of her Imperial neighbour. Tuscany followed, though with laggard steps, and the Papal Court suffered for its prostration under the general fever by the occupation of Ferrara by Austrian forces. Charles Albert at once notified to the Pope his readiness to assist him with a Piedmontese army if the Imperial troops made any further advance. Meanwhile Pius IX., being engaged in administrative reforms, had expressed to the English Government a wish to have the assistance of some person of rank and experience who might aid him by advice, and at the same time afford him the moral support of England. Lord Minto therefore went off to Rome in November, 1847, with directions to visit Turin and Florence on his way. His aim was so to represent the English Government as to strengthen

the authority of the constitutional governments in Italy, but he did not profess to believe that English mediation or interposition in territorial questions was likely to turn to much account. He only thought it probable that, by taking a firm and decided line, England might enable the wise friends of order and freedom to cope in their domestic affairs with the sedition of the young Italy and Mazzini firebrands.

Lord Palmerston's instructions to Lord Minto were, first of all, to convey to the King of Sardinia the sympathies of the British Government, and the expression of its surprise and regret that Austria should have intimated the possibility of an entry by her troops "upon Sardinian territory, if the King, in the exercise of his indisputable rights of sovereignty, should make certain organic arrangements within his own dominions which would be displeasing to the Government of Austria." Lord Minto was to add that Her Majesty's Government had learnt with much pleasure the assurances of friendly and defensive support which his Sardinian "Majesty had recently caused to be conveyed to the Pope, and which did great honour to His Majesty as a generous Prince and as an Italian Sovereign."

To the Grand Duke of Tuscany Lord Minto was instructed to address himself in a tone of encouragement, urging him to persevere in that independent course of enlightened progress which he at that moment seemed inclined to pursue.

"You will be at Rome," proceeded Lord Palmer-

ston, "not as a minister accredited to the Pope, but as an authentic organ of the British Government, enabled to explain its views and to declare its sentiments upon events which are now passing in Italy, and which, both from their local importance and from their bearing on the general interests of Europe, Her Majesty's Government are watching with great attention and anxiety.

"Her Majesty's Government are deeply impressed with the conviction that it is wise for sovereigns and their governments to pursue, in the administration of their affairs, a system of progressive improvement; to apply remedies to such evils as, upon examination, they may find to exist, and to remodel, from time to time, the ancient institutions of their country, so as to render them more suitable to the gradual growth of intelligence and to the increasing diffusion of political knowledge; and Her Majesty's Government consider it to be an undeniable truth, that if an independent sovereign, in the exercise of his deliberate judgment, shall think fit to make within his dominions such improvements in the laws and institutions of his country as he may think conducive to the welfare of his people, no other Government can have any right to attempt to restrain or to interfere with such an employment of one of the inherent attributes of independent sovereignty." Lord Palmerston concluded by authorising Lord Minto to say "that Her Majesty's Government would not see with indifference any aggression committed upon the Roman terri-

tories, with a view to preventing the Papal Government from carrying into effect those internal improvements which it might think proper to adopt."

Lord Minto was received with great ovations. At Avezzo, Genoa, and other places he was called upon to address the people from the balcony amid flags and music. With wise discretion, he usually confined his speech to a cry of "Viva l'Indipendenza Italiana!" which satisfied the crowds and caused their dispersion, to the sound of "Viva l'Italia!"

On reaching Rome he placed himself in communication with the Papal Government, so as to carry out his instructions. Pio Nono was at this time apparently about to enter on a career of progressive and successful reform, but Lord Minto was evidently not sanguine as to His Holiness's ability "to ride the whirlwind and direct the storm." Writing home during the early troubles of 1848, he says:—

"The Pope is a most amiable, agreeable, and honest man, and sincerely pious to boot, which is much for a Pope; but he is not made to drive the State coach. To-day he is in very good spirits, although he foresees the dangers of the country, because he has recovered a saint's skull which had been sacrilegiously stolen."

The fact is that Pio Nono was at that time, and has always since been, far more anxious for his power as Head of the Catholic Church than for his position as a temporal sovereign; but the British Government sought to turn to account whatever anxiety he might feel in his temporal capacity

by obtaining, in return for their good offices, the exercise of his influence in Ireland to second their efforts in the cause of national education and to restrain the lawlessness of the priests.

In the following letters Lord Palmerston refers to the Papal rescript against the newly-established Queen's Colleges, and to the fact that agrarian outrages were, if not sanctioned, at any rate not condemned by the spiritual guides of the people. England had communicated to Austria, as her old ally, her hope that the Pope would not be interrupted by foreign force. She was also considering the means of opening formal communications with Rome, and naturally expected meanwhile a friendly attitude on the part of the Head of that Church which had many adherents across the Irish Channel.

“F. O., October 29, 1847.

“MY DEAR MINTO,

“Nothing could be better nor, I trust, more useful than your negotiations at Turin, upon which I have written to you official approvals. That Italian Commercial League will be an excellent thing if it is placed upon a proper footing, commercial and political.

“As to the Austrians, they have been headed, and will not break cover towards Italy. Many things have contributed to this, but we have had our share in the merit, and were the first to set up the view holloa which scared them. The Pope ought to feel

grateful to us for this, and if he does so, he ought to give us some tokens of his thankfulness. I send you a copy of memorandum sent some little time ago by Clarendon for your use. It is, in the main, good. There is a little inconsistency in the parts, for in one part he assumes that the priests have no influence in Ireland, and in another part he assumes that they have a great deal. But the fact is so : they have influence and they have not ; they have it in some things and not in others. But we wish to make to the Pope the plain, and simple, and reasonable request that he would exert his authority over the Irish priesthood, to induce them to abstain from meddling in politics, but, on the contrary, to confine themselves to their spiritual duties ; and in these duties to exhort their flocks to morality, good conduct, obedience to the law, and abstinence from acts of violence and crime, and, moreover to inculcate on their flocks the propriety of not only obeying the law themselves, but of aiding honestly and fearlessly in the execution of the law, and in the attainment of the ends of justice by faithfully performing their functions, as magistrates, jurymen, and witnesses. I disagree entirely with Clarendon as to the expediency of advising or inviting the Pope to send any confidential agent to Ireland. I should fear that such person, unless very well chosen indeed, would be got hold of by McHale rather than by Clarendon, and then if his reports were to be unfavourable to us, we should have increased our difficulties instead of diminishing them.

I shall be able to send you by the next messenger a memorandum about the letter which has recently been received by McHale from Rome, upon the subject of Irish colleges.\* This is an unkind and a most

\* "College of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, Rome, October 9, 1847.

"Monitos voluit Sacra Congregatio archiepiscopos et episcopos Hiberniæ ne ullam in ejusdem executione partem habeant; quemadmodum vero exoptasset ut antequam ex eis nonnulli apud gubernium agerent ad legis præfata collegia respicientis mitigationem aliaque in eorumdem favorem obtinenda Sedis Apostolicæ sententiam postulassent, ita pro summo obsequio quod erga eandem Hiberniæ Antistites jugiter præ se tulerant, haud dubitat quin eidem ea quæ in contrarium præstiterunt sint retracturi.

\* \* \* \*

"Imprimis vero opportunum Sacra Congregatio fore duceret si, collatis viribus, Catholicam Academiam ad illius instar quæ per Belgii Antistites in civitate Lovaniensi fundata est, in Hibernia quoque origendam episcopis curarent.

\* \* \* \*

"Hæc vero eo majore studio vos præstituros arbitramur, cum eadem in omnibus Sanctissimi Domini Nostri Pii IX. sententia extiterit qui Sacræ Congregationis

"The Sacred Congregation has felt it its duty to caution the archbishops and bishops of Ireland against taking any part in establishing them. But as it would have wished, before some of the prelates had entered into any negotiations with the Government for amending the law regarding the aforesaid colleges and procuring other measures in their favour, that they had taken the opinion of the Holy See, so it doubts not but that, from the profound obedience which the prelates of Ireland invariably exhibited towards it, they will retract those things which they have done to the contrary.

\* \* \* \*

"Above all things, the Sacred Congregation would deem it advantageous that the bishops, uniting their exertions, should procure the erection in Ireland of such a Catholic academy as the prelates of Belgium have founded in the city of Louvain.

\* \* \* \*

"With these things you will, we are sure, comply with the greater alacrity since they are in all points in conformity with the judgment of our most Holy Lord

mischievous measure, and was little to be expected at the hands of the Pope at the very moment that we were stepping out of our way to be of use to him. It is an ungrateful return, and can only be explained on the supposition that it was extorted by intrigue and false representations made at Rome by McHale, and that the Pope acted ignorantly and without knowing the mischief he was doing. But you should lose no time in making him aware of his mistake, and you should say that if he expects the English Government to be of any use to him, and to take any interest in his affairs, he must not strike blows at our interior. You may also say that an Act of Parliament will be necessary to enable us to establish diplomatic relations with him. Things of this kind may have so bad an effect upon public opinion in England as to make it impossible for us to obtain the consent of Parliament to any such measure.

“Commercial distress is lessening, but still severe, and will so continue for many months to come. The grain which was imported into the United Kingdom in the first nine months of this year cost in prime

consilium probandum censuit, eique supremum auctoritatis suæ robor adjecit.

“J. PHIL. CARDINALIS PHRANSONIUS, P.D.P.F.

“ALEXANDER BARNABO, Pro-Secretarius.”

Pius IX., who has sanctioned with his approbation the decision of the Sacred Congregation, and gave to it the supreme weight of his authority.

“J. PHIL. CARDINAL FRANSONI, P.D.P.F.

“ALEXANDER BARNABO, Pro-Secretary.”



cost and freight rather more than twenty-six millions sterling. We had to advance upwards of six millions for public works in Ireland, and the nation has spent this year forty-five millions in railways at home, and upwards of ten millions in railways abroad. The wonder is not that we are distressed, but that we are not all of us bankrupt.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

The Memorandum on the “ Irish Colleges ” referred to in the foregoing letter was as follows :—

“ Whether intentionally or ignorantly I know not, but the Pope, by his rescript against the Irish colleges, committed a hostile, ill-judged, and unnecessary act. It was hostile, because he publicly denounced and directed the Roman Catholic hierarchy to oppose a measure which had received the sanction of the Sovereign and Parliament of England. It was ill-judged, because he showed no regard for the opinion of the Roman Catholic prelates and a great proportion of the Roman Catholic laity of Ireland, who consider the colleges an important boon, and well calculated to supply a want that has been long and severely felt, and who are determined not to be deprived of institutions from which they expect much good. The authority of the Pope so exercised at a moment when the British Government was about to render him a great political service, and the sending the rescript so that it should arrive when the whole of the hierarchy were assembled in Dublin, and when it consequently would do most harm, was also ill-judged. It has produced feelings of resentment and irritation among the Protestants of Great Britain, and, I may add, among many of the Catholics of Ireland, that will not easily be allayed,

and that are much regretted by all those who desire to soothe animosity between the two creeds, and to promote the establishment of friendly relations with Rome.

“The Lord Lieutenant was in communication with the Primate, Dr. Crolly, with Archbishops Murray and Nicholson. Every suggestion of theirs had been scrupulously attended to for securing the religious instruction and moral conduct of the Roman Catholic students, and in conformity with their wishes the statutes were under revision as soon after the long vacation as the Presidential Board could assemble. When these facts are brought to the knowledge of the Pope, it is hoped that his Holiness will see that he has been led into error, and that greater circumspection will be desirable in listening to malicious and unfounded reports transmitted from Ireland, and which have been hitherto too readily believed at Rome. There are among the Roman Catholic prelates of Ireland men of great intelligence and activity, who lend themselves to political agitation, and who seek to obtain the sanction of the Pope’s authority towards the maintenance of hostile feelings against the British Government, and between the Protestants and Catholics of the United Kingdom. These men untruly assume to speak in the name of the entire hierarchy, and their statements have in consequence had an importance given to them at Rome to which they are not entitled. It is probable that by this time the Pope has received certain resolutions against the colleges, and against the national system of education in the name of the archbishop and bishops of Ireland in Synod assembled; but these resolutions were not passed in Synod at all. Many of the prelates had left Dublin at the time they were framed, and even Archbishop Murray, who was in Dublin, never heard of or saw them till he read them in the newspapers, when he highly disapproved of them, and felt sure that many of his brethren would do the same. His example, among many that might be quoted, will show the unscrupulous character of certain prelates, and the

necessity of receiving with caution any facts or opinions put forward by them. The best course for the Pope now to pursue is to remain entirely passive until he receives further and more correct information. He may rest assured that in the establishment of these colleges the British Government have had no other object than to supply the best possible education to the middle classes in Ireland, and, as a consequence of that object, to promote religion and morality among the students of different denominations alike. The British Government has no ulterior or sinister design, as has been most falsely asserted. It uses no disguise. The Lord Lieutenant has freely communicated with the Primate, and Archbishop Murray has received and acted upon their suggestions, and will communicate to them the statutes as soon as they are revised, and before they are definitively determined upon. It may perhaps be desirable, in whatever form Lord Minto shall think best, to let the Pope understand that the Roman Catholics of Ireland have neither the means nor disposition to establish at their own expense such seminaries as are recommended in the rescript, and that they can only be provided for out of the public funds. That a large proportion of the Roman Catholic laity are so convinced of the desirableness of these colleges, that nothing will prevent them from sending their sons there when once they are satisfied that religious instruction is duly provided for, and that if the opposition of Dr. McHale and others should unfortunately prove successful under the supposed sanction and authority of the Pope's name against the national system of education, by which four hundred thousand children are rescued from ignorance and its consequences, the large funds annually devoted to this object by the Legislature will probably fall under the exclusive management of the Protestants, by whom a large proportion of these children will be educated. For all who are acquainted with Ireland must be aware that not even the influence of the priesthood can check the uncontrollable desire for education that exists

among the people. They will greatly prefer to receive it from Catholics, but, rather than forego its benefits, they will gladly accept it from Protestants.

“CLARENDON.

“*November 20th, 1847.*”

“F. O., December 3, 1847.

“MY DEAR MINTO,

“I send you a letter from Clarendon, the whole of which you may, I think, read to anybody with whom you are in communication on the part of the Pope. But you may safely go further than Clarendon has chosen to do, and you may confidently assure the Papal authorities that at present, in Ireland, misconduct is the rule, and good conduct the exception, in the Catholic priests. That they, in a multitude of cases, are the open, and fearless, and shameless instigators to disorder, to violence, and murder, and that every day and every week the better conducted, who are by constitution of human nature the most quiet and timid, are being scared by their fellow-priests, as well as by their flocks, from a perseverance in any efforts to give good counsel and to restrain violence and crime. Major Mahon, who was shot the other day, was denounced by his priest at the altar the Sunday before he was murdered. He might have been murdered all the same if the priest had not denounced him, but that denunciation of course made all the people in the neighbourhood think the deed a holy one instead of a diabolical one. The irritation and exasperation thence growing up in the public

mind against the Catholic priesthood is extreme, and scarcely anybody now talks of these Irish murders without uttering a fervent wish that a dozen priests might be hung forthwith, and the most effectual remedy which has been suggested, and which seems the most popular, is that whenever a man is murdered in Ireland the priest of the parish should be transported. A more generally popular proposal would be that he should be hung, and many who clamour for martial law fancy, I have no doubt, that by martial law this latter process could be adopted.

“In the meanwhile I begin to doubt whether it would be prudent at present to bring in our proposed Bill for Legalising Diplomatic Intercourse with the Court of Rome. The sectarian prejudices which, under any circumstances, would give much opposition to such a Bill, but which, in a better state of things, we should be able to conquer, would find such sympathy in public opinion at present, that our task would be more difficult; however, we do not give up our intention, but must postpone its execution till after the Christmas recess. I really believe there never has been in modern times, in any country professing to be civilised and Christian, nor anywhere out of the central regions of Africa, such a state of crime as now exists in Ireland. There is evidently a deliberate and extensive conspiracy among the priests and the peasantry to kill off or drive away all the proprietors of land, to prevent and deter any of their agents from collecting rent, and thus practically to

transfer the land of the country from the landowner to the tenant. I trust, however, that some of these murderers will be taken; some, indeed, have already been apprehended, and if evidence can be got against them, the hanging of a dozen of these miscreants all in a row may have some effect in deterring others from following their example, and if we could but get a priest in the lot it would be like a ptarmigan in a bag of grouse, or a pied or ring-necked pheasant in a battue.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

*Extract from Letter of Earl of Clarendon, dated V. R. Lodge,  
November 26, 1847.*

“McHale is a dangerous demagogue, whose proceedings as a citizen, and irrespective of their ecclesiastical indecorum, no Government in the world but ours would tolerate. Political agitation, popular elections, and inflammatory publications are his favourite pursuits. His object seems to be to set the people against their rulers; and if he could have his way their ignorance and their turbulence would be perpetual, and throughout his province those priests have the greatest share of his favour who most promote his sinister designs. The majority of the bishops dislike his proceedings and his character, but they succumb because he is audacious and overbearing, and they are afraid of making public the grave dissensions that exist among the Roman Catholic hierarchy. Such a man, however, and such a bitter opponent of the British Government and the true interests of Ireland, is not an adviser upon whom the Pope should rely.

“With respect to the priests, I must again repeat that, as a body, there is not in the world a more zealous, faithful, hard-working clergy, and most of the older priests are friendly

to order, to education, and to the general improvement of the people. There are, however, some unfortunate exceptions, but it is among the younger clergy, the curates and coadjutors, that the real mischief-makers are to be found, and if they could be held in check, great scandal to religion and social order would be prevented. Things, however, cannot much longer go on in their present state: the duty of a Government towards the peaceable and well-disposed portions of the community will render special legislation necessary for a state of things which has become intolerable, if the existing laws should become insufficient, and if the timely exercise of spiritual authority be much longer withheld.

“There are at this moment numerous cases in which, if evidence could be procured, a prosecution could be sustained against priests as accessories to atrocious crimes, by the inciting language they have held to people over whose minds they exercise an absolute control.

“I have endeavoured to procure such evidence, because it is the duty of Government to punish misconduct that tends to the disruption of every social tie, and in the administration of the law no distinction of persons can be admitted; but such evidence in an available form is not to be procured. From different parts of the country, and from persons upon whose veracity I can confide, I hear either that a landlord has been denounced by name from the altar, in a manner which is equivalent to his death-warrant, or that persons giving evidence against criminals are held up as public enemies and traitors, or that people are advised to assemble in mobs and enforce their demands upon individuals. It was only yesterday that I heard of a priest (in the diocese of Dr. McHale) addressing a man in the chapel, and telling him that he would not curse him, because the last man he had cursed died directly, but that before *the blossom fell from the potato* he would be a corpse. This man's offence was having given evidence in a court of justice against a party that had broken into his house and robbed him. I have sworn depositions

now lying on my table in proof of acts of this kind, but the deponents dare not come forward and openly give their evidence, for they say—and I know it to be true—that their lives would not be worth four-and-twenty hours' purchase. Indeed, to prevent any misunderstanding upon the subject, the priest usually defies any person to give information of what he has been saying, and warns them of the consequences.

“The result of all this is, not only that crime is encouraged, but that the priesthood must fall into contempt, and that the wholesome restraint and humanising influence of religion will decline; that the people will become more barbarous; and that the clergy, to maintain their position, must still pander to the passions of their flocks. In places—and there are many—where a priest friendly to order and anxious for the real welfare of his people has given good advice, and intimated that among those present in the chapel there were some who had been guilty of such and such crimes, the individuals alluded to will come forward and bid him hold his tongue, and threaten him with vengeance if he proceeds. I could multiply facts and details *ad infinitum*, for every day some fresh ones come to my knowledge, but the above are sufficient to exhibit the state of things in certain parts of Ireland, and all its evil tendencies; for wherever the priests so misconduct themselves, there the people are always found to be the most turbulent and wretched. The indignation, and I may add shame, of the respectable Roman Catholic classes are extreme: they consider that the course pursued by these unruly priests is calculated to give a false impression of their (the Roman Catholic) religion and their politics; to exasperate against them the entire Protestant people of England, and to check effectually any intentions on the part of the Government to place the two churches on a footing of equality.

“The Pope may well hesitate to believe in things the like of which exist in no other part of the world; but we don't ask him to take our words for them. He has himself pro-



posed to send some person over here to examine and report, and I am sure that will be the best mode of proceeding, if any one sufficiently unprejudiced, and likely to resist the evil influences by which he will be surrounded immediately on his arrival, can be found to undertake the mission. He should not come in any public capacity, or with pomp and circumstance, but privately, and with instructions whom he should consult, and with powers to act, but not to go beyond the sphere of spiritual jurisdiction. The Primate and Archbishop Murray, and some of the metropolitan clergy, who well understand the interests of their church, and are acquainted with all that is going on in the country, would be safe guides; and I feel sure that a Papal prohibition to take part in political agitations, and to make use of the places of worship for secular purposes, would be received as a great boon by the well-disposed priests (*i.e.*, the majority of the clergy), who, when they become agitators, yield to intimidation, and are compelled to act against their judgment. If they could appeal to the sanction of the Pope's authority for confining themselves to their spiritual duties, they would not fear to have their chapels deserted, and thus find themselves destitute of the means of subsistence.

“To the best of my belief, the bishops are not in the habit of punishing such misdeeds as those I have alluded to. They may do so; but I have neither official nor private knowledge of the fact, and if they do, their interference is not very successful.

“Believe me, &c.,

“CLARENDON.”

The “Diplomatic Relations with Rome Bill,” to which Lord Palmerston referred, passed through Parliament, but Lord Eglinton, in the House of Lords, carried a clause against the Government by which the reception of an ecclesiastic as Papal nuncio

in London was forbidden. This condition was regarded at Rome with such dislike that the Pope refused to send any minister, and also declined to receive an envoy from England on a unilateral footing. The truth was that representations made to him from Ireland induced him to imagine that we were in such straits in Irish affairs that we should be compelled to yield to him. When Lord Minto asked whether he would, on his part, receive as English minister one of our archbishops or the moderator of the Church of Scotland in full canonicals, he frankly owned that he could not; but reciprocity has never been a weakness of the Vatican.

Lord Palmerston was in favour of the Eglinton clause. To Lord Clarendon he writes :\*

“I could not have consented to make myself responsible for receiving an ecclesiastic as Roman envoy, and it is much better that our refusal should stand upon a prohibitory law than upon our own voluntary determination. I quite concur in the view taken of that question by Aberdeen and Stanley, and I am convinced, by my diplomatic experience, that there would be no end to the embarrassments and inconveniences which we should suffer from having a Roman priest invested with diplomatic privilege holding his court in London, surrounded by English and Irish Catholics, and wielding a power of immense though secret extent, and capable of becoming an

\* F. O., 9th March, 1848.

engine of political intrigue to serve all kinds of foreign interests.

“As for the idea that we could manage the Irish priests by means of a Roman priest in London, I am convinced that the presence of such a man would only have given the Irish priests an additional means of managing us.

“Cappucini, a liberal and enlightened man, was offered to be nuncio at Paris; he declined, and gave to his private friends the reason—that he knew he should have been obliged, by his official position, to side with the most ultra of the Catholic and Jesuit party in France, and as his opinions were against them, he would not place himself in so disagreeable a position.”

Very shortly after Lord Minto arrived in Rome—namely, in January, 1848—an insurrection broke out at Palermo, the Sicilians demanding from the King of Naples the Constitution of 1812. Both parties applied to Lord Napier, then our *chargé d'affaires* at Naples, to mediate between them. The Sicilians founded their application upon the former connection between England and Sicily, and upon the share which the British Government had had in the remodelling of the Sicilian Constitution in 1812. The Neapolitan Government founded their application upon the well-known interest which had always been taken by the British Government in the welfare of the kingdom of Naples. Lord Napier, however, did

not undertake the office, because the Neapolitan Government was not willing at that time to authorize such proposals as were alone likely to lead to any arrangement. Soon, however, the King invited Lord Minto to Naples, and requested him to employ his good offices to effect a reconciliation between the Sicilians and the Home Government.

“ Foreign Office, 24th Feb.\* 1848.

“ MY DEAR MINTO,

“ I have now but five minutes to write to you, more than enough to give you all the instructions you need, which are to act according to your own good judgment as events succeed each other. Nothing can be better than everything you have done hitherto, and we can have no doubt that all you will do hereafter will be equally prudent and wise. I most sincerely hope that you will have been able to bring the Naples Government round to your views about Sicily. Your scheme of amalgamation is excellent, and would afford the best chance of a permanent connection between the two countries; but one fears the blind obstinacy of the King. The Sicilians, moreover, doubt his future good faith, but things have gone much too far for it to be possible for him hereafter to retract; and as to our guarantee, that is out of the question, and would lead us into future embarrassments and responsibilities of the most difficult and inconvenient kind. In short, the

\* Two days before the Revolution at Paris.

position of a foreign power who should be guarantee between a sovereign and a portion of his subjects would be embarrassing for such power, and inconsistent with the independence of such sovereign. Probably the King of Naples would not consent to it.

“As to the poor Pope, I live in daily dread of hearing of some misadventure having befallen him. Events have gone too fast for such a slow sailer as he is. I only hope he will not be swamped by the swell in the wake of those who have outstripped him, for this would perhaps bring the Austrians into the Roman States; and then we should have a regular European row. One thing, however, might prevent this, and that is, the change of Government which happened yesterday at Paris;\* for Metternich, if he hears of it in time, will not be disposed to take any step which will irretrievably commit him until he is able to learn the views and intentions and policy of this new Government in France. It will, however, of course, be much more liberal than Guizot's, both at home and abroad, and especially in regard to Italian affairs. What had been happening in Italy ought to have been a warning to Guizot; what has now happened to Guizot ought to be a warning to Italy. Guizot thought that by a packed Parliament and a corruptly-obtained majority he could control the will of the nation, and the result has been that the will of the Crown has

\* M. Guizot's resignation.

been controlled by an armed popular force. People have long gone on crying up Louis Philippe as the wisest of men. I always have thought him one of the most cunning, and therefore not one of the wisest. Recent events have shown that he must rank among the cunning who outwit themselves, and not among the wise, who master events by foresight and prudence. This surrender of the King of the Barricades to the summons of the National Guard is, however, a curious example of political and poetical justice. Good-bye; I have no time to write more.

“Yours sincerely,  
“PALMERSTON.”

After much discussion with the King and his ministers, Lord Minto was authorized to propose an arrangement which, in his opinion, the Sicilians might reasonably and probably accept. He then sailed for Palermo. Meanwhile, however, arrived the news of the French Revolution. This was a spark that set fire to all that was combustible in Italy. The news turned the heads of the Sicilians, and they suddenly determined no longer to acknowledge the King of Naples as their sovereign. This was what Lord Minto found to be the state of affairs on his arrival. He refused to land unless the Sicilians consented to the union of the two crowns, and he found it eventually impossible to carry out his mediation, owing to the ferment caused by events in France. Lord Palmerston writes

prophetically, though, as it turned out, ten years were to elapse before the fulfilment.

“ Foreign Office, March 28, 1848.

“ MY DEAR MINTO,

“ Was there ever such a scene of confusion as now prevails almost all over Europe. Fortunate, however, has it been for Italy that you crossed the Alps last autumn. If the Italian sovereigns had not been urged by you to move on, while their impatient subjects were kept back, there would by this time have been nothing but Republics from the Alps to Sicily.

“ I hope you will have been able to settle matters between the Sicilians and the Government of Naples without a separation of the crowns, though your last accounts, written just after your arrival at Palermo, inspired us with some doubts on that point.

“ This is one more in addition to the numberless proofs of the danger of delays. If Bozzelli had not been so obstinate you would have been able to settle it all before the news of the French Revolution reached Sicily. I suppose that when you have settled Sicily and Naples you will return to Rome, where by that time your presence will probably be much needed.

“ The greatest and most important event of these last few weeks is perhaps the retirement of Metternich. Happy would it have been for the continent

of Europe, if this had happened some years ago. But better now than later. We have just heard of the entrance of Sardinian troops into Lombardy to help the Milanese. Northern Italy will henceforward be Italian, and the Austrian frontier will be at the Tyrol. This will be no real loss to Austria. If North Italy had been well affected, it would have been an element of strength. Discontented as it was, it has proved a source of weakness. Of course Parma and Modena will follow the example, and in this way the King, no longer of Sardinia, but of Northern Italy, will become a sovereign of some importance in Europe. This will make a league between him and the other Italian rulers still more desirable and much more feasible. Italy ought to unite in a Confederacy similar to that of Germany, commercial and political, and now is the time to strike the iron while it is hot. Austria may perhaps lose Galicia also. I hope her losses will go no further; but enough will even then remain to her to make her, if well governed, a most powerful State. The question is, has she any men capable of making any State a powerful one by good government?

“The King of Prussia was pushed on by the States of Western Germany to put himself forward as he has done. Baden, Wurtemberg, and others (but not Bavaria, who is jealous) told him that if he did not do so, they would all be turned into Republics.

“This country is for the present quiet, though the Repealers and the Chartists meditate some move-



ment. I think, however, that we shall be fully a match for them. The country is sound at heart, and there is a gallant public spirit which will show itself at the first intimation of real danger.

“ Yours, &c.,

“ PALMERSTON.”

On the failure of Lord Minto's mediation the Sicilians proceeded to decree the separation of the crown of Naples and Sicily, and proposed to the Duke of Genoa to become their king, which he, however, declined. The King of Naples, on the arrival of this news, despatched ships and troops against Messina and Palermo. The bombardment of these towns was attended by such acts of violence and cruelty on both sides, that the English and French fleets interfered to procure an armistice. The period for cessation of hostilities expired, however, without any arrangement being arrived at. The fight was renewed; and the Sicilian revolt was finally put down by the middle of the year 1849.

## CHAPTER III.

Arbitration—Movements in Italy—French Revolution—Chartist Agitation in London—War between Austria and Italy—Sir Robert Peel at the Mansion House—French Occupation of Rome—Debates in Parliament—Cholera—Naples.

THE repeal of the Navigation Laws was one of the most prominent measures promised in the Queen's Speech at the opening of the new Parliament. The Government having thus pledged themselves to deal with the question, Lord Palmerston saw that such a step would advantageously affect our foreign relations with maritime powers, and especially with the United States of America. He desired that the obstacles which such a measure would remove from the way of our free intercourse with the latter country, should be succeeded by a cordial alliance. The following letter contains his views; and it is interesting as showing how different was the spirit with which he approached these subjects from that usually ascribed to him both at home and abroad. Even as early as 1848, anticipating Cobden and the Declaration of Paris, he was suggesting the

principle of arbitration, and advocated the abolition of letters of marque :—

“ C. G., January 20, 1848.

“ MY DEAR JOHN RUSSELL,

“ If, as I hope, we shall succeed in altering our Navigation Laws, and if, as a consequence, Great Britain and the United States shall place their commercial marines upon a footing of mutual equality, with the exception of the coasting trade and some other special matters, might not such an arrangement afford us a good opportunity for endeavouring to carry in some degree into execution the wish which Mr. Fox entertained in 1783, when he wished to substitute close alliance in the place of sovereignty and dependence as the connecting link between the United States and Great Britain ?

“ A treaty for mutual defence would no longer be applicable to the condition of the two countries as independent Powers ; but might they not, with mutual advantage, conclude a treaty containing something like the following conditions :—

“ 1st. That in all cases of difference which may hereafter, unfortunately, arise between the contracting parties, they will, in the first place, have recourse to the (<sup>mediation</sup><sub>arbitration</sub>) of some friendly Power ; and that hostilities shall not begin between them until every endeavour to settle their difference by such means shall have proved fruitless.

“ 2nd. That if either of the two should at any time be at war with any other Power, no subject or citizen

of the other contracting party shall be allowed to take out letters of marque from such other Power, under pain of being treated and dealt with as a pirate.

“3rd. That in such case of war between either of the two parties and a third Power, no subject or citizen of the other contracting party shall be allowed to enter into the service, naval or military, of such third Power.

“4th. That in such case of war as aforesaid, neither of the contracting parties shall afford assistance to the enemies of the other, by sea or by land, unless war should break out between the two contracting parties themselves, after the failure of all endeavours to settle their differences in the manner specified in Article 1.

“Yours sincerely,  
“PALMERSTON.”

As to this arbitration question, however, he would in practice have tempered theory with prudence. In a debate in 1849 he spoke—I might almost say prophetically—of the disadvantages which England would probably have to encounter before such international tribunals. It was on the 12th of June, on a motion of Mr. Cobden's. Lord Palmerston combated vigorously the proposition that we should in any way pledge ourselves to submit to the arbitrament of a third party. He said: “I confess also that I consider it would be a very dangerous course for this

country to take, because there is no country which, from its political and commercial circumstances, from its maritime interests, and from its colonial possessions, excites more envious and jealous feelings in different quarters than England does; and there is no country that would find it more difficult to discover really disinterested and impartial arbiters. There is also no country that would be more likely than England to suffer in its important commercial interests from submitting the case to arbiters not disinterested, not impartial, and not acting with a due sense of their responsibility."

At the outset of the session a most violent onslaught was made upon him and his policy by Messrs. Anstey and Urquhart, and an impeachment before a committee of inquiry demanded in two speeches which occupied nearly the whole of a Wednesday's sitting. He had scarcely begun his reply when the sitting came to an end by the six o'clock rule; and in the stirring times that were coming on the House had something better to do than to listen to the outpourings of such men, who for many years would insist that Lord Palmerston in all his actions was the secret agent of Russia.

The few words, however, which he had time to say contained the following manly and statesmanlike declaration:—"I am conscious that during the time for which I have had the honour to direct the foreign relations of this country, I have devoted to them all the energies which I possess. Other men might have acted, no doubt, with more ability. None

could have acted with a more entire devotion both of their time and faculties. The principle on which I have thought the foreign affairs of this country ought to be conducted is the principle of maintaining peace and friendly understanding with all nations, as long as it was possible to do so consistently with a due regard to the interests, the honour, and the dignity of this country. My endeavours have been to preserve peace. All the Governments of which I have had the honour to be a member have succeeded in accomplishing that object.

“I hold, with respect to alliances, that England is a power sufficiently strong to steer her own course, and not to tie herself as an unnecessary appendage to the policy of any other Government. I hold that the real policy of England is to be the champion of justice and right; pursuing that course with moderation and prudence, not becoming the Quixote of the world, but giving the weight of her moral sanction and support wherever she thinks justice is, and whenever she thinks that wrong has been done.

“As long as she sympathises with right and justice, she will never find herself altogether alone. She is sure to find some other state of sufficient power, influence, and weight to support and aid her in the course she may think fit to pursue. Therefore I say that it is a narrow policy to suppose that this country or that is to be marked out as the eternal ally or the perpetual enemy of England. We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our in-

terests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow. And if I might be allowed to express in one sentence the principle which I think ought to guide an English minister, I would adopt the expression of Canning, and say that with every British minister the interests of England ought to be the shibboleth of his policy."

At the opening of 1848 Italy was agitated by the most violent heavings. To the thirst for social amelioration and political power were added aspirations for national unity. The reforms of Pio Nono, the democratic concessions of Charles Albert and of the King of Naples, had so strongly stimulated the revolutionary passions, that it seemed only a question of time when the smothered flames would break out in one general conflagration. Austria saw all this with declared uneasiness, and seemed inclined to interfere. This it was Lord Palmerston's object, if possible, to prevent.

" F. O., February 11, 1848.

" MY DEAR PONSONBY,

"I send you an important despatch to be communicated to Prince Metternich, and I wish you to recommend it to his most serious consideration. It is worded, I trust, in such a way as not to be liable to give offence; but it must be understood as meaning and implying more than it expresses. The real fact is, that upon Metternich's decision in regard to the affairs of Italy depends the question of peace or war in Europe. If he remains quiet, and does not

meddle with matters beyond the Austrian frontiers, peace will be maintained, and all these Italian changes will be effected with as little disturbance as is consistent with the nature of things. If he takes upon himself the task of regulating by force of arms the internal affairs of the Italian States there will infallibly be war, and it will be a war of principles which, beginning in Italy, will spread over all Europe, and out of which the Austrian Empire will certainly not issue unchanged. In that war England and Austria will certainly not be on the same side; a circumstance which would occasion to every Englishman the deepest regret. In that war, whatever Louis Philippe and Guizot may promise, the principal champions contending against each other would be Austria and France; and I would wish Metternich well and maturely to consider what would be the effect on the internal condition of Germany which would be produced by a war between Austria and France, in which Austria was engaged in crushing and France in upholding constitutional liberty. It would be well for Prince Metternich to calculate beforehand, not merely what portion of the *people* of Germany he could count upon as allies in such a contest, but how many of the governments even would venture to take part with him in the struggle. If he wished to throw the greater part of Germany into close alliance with France, he could not take a better method of doing so.

“He best knows the disposition of his own states;



but I should greatly doubt his receiving any support in such a struggle from Hungary or Bohemia; and he would of course have all the Emperor's Italian subjects against him.

“When one comes to reflect upon all the endless difficulties and embarrassments which such a course would involve, one cannot believe that a statesman so prudent and calculating, so long-sighted and so experienced, could fall into such an error; but the great accumulation of Austrian troops in the Lombard and Venetian provinces inspires one with apprehension.

“The recent debates in the French Chambers will have shown to Prince Metternich how little he can count upon the support or even the neutrality of France; and he may depend upon it, that in defence of constitutional liberty in Italy the French nation would rush to arms, and a French army would again water their horses in the Danube.

“Pray exert all your persuasion with the Prince to induce him to authorize you to send us some tranquillising assurances on this matter. We set too great a value upon the maintenance of Austria as the pivot of the balance of power in Europe to be able to see without the deepest concern any course of action begun by her Government which would produce fatal consequences to her, and which would place us probably, against our will, in the adverse scale.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

At the same time he was consistently using his influence to keep the Italian Governments in the constitutional path on which they appeared to have entered. Mr. Abercromby was our minister at the Sardinian Court.

“ F. O., February 12, 1848.

“ MY DEAR ABERCROMBY,

“ I send you a despatch which I had prepared before I received yours, which reached me this morning, stating that the Cabinet at Turin were deliberating about the grant of a constitution. I hope their deliberation will have ended affirmatively, and in that case our exhortations will apply only to the method of carrying their assent into execution. If they should have refused, you will then have to exert your eloquence in trying to persuade them and the King to reconsider and to reverse their decision. Arguments will not be wanting. If the King resolves to oppose himself to the wishes and demands of his subjects, he must be prepared for one of two courses. He must either abdicate or call in foreign aid. The first alternative would be unwise and unnecessary, and would, moreover, be like a man shooting himself to avoid a danger which might threaten him with death.

“ As to calling in foreign aid, we cannot believe that, with his high and patriotic feelings, he would consent to hold his throne by means of French or Austrian bayonets, and to become thereafter the mere puppet of Austria or of France. It is possible,

indeed, that he may have a more high-minded feeling on this subject, and that, having committed himself in some way or other against a Constitution, he may think it derogatory to his consistency now to accept one. It is needless to point out how untenable such a notion would be, and how futile any such pledge or any such former resolution ought to be deemed as an obstacle to prevent him from now performing a great and important duty, as Sovereign, towards the nation which Providence has committed to his charge.

“From the first moment that one heard that the King of Naples had consented to a Constitution, it was easy to foresee that the rest of Italy must have one too.

“I have no time to say more.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To Sir George Hamilton, at Florence, he writes :—

“I conclude that before this reaches you the question whether there is or is not to be a Constitution in Tuscany will have been decided ; but pray do all you can to persuade the Government to yield with good grace to the wishes of the people, and upon no account whatever to think of calling in or of letting in the Austrians to coerce the subjects of the Grand Duke. The first thing of all is national independence, and nothing can make up for the loss of that.”

The Revolution at Paris came, however, like a

thunder-clap to scatter all the timid compromises and faltering concessions of kings, emperors, and grand dukes. In France the blind obstinacy of a self-willed King, the corruption of the Government, and governing classes, as illustrated by the Cubières-Teste and Petit scandals, and by the Praslin tragedy, the anti-Liberal and unpopular policy of the French Foreign Office, partly the result of estrangement from England caused by the "Spanish marriages;" these all had combined to bring to a climax discontent, which a long period of commercial and financial distress had greatly fomented. The different sections of malcontents agreed to unite on the basis of a demand for parliamentary reform. Banquets were organised in different parts of France, when exciting speeches were made, and complaints found audible expression. The Assembly met on the 28th of December. Upon the Address arose a debate, which lasted twenty days, and during which Guizot and Duchatel\* had in vain tried to make head against the attacks of Thiers, Lamartine, Billault, and De Tocqueville. The Ministry kept a servile though a decreasing majority in the divisions which took place; but the victory lay with the others. The debate closed on the 7th of February. "The war of words," said the 'National' on the 9th, "is at an end. That of deeds is now to come."

\* Guizot was a brilliant orator, but neither a statesman nor a man of business. Duchatel had great aptitude, but was an idle man, and not an effective speaker, except on finance.

A political banquet, which had been originally fixed for the 19th of January in Paris itself, had been postponed in consequence of an interdiction by the police. On the day after the rejection of the amendment on the Address, the Liberal deputies met and determined to persevere in their design. The revived banquet was fixed for the 22nd, and was publicly announced. At this crisis Louis Philippe's obstinacy showed itself most disastrously. The death of his sister, the Princess Adelaide, a few weeks before had removed his best counsellor. "I never will consent to Reform," he declared with cynical contempt for constitutional doctrine. "Reform is another word for the advent of the Opposition!"

Vacillation, however, often hangs on the skirts of obstinacy. With Louis Philippe it was always so, and this occasion formed no exception. The Liberal chiefs were as anxious as the Government itself to avoid any violent collision. A compromise was agreed to, by which there was to be a procession, but no banquet. When it appeared likely that the multitude would be great, the authorities took alarm, again changed front, and, on the very morning of the 22nd, covered the walls of Paris with placards forbidding any assembly in the streets. The crowds, however, had collected, and all day thronged the central parts of the city. Their leaders had stayed away.

Lord Normanby sent Lord Palmerston the fol-

lowing record of his personal observations during these events :—

“ Paris, March 13, 1848.

“There are some scattered incidents in the last days of Louis Philippe and his minister which came within my personal observation, which I should like to take this early opportunity of collecting and recording, as they have their bearing upon the great political moral to be derived from the astounding catastrophe.

“I ventured, in the middle of last year, to call your lordship’s attention to the state of political feeling in the country, and to remark that nothing could save the dynasty of July but an immediate change of men, and measures of reform at once prompt and sincere. Not one measure of a conciliatory description was from that time even contemplated by the Government, and yet there was a moment when the very extent of the general discontent appeared to hold out hopes of a peaceful solution of the question.

“The danger had always been that the King, supported by a packed majority of the Chamber, would persevere to the last to resist the popular will, but this will had latterly acquired such an irresistible impulse that it had even found its way into the constitutional channels hitherto choked up by corruption. When one saw, in the course of the debates on the Address, the effect of public opinion in reducing even such a majority from 120 to 30, one had even hopes that a vote of the Chamber, by upsetting the Ministry, might preserve the throne. As I attended personally every one of these sittings, which lasted three weeks, I could observe that the decline of the numerical force of the majority was not so strong an indication as the changes in its tone. There was still a disposition on the part of many to prolong, for a short time, the existence of the Ministry, in order to avoid the probable dissolution of the Chamber, but during the whole of that discussion of unexampled length, there was hardly an indepen-

dent member, or one not actually in office with the Government, who said one word in favour either of their foreign or domestic policy; and it was also remarkable that, often as M. Guizot had upon former occasions recovered himself from surrounding difficulties by the exercise of his extraordinary talent in the tribune, he never once, during the debates on the Address, made a single effective rally.

“He heard, without an attempt at reply, the Spanish marriages stigmatised as a selfish and anti-national policy, amidst the cheers of his opponents, and without one dissenting murmur from that majority which had supported them last year. It was proved by the admission of his own Minister of War that at the time when he was proposing to Europe a mediation in Swiss affairs, he had smuggled, for the benefit of the Sonderbund, arms and ammunition out of the Royal Arsenal at Besançon, concealed in the shape of other merchandise, and with a false declaration to their own Customs. The only excuse he attempted of his Italian policy was to say that there could not be a thought of a Constitution in Italy for the next five or ten years, and this dictum was uttered on the very day the Constitution was proclaimed at Naples.

“The miserable figure which the Government made during the whole of the debate was in no small degree caused by the profound sensation produced in the Chamber and in society by the incident with which it commenced. The personal integrity of M. Guizot had, next to his oratorical superiority, been the throne upon which his supporters had distinguished him from his fellows. That which was called ‘l’affaire Petit’ was, therefore, calculated to make a great sensation, not so much from its individual importance as from the system which it showed up. M. Guizot was not so much injured by his evident participation in it as by the callous audacity with which he treated the matter.

“M. Bertin de Vaux, a peer of France, and a part proprietor of the ‘Journal des Débats,’ desired to procure a place for

M. Petit, the husband of his mistress. As what M. Bertin desired was employment for M. Petit, and as M. Petit was not particular at what price his ambition was gratified, M. Guizot told M. Bertin de Vaux that, provided M. Petit would buy the resignation of a better place, he should himself possess a smaller one then vacant. This bargain was executed, but the exigencies of parliamentary corruption at that time pressing hard upon M. Guizot, he gave away, without reference to M. Petit, both the place he desired and that which he had bought, endeavouring to put him off with a promise of an early vacancy ; but at this both M. Petit and his patron, M. Bertin de Vaux, were indignant, and the 60,000 francs which M. Guizot himself repaid M. Bertin de Vaux for M. Petit, as the price he had paid for the place, were obtained for that purpose out of the Secret Service Money. This was the real history of the first part of this affair, and yet M. Guizot had the effrontery to say from the tribune that he was not personally acquainted with any of the details of the affair. There was not one of his majority who believed a syllable of this assertion, and how could they, as, when asked how then M. Bertin de Vaux came to assert in his letter that he had received the money *from him*, he was forced to remain silent ?

“It was under the general impression thus produced that the question of the banquet arose.

“I have already, in former despatches, mentioned to your lordship the exasperation caused by the hostile phrases in the King’s speech.

“When, in addition to this in assertion of the illegality of the banquets, the Minister of Justice made the astounding declaration from the tribune that every act that was not expressly permitted in the charter was thereby forbidden, the Opposition thought it necessary to make a striking demonstration in vindication of their rights.

“Upon this point I have received from the best sources detailed information as to the negotiation which took place



between the Government and the committee for the banquet. This negotiation was conducted, on the part of the Government, by M. Vitel, the reporter on the Address, and Count de Morny, and, on the Reformers' side, by M. Odillon Barrot and M. Duvergier de Hauranne.

“It was agreed between them that there must be a procession to the banquet, and that as the National Guards in great numbers desired to attend, they should be arranged in a manner to keep order, of course without arms.

“M. Duchatel gave his consent to this arrangement, and, after some opposition from M. Guizot and M. Hebert, it was agreed to by the Government on the Friday before. When, on the Monday morning, the public announcement of what had been previously settled was made in an objectionable form, M. Guizot and M. Hebert revived their opposition, prevailed over M. Duchatel, and M. Vitet and M. de Morny went to the committee-room to announce that the Government would not permit the meeting.

“The dangerous consequence of so late a change of purpose was enforced by M. de Hauranne and others, and so convinced M. Vitet and M. de Morny that they agreed to draw up a paragraph protesting against assuming any other right than to give counsel for the maintenance of order, and promised to induce the Ministers, with this qualification, to allow the meeting to proceed.

“Upon their return, however, they found that M. Guizot and M. Hebert had persuaded the King to take it up warmly; and then followed the scene in the Chamber of Deputies.

“The Opposition deputies determined upon their return to the committee-room, at any sacrifice of their popularity, to avoid a collision in the streets; but one of them told me that when this decision was broken that night to some of the superior officers of the National Guards who were assembled to make the last arrangements for the morrow, they were all furious, and said that this decision would cost the King dear.

“I went that night to the Tuileries without knowing the decision of the Opposition deputies.

“As His Majesty had often volunteered to speak to me upon his own affairs, I thought it possible he might do so then, and I was prepared, if the occasion was thus offered, humbly to represent to His Majesty the danger, in the then state of the public mind, unnecessarily to provoke a collision in the streets. But I was told by one of the Government whom I met on the stairs that the Opposition had given up the banquet, and I found the whole Court in an ecstasy of delight, as if they had gained a great victory. The King spoke to me for some time with great animation, but never once alluded to the passing events. He adverted to our proposed diplomatic intercourse with Rome, to the difficulty of receiving a priest at St. James’s in full canonicals; told a story of the Archbishop of Narbonne, who, in the days of his emigration, had got over this difficulty by going to George the Third in a court dress with a sword. I only allude to these trivial subjects of conversation because I found afterwards that the King had been studying effect to the last, and that he had said to those to whom he spoke immediately afterwards, ‘I am very well satisfied with Lord Normanby to-night,’ as if he had been speaking to me of the pressing concerns of the moment, and that I had approved the course of his Government.

“The infatuation of the King during the whole of the debates on the Address was very remarkable. Several of the representatives of the smaller German Courts went to him with letters of condolence on Madame Adelaide’s death, and to some he said, ‘Tell your master not to mind having popular assemblies; let them only learn to manage them as I manage mine; see the noise they are making now; I shall soon have them in hand again; they want me to get rid of Guizot; I will not do it. Can I possibly give a stronger proof of my power?’

“As I have mentioned Madame Adelaide, it is right to say, in justice to her memory, that, though she was for a time

dazzled by the ideas of family aggrandisement, and took an unfortunate part in the affair of the Spanish marriages, she soon saw the mischief to which that led, and upon all other subjects she always was disposed to give to her brother more liberal advice than he was always ready to receive. A few days before her death she gave a detail to one of her intimate friends of the vain efforts she had made to persuade the King to dismiss his Ministry and promise reform. Marshal Sebastiani's opinion agreed with Madame's, and, just before the opening of the Chambers, the King coming into his sister's room where the Marshal was, the Princess insisted upon his repeating what he had been saying as to the impolicy of longer maintaining the Guizot Ministry. When the Marshal had said what occurred to him, the King almost brutally replied, 'Vous le croyez? vous baissez, Maréchal, évidemment vous baissez.'

"The King had also received the same advice from Count Montalivet, which he reported to Guizot, and, but for the interposition of some of the Royal Family, was very nearly sacrificing the most personally attached of all his servants to the resentment of his minister.

"Such, my lord, was the disposition of the King and the situation of the Ministry on the eve of the 22nd of February.

"I have, &c.,

"NORMANBY."

Although the Government had forbidden the meeting, they kept no troops to overawe the mob. Rioting, therefore, began towards the evening of the 22nd, and troops were sent for during the night. On the 23rd a collision took place in front of the Foreign Office between the soldiers and the people. Lives were lost, and the Revolution was started. During the following night the Guizot Ministry

resigned, and was succeeded by Thiers and Odillon Barrot. Marshal Bugeaud and General Lamoricière were placed in command of the troops and National Guard. The Marshal lost no time in securing the control of Paris, and daybreak of the 24th found the whole city in possession of the army. Had he been allowed to act as he had arranged, the insurrection would have been easily suppressed; but an order from the Palace to cease the combat and withdraw the troops sealed the fate of the monarchy. Sore and disheartened, those of his soldiers who retired on the Tuileries made but a feeble resistance to the mob which broke in, while the King, after signing his abdication, was escaping with his family by a back door. The Duchess of Orleans forced her way to the Chamber of Deputies, and made a courageous effort to secure the throne for her son, the Comte de Paris, but all in vain. Thus in two short days the monarchy was swept away, and the Provisional Government of a Republic substituted in its stead.

Lord Palmerston acknowledged the news as follows:—

“ F. O., February 26, 1848.

“ MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“ I received at half-past eleven last night in the House of Commons your despatches of Thursday. What extraordinary and marvellous events you give me an account of. It is like the five acts of a play,

and has not taken up much more time. Strange that a king who owed his crown to a revolution brought about by royal blindness and obstinacy should have lost it by exactly the same means, and he a man who had gone through all the vicissitudes of human existence, from the condition of a schoolmaster to the pomp of a throne; and still further that his overthrow should have been assisted by a minister deeply read in the records of history, and whose mind was not merely stored with the chronology of historical facts, but had extracted from their mass the reasons of events and the philosophy of their causes.

“I can give you but provisional instructions. Continue at your post. Keep up unofficial and useful communication with the men who from hour to hour (I say not even from day to day) may have the direction of events, but commit us to no acknowledgment of any men, nor of any things. Our principles of action are to acknowledge whatever rule may be established with apparent prospect of permanency, but none other. We desire friendship and extended commercial intercourse with France, and peace between France and the rest of Europe. We will engage to prevent the rest of Europe from meddling with France, which indeed we are quite sure they have no intention of doing. The French rulers must engage to prevent France from assailing any part of the rest of Europe. Upon such a basis our relations with France may be placed on a footing more friendly

than they have been or were likely to be with Louis Philippe and Guizot.

“Yours sincerely,  
“PALMERSTON.”

The pacific intentions, however, of the Provisional Government began to be doubted, and a report got abroad that they were about to declare war against Austria at once, and also to annex Belgium on the invitation of the Republican party in that country. The ex-King was making for the coast, hoping to reach England, and the British Government was taking steps to assist him in his flight.

“F. O., February 27, 1848.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“I send you a hundred sovereigns by this messenger, and will send a hundred more by the next. You must use your discretion about going away or staying. It is desirable that you should stay as long as you can do so with safety both to yourself and to the dignity of the country, because your presence protects British subjects; and your coming away would be a measure of much import, and therefore of importance.

“Your accounts of Friday night, received to-day, and the further reports that reach us are fearfully ominous for the peace of Europe. A general war seems to be impending at the moment when we all were flattering ourselves that peace would last thirty

years to come. One felt yesterday that the French army had till then counted for nothing in the events which had taken place in Paris, and that it was impossible that the French army should count for nothing in deciding the destinies of France. One therefore felt that it might be in the power of any popular general to march fifty or sixty thousand men into Paris, and decide matters according to his will, in spite of the armed mob or of the National Guard; this thought seems also to have occurred to those who are for the moment at the head of affairs, and they seem to propose to send the army to attack the neighbours of France instead of letting it come into Paris to upset them. It remains to be seen whether the army will take this bait. One fears that it may. If this should be, the British Government will have to come to a grave and serious determination. We cannot sit quiet and see Belgium overrun and Antwerp become a French port; and even a war in other directions will sooner or later draw us into its vortex.

“ We have taken such measures as are within our power to afford the means of coming over to such passengers as may come to the coast, including the persons to whom you alluded in your last.

“ We shall manage somehow or other to get over the difficulty about the Income Tax. Most people seem to agree that a change of Government at this moment would be a public evil, as there are no set of men ready to succeed us with a chance of stability.

Montebello says that he sent a message to the Duchess of Orleans on Thursday morning, which did not reach her, warning her not to rely on the Parliament, against whom, as much as against the King, the revolution was directed, but to take her son into the streets and throw herself on the National Guard. Perhaps if she had received this advice and acted upon it, things might have gone differently.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

“C. G., February 28, 1848.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“I received at 11 o'clock this evening your very important despatches. All are important, but pre-eminently so your short note of yesterday reporting the pacific assurances made to you from the Provisional Government, and especially their resolution not to accept the incorporation even if offered. This is a most wise resolve; for if they will look to the stipulations of the treaty finally concluded between the five Powers, Belgium, and the Netherlands, they will see that there are in it guarantees which would have a very awkward bearing upon any attempt by France to annex Belgium to its territory. In fact, the peace of Europe is now in the hands of the French Government, and with them rests the question of peace or war.

“You will have received before this time my despatch desiring you to stay where you are till you



receive other instructions, and authorizing you to hold such unofficial communications with the Government as may be necessary for the public service. Of course the French Government cannot expect that we should send you formal credentials to a Government professedly provisional and temporary, but we shall take no hostile step towards them, and shall not bring you away as long as they continue to maintain their authority, and to use it with moderation and for purposes of order. Whenever a permanent Government shall have been established, then will be the time for deciding as to renewed credentials; and you know that the invariable principle on which England acts is to acknowledge as the organ of every nation that organ which each nation may deliberately choose to have. But it must be an organ likely to be permanent, for it would not be consistent with the dignity of England to be sending to her ambassador fresh credentials every ten days, according as the caprice of the people of Paris might from time to time change the form and substance of French institutions. I grieve at the prospect of a republic in France, for I fear that it must lead to war in Europe and fresh agitation in England. Large republics seem to be essentially and inherently aggressive, and the aggressions of the French will be resisted by the rest of Europe, and that is war; while, on the other hand, the example of universal suffrage in France will set our non-voting population agog, and will create a demand for an incon-

venient extension of the suffrage, ballot, and other mischievous things. However, for the present, *vive* Lamartine!

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

It was fortunate for the peace of Europe that a Whig Cabinet and a Liberal Foreign Secretary were in office at this time. If there had been in London an illiberal and anti-democratic Cabinet, imbued with the maxims of Burke and the traditions of Pitt, a monarchical coalition against France might again have been formed. The friendly relations of England with France were of great service to the cause of peace. No less an authority than the King of the Belgians bore testimony to this at a later period in a letter to Lord Palmerston,\* in which he said, “I must take this opportunity to express to you my conviction that the acting together of England and France has been most useful, as it has facilitated to the French Government a system of moderation which it could but with great difficulty have maintained if it had not been acting in concert with England.”

Lord Palmerston's great anxiety at this critical moment was to preserve peace by preventing any act hostile to the French Republic on the part of the great Powers. On the other hand, he hoped by a

\* January 23, 1849.

speedy recognition of the new form of government in France to bring the legitimate influences of Europe to bear upon it. He writes to Lord Westmorland at Berlin, and to Lord Ponsonby at Vienna :

“ F. O., February 29, 1848.

“ MY DEAR WESTMORLAND,

“ I firmly believe Lamartine to mean peace and no aggression ; it will be of importance, therefore, that the three Powers should not take any steps which might look like a threat of attacking France or an intention to interfere in her internal affairs. The only thing to do is to wait and watch, and be prepared. As for us, whenever there is a settled Government established, we shall, according to our usual custom, acknowledge it by sending fresh credentials to our ambassador. But we should like to do this in concert with the other Powers ; only we should not be able perhaps to wait for them if they were disposed to hesitate or demur when the proper time may come ; and we may not think it expedient to wait till after the constituent Assembly shall have met. All men of mark of all parties, including the Legitimists, are supporting Lamartine's Government as the only security at present against anarchy, conflagration, and massacre. It must be owned that the prospect of a republic in France is far from agreeable ; for such a Government would naturally be more likely to place peace in danger than a monarchy would be. But we must deal with things as they

are, and not as we would wish to have them. These Paris events ought to serve, however, as a warning to the Prussian Government, and should induce them to set to work without delay to complete those constitutional institutions of which the King last year laid the foundations.

“Yours sincerely,  
“PALMERSTON.”

“F. O., February 29, 1848.

“MY DEAR PONSONBY,

“Here is a pretty-to-do at Paris; it is plain that, for the present at least, we shall have a republic in France. How long it may last is another question. But, for the present, the only chance for tranquillity and order in France, and for peace in Europe, is to give support to Lamartine. I am convinced this French Government will not be aggressive, if left alone; and it is to be hoped that Apponyi and others will be allowed to remain in Paris till things take a decided turn. If a republic is decidedly established, the other Powers of Europe must, of course, give credentials addressed to that Government, or they will have to give billets to its troops. I have no time to write more, but nothing can be more positive, or, as I believe, more sincere than Lamartine’s declarations of a peace policy, and you will observe that, by saying that France has not changed her place in Europe, he virtually acknowledges the obligations of existing treaties. He could

not well have done so at present in more distinct terms.

“ I should advise the Austrians to come to a good understanding with Sardinia as to mutual defence if attacked, which, however, they are not at present likely to be. But if the Austrian Government does not mitigate its system of coercion in Lombardy and grant liberal institutions, they will have a revolt there ; and if there shall be conflict in Lombardy between the troops and the public and much bloodshed, it is to be feared that the French nation will break loose in spite of Lamartine’s efforts to restrain them.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.’

The King of Prussia, tottering on his throne, was still bent on interfering in Sleswick, so to Berlin Lord Palmerston sent a word of warning.\*

“ I have only time to write two lines to beg you to entreat the Prussian Government not to begin hostilities against Denmark. The question about Sleswick and Holstein may surely admit of arrangements by negotiation, and there are elements enough of discord afloat in Europe without adding this to the number.

“ Central Europe ought surely to remain united, to make head against dangers to which it might be

\* To Lord Westmorland, April 6, 1848.

exposed from the west or from the east, and ought not to begin a civil war as a preparation for the foreign war which it may ere long be compelled to engage in. The owner of Rhenish Prussia might, in prudence, pause before he set the example of armed interference between a Sovereign and his subjects."

Lamartine now issued a very able circular or manifesto to the diplomatic agents of France. It deprecated any idea that the Republic of 1848 must necessarily follow the warlike principles of 1792, but went on to declare that, in the eyes of France, the treaties of 1815 existed no longer as law, and that she would not look with indifference on any forcible attempt to repress the nascent aspirations of oppressed nationalities. Lord Palmerston writes to Lord Clarendon on the 9th March :—"Any Government which wished to pick a quarrel with France might find ample materials in this circular. But it seems to me that the true policy of Europe at present is, to say as little and do as little as possible, so as not to stir matters in France beyond their natural turbulence, and to watch events to be prepared for them. The circular is evidently a piece of patchwork put together by opposite parties in the Government. The one warlike and disturbing, the other peaceful and conciliatory. I should say that if you were to put the whole of it into a crucible, and evaporate the gaseous parts, and scum off the dross, you would find the

regulus\* to be peace and good-fellowship with other Governments.”

There soon arose an occasion for testing the truth of this opinion. The Irish revolutionists, confident that they would get sympathy and aid from the French Republic, were sending over deputations to Paris; and at the interviews which they obtained Irish questions were very freely discussed. Lord Palmerston thought it well to speak out at once before much harm was done.

“F. O., March 21, 1848.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“I have written you an official despatch about M. de Lamartine’s allocutions to Irish deputations and his direct allusions therein to our internal affairs, such as Catholic Emancipation, Irish agitation, Repeal of the Union, and other matters, with which no foreign Government had any right to meddle. I wish you to convey to him, in terms as civil as you can use, that these speeches, and especially that to which my despatch refers, have given great offence in this country to many persons who very sincerely desire to see the most friendly relations maintained between England and France, and that if this practice of interfering in our affairs, and of giving in this manner direct encouragement to political agitation within the United Kingdom, shall continue to be persevered in by the French Government, a cry

\* The pure metal, which in the melting of ores falls to the bottom of the crucible.

will soon arise in this country for the withdrawal of our embassy from Paris. This has already been suggested to me by many of the supporters of the Government as an appropriate mark of our disapprobation of the proceedings of the French Government in these matters.

“Yours sincerely,  
“PALMERSTON.”

This remonstrance was not without effect. A deputation, headed by Smith O'Brien himself, received from Lamartine an answer which must have dashed all their hopes. He told them that it was not “convenient” for the French nation to intervene in the affairs of a country with which they were and wished to remain at peace. Lord Palmerston acknowledges the straightforward conduct of the French Foreign Minister.

“F. O., April 4, 1848.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“Pray tell Lamartine how very much obliged we feel for his handsome and friendly conduct about the Irish deputation. His answer was most honourable and gentlemanlike, and just what might have been expected from a high-minded man like him.

“I forgot in the hurry in which I have been living to tell you that I had Guizot and the Lièvens to dinner on Sunday week last, with half a dozen people to meet them; but I took care that it should not be put into the paper. Nobody, I imagine, can



suppose that there is any political sympathy between Guizot and me ; we have been opposed to each other as public men, both as representing adverse systems of general political principles, and as acting upon conflicting views of international interest. But Guizot and I were upon very good terms personally while he was ambassador here ; and he was particularly civil to me when I was at Paris two years ago. He is now in misfortune and adversity ; and though I may agree with most other people in thinking that his own political errors have been the true causes of his present condition, yet it would, I think, have been ungenerous in me if I had not shown myself as sensible of his former civility to me as I should have done if he had come here under circumstances more fortunate for himself. I am sure that no reasonable Frenchman can find fault with those small attentions which are merely the expressions of personal feeling, and which have nothing whatever to do with any political matters. I shall, on the same principle, have the Duchatels to dinner in a quiet and unostentatious manner ; I saw a good deal of them on the Rhine, and they also gave us a very hospitable reception when we were at Paris.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

In Italy the news of the French Revolution had a prodigious effect. Everywhere the aristocratic had

to yield to the democratic party. Venice broke away from Austria, and proclaimed a Republic. Milan revolted, and compelled the Austrian troops to commence a retreat which only ceased beyond the Mincio. Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, resolved to embrace the cause of Italian independence, and to bring the regular forces of the Piedmontese monarchy to the aid of insurgent Lombardy. On the 25th of March his army crossed the Ticino and entered the Austrian territory. On the 31st of March Lord Palmerston writes to Lord Normanby:—

“ Our attitude with regard to what is passing in the north of Italy is that of passive spectators. Abercromby made no protest, though he urged all the arguments which suggested themselves to him against the advance of the Sardinian troops.

“ It may be questionable how far Charles Albert was justified by the rules of good neighbourhood in seizing an Austrian province; my own belief is that he could not help doing so, and as Europe is now undergoing great changes, I cannot myself regret that the establishment of a good state in Northern Italy should be one of them. As to your not always getting letters from me by every messenger who passes through Paris, never wonder at that nor think it extraordinary. Wonder rather when I am able to find time to write at all; I am sure you would if you saw the avalanche of despatches from every part of the world which come down upon me daily,

and which must be read, and if you witnessed the number of interviews which I cannot avoid giving every day of the week. Every post sends me a lamenting minister throwing himself and his country upon England for help, which I am obliged to tell him we cannot afford him. But Belgium is a case by itself, and both France and England are bound by treaty engagements in regard to that country, which it is most desirable for the repose of France and England that no events should call into active operation.”

With Russia he wished to be on good terms, as the only state left erect amid the general downfall; although he frankly stated to the Government of the Czar that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, Poland was entitled to a Constitution under the terms of the Treaty of Vienna; so he says to Lord Bloomfield at St. Petersburg\*—

“Assure Count Nesselrode that our feelings and sentiments towards Russia are exactly similar to those which he expresses to you towards England. We are at present the only two Powers in Europe (excepting always Belgium) that remain standing upright, and we ought to look with confidence to each other. Of course he must be aware that public feeling in this country runs strong in favour of the Poles; but we, the Government, will never do any-

\* To Lord Bloomfield. F. O., April 11, 1848.

thing underhand or ungentlemanlike on those matters. I wish we could hope that the Emperor might of his own accord settle the Polish question in some satisfactory manner."

While all these conflicts were surging in Europe, and threatening to wipe out almost every line of the Treaty of Vienna, the British Foreign Office had, as may be supposed, plenty of work to engage its attention. Its policy at this crisis may be thus summarised:—

To maintain peace as long as possible, but to maintain it by exerting, and not by foregoing, English influence. To support the integrity and independence of Belgium so long as the Belgians were themselves willing to uphold it. To favour the development of German unity—whether in the shape of one or two German Powers—strong enough to make head against any attack from France or Russia. To advise Austria not to keep up a bloody struggle for the maintenance of the Lombard kingdom. Lastly, not to interfere in any way with the form of government in France, but not to slacken or part with any means of resistance should the French seek to relieve internal embarrassment by external aggression.

England felt also in her home affairs the events in France, for they stirred up the revolutionary spirit, such as it was. The Chartists, with mad Fergus O'Connor at their head, prepared a demonstration for

the 10th of April, when they proposed, after meeting on Kennington Common, to march to the House of Commons with a monster petition. On the day named they were quietly informed by the police officers on the ground that they would not be allowed to cross the Thames. The whole affair ludicrously collapsed, although it had created serious alarm in London. Lord Palmerston reports the result as follows:—

“ F. O., April 11, 1848.

“ MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“ Yesterday was a glorious day, the Waterloo of peace and order. They say there were upwards of one hundred thousand special constables—some put the number at two hundred and fifty thousand; but the streets were swarming with them, and men of all classes and ranks were blended together in defence of law and property. The Chartists made a poor figure, and did not muster more than fifteen thousand men on the Common. Fergus was frightened out of his wits, and was made the happiest man in England at being told that the procession could not pass the bridges. The Chartists have found that the great bulk of the inhabitants of London are against them, and they will probably lie by for the present and watch for some more favourable moment.

Meanwhile, the result of yesterday will produce a good and calming effect all over this and the Sister Island. The foreigners did not show; but the constables, regular and special, had sworn to make an

example of any whiskered and bearded rioter whom they might meet with, and I am convinced would have mashed them to jelly.

Smith O'Brien surpassed himself last night in dulness, bad taste, and treason.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

The speech here referred to was on the discussion of the “Bill for the more effectual Repression of Treasonable Proceedings,” and was the last occasion on which Smith O'Brien appeared in the House of Commons previous to taking the field! The contemptuous indignation with which he was received by the House was overwhelming. In the next letter we get a very neat retort of Sir Robert Peel's, which shows him capable of humour when occasion offered.

“F. O., April 18, 1848.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“Lamartine is really a wonderful fellow, and is endowed with great qualities. It is much to be desired that he should swim through the breakers and carry his country safe into port. I conclude that he has escaped one danger by the refusal to naturalise Brougham; for it is evident that our ex-Chancellor meant, if he had got himself elected, to have put up for being President of the Republic. It is woful to see a man who is so near being a great man make himself so small.

“ We have just been sending up to the Lords from the House of Commons our Bill for the Security of the Crown. Peel made a good hit in the debate. Fergus O'Connor alluded to the possible case of Beelzebub being sovereign, and Peel said that in that case Fergus would certainly enjoy the confidence of the Crown. Hume, at the close of the debate, blamed us for not having put down the Convention,\* which, he said, ought not to be permitted to go on, and which, he contended (though erroneously), comes within the prohibitive provisions of our existing laws.

“ What we hear from Ireland tallies with what you wrote me a few days ago, that there can be no decided and extensive outbreak till the potato and grain harvest is in, as men must eat to be able to fight. I trust we shall be able to keep them quiet after all.

“ Yours sincerely,  
“ PALMERSTON.”

Leopold, King of the Belgians, was all through his long and useful life one of Lord Palmerston's constant correspondents. His sagacity and liberal views won the respect of the English minister, who was always ready frankly to interchange ideas with him. Since February, Paris had passed through a series of convulsions, and, at the moment when the following letter was written, the French Assembly, engaged in

\* Chartist Convention.

a struggle with the Socialists, exhibited the strange spectacle of a legislature elected by universal suffrage deliberating under the protection of cannon pointed against its own constituents. In Italy the tide had not yet turned in favour of the Austrians, and they were still entrenched in their lines beyond the Mincio. Lord Palmerston foresaw that their success, even if it did come, would be but temporary.

“Carlton G., June 15, 1848.

“SIRE,

“I was much obliged to Your Majesty for the letter which I had the honour of receiving from Your Majesty some little time ago; and I am happy to have the opportunity which is thus afforded me of congratulating Your Majesty upon the continued tranquillity and stability of your kingdom. It would seem as if the storms which have shaken everything else all over the continent of Europe had only served to consolidate more firmly the foundations of Your Majesty's throne. As to France, no man nowadays can venture to prophesy from week to week the turn affairs may take in that unfortunate country. For many years past the persons in authority in France have worked at the superstructure of monarchy without taking care of the foundation. Education and religion have been neglected, and power has now passed into the hands of a mob ignorant of the principles of government, of morality, and of justice; and it is a most remarkable fact in the history of



society that in a nation of thirty-five millions of men, who have now for more than half a century been in a state of political agitation, which, in general, forms and brings out able men, and who have during that time been governed by three dynasties, there is no public political man to whom the country looks up with confidence and respect, on account of his statesmanlike qualities and personal character combined; and there is no prince whom any large portion of the nation would make any considerable effort to place as sovereign on the throne. The principle of equality seems to have been fully carried out in one respect, and that is that all public men are equally without respect, and all candidates for royalty equally without following.

“As to poor Austria, every person who attaches value to the maintenance of a balance of power in Europe must lament her present helpless condition; and every man gifted with ever so little foresight must have seen, for a long time past, that feebleness and decay were the inevitable consequences of Prince Metternich’s system of government: though certainly no one could have expected that the rottenness within would so soon and so completely have shown itself without. Lord Bacon says that a man who aims at being the only figure among ciphers is the ruin of an age: and so it has been with Metternich. He has been jealous of anything like talent or attainment in individuals, and of anything like life in communities and nations. He succeeded for a time in

damming up and arresting the stream of human progress. The wonder is, not that the accumulated pressure should at last have broke the barrier and have deluged the country, but that his artificial impediments should have produced stagnation so long.

“ I cannot regret the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy. I do not believe, Sire, that it will diminish the real strength nor impair the real security of Austria as a European Power. Her rule was hateful to the Italians, and has long been maintained only by an expenditure of money and an exertion of military effort which left Austria less able to maintain her interests elsewhere. Italy was to her the heel of Achilles, and not the shield of Ajax. The Alps are her natural barrier and her best defence. I should wish to see the whole of Northern Italy united into one kingdom, comprehending Piedmont, Genoa, Lombardy, Venice, Parma, and Modena; and Bologna would, in that case, sooner or later unite itself either to that state or to Tuscany. Such an arrangement of Northern Italy would be most conducive to the peace of Europe, by interposing between France and Austria a neutral state strong enough to make itself respected, and sympathising in its habits and character neither with France nor with Austria; while, with reference to the progress of civilisation, such a state would have great advantages, political, commercial, and intellectual. Such an arrangement is now, in my opinion, Sire, inevitable; and the sooner the Austrian Government makes up its mind

to the necessity, the better conditions it will be able to obtain. If Austria waits till she be forcibly expelled—which she will soon be—she will get no conditions at all.

“ I have the honour to be, Sire,

“ Your Majesty’s most obedient humble Servant,

“ PALMERSTON.”

Soon after the first successes of the Italians the Austrian Government asked for the “good offices” of England.

Baron Hummelauer came from Vienna instructed to propose the erection of Lombardy into a separate duchy, with an Austrian prince, but under the suzerainty of the Emperor. Lord Palmerston told him that things had gone too far for that. He then said that he would recommend to his Government the abandonment of Lombardy on condition that she took on her shoulders part of the Austrian debt. Lord Palmerston replied that, with Venice already in Italian hands, neither Charles Albert nor his people would be satisfied with this, and suggested that a part at least of Venetia should be included. Baron Hummelauer then said that he would go back and submit this to his Government.

It was certainly a tribute to British influence that it should have been sought thus early by a Power which was not at any rate very well inclined to the man who represented England with foreign nations.

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Prince Metternich had detested Canning, and nursed the greater part of his antipathy for the benefit of Canning's distinguished disciple. Prince Schwarzenberg, when he succeeded to Metternich's place, succeeded also to his prejudices, and brought at the same time a more passionate nature to bear. The consequence was that the spirit of Lord Palmerston's policy and proceedings towards Austria was entirely misunderstood by the Imperial cabinet. The preservation of the Austrian empire was one of the leading considerations which bore upon his different projects for the settlement of the Italian question. Certainly, in 1848, he apprehended its downfall, but he only participated in the fears of every statesman in Europe, including the Austrians themselves. To concentrate her resources upon her own important territories appeared, in the summer of that year, the only way for Austria to extricate herself from her difficulties, and to save her Germanic crown.

In the following letters we find evidence of the general feeling at the time, shared by the Austrians themselves, that the independence of Lombardy was won. Lord Palmerston's suggestion as to the abdication of the Emperor Ferdinand only anticipated what took place some months later. The present Emperor, at that time, "the lad of sixteen or twenty," mounted the throne, saved the Austrian empire, and has since shown himself a wise and patriotic ruler.

“ F. O., April 21, 1848.

“ MY DEAR PONSONBY,

“ I have, at the request of Dietrichstein,\* instructed Abercromby to recommend to the Sardinian Government a suspension of arms, in order to give Count Hartig an opportunity of trying negotiation with the Milanese; but the success or failure of Abercromby's application will depend entirely upon the state of military operations at the time when my despatch reaches him; and, to say the truth, I have little expectation that his application will be successful, unless for the attainment of an armistice of a few days. Of course, the Sardinians and Lombards will consider the armistice as a pretence by which to gain time for the advance of Austrian reinforcements under Count Nugent. I have received your note stating the three degrees of arrangement which Hartig is authorized to propose. The first and second, I am quite sure, will not be listened to. Things have gone much too far to admit of the possibility of any future connection between the Italians and Austria. Either of those two first arrangements might have been received with thankfulness six months ago, but they now come too late. Whether the third will be agreed to or not, will probably depend on the turn which the war will have taken. If the Austrians still retain a strong military position, from which they could not be driven without much expense of time,

\* Austrian ambassador in London.

blood, and money, the Italians may consent to buy them out; but even in this case there will most likely be a wide difference between what one party asks and what the other would give. If, on the other hand, the Austrians should be evidently losing ground when Hartig arrives, the chances are that the Italians will not consent to pay anything to Austria, and will only agree to give the Austrian troops a *lascia passare* for their retreat to their own homes. I certainly quite agree with you and your Austrian friend that Austria would be much better out of Italy than in it. Italy can never now be a useful possession for Austria. National antipathy has been so powerfully excited that Lombardy could be kept only by the sword, and that tenure would, under the most favourable circumstances, be very insecure, and would render the occupation far more expensive than valuable. I should say that the Austrians would be right in trying to drive a good bargain with the Lombards, provided they do not stand out too long, nor for terms over-high: anything would be better than a prolonged contest; for that would infallibly bring the French into the conflict, and then Austria would have on her hands a war which every prudential reason should teach her not to provoke, though, of course, she would meet it stoutly if it came upon her unprovoked and without any reason.

“ On the whole, the conclusion to which I should come is, that the cheapest, best, and wisest thing

which Austria can do, is to give up her Italian possessions quietly and at once, and to direct her attention and energy to organising the remainder of her coast territories, to cement them together, and to develop their abundant resources. But to do this there ought to be some able men at the head of affairs, and our doubt is whether there are any such now in office. First and foremost, what is the animal *implumis bipes* called Emperor? A perfect nullity; next thing to an idiot. What is the man who would succeed if the Emperor was to die? A brother scarcely a shade better than the Emperor. Who comes next? A lad of sixteen or twenty; and what else he is, nobody seems to know; but whatever he may become hereafter, he cannot now be competent to take any part in political affairs. If the next heir to the crown were a man of energy and capacity, I should say that the only way of saving Austria would be to persuade the Emperor to abdicate in favour of that successor; and I presume that if the Emperor was told that he must abdicate, he would do as he was bid. But to do any good in this way would require three successive abdications, so as to set aside the present, the next, and the next but one Emperor, and thus to pave the way for the accession of the Archduke John, though I do not know that even then we should be in the regular line of succession. But everybody seems to agree that he is the best man, if not the only man, among them all. Now, three abdications

are not easily obtained without a revolution ; even after the three glorious days of July there were only two, namely, that of Charles X. and that of the Duke of Angoulême. But the Archduke John might be brought forward and be placed in some situation of commanding influence. These are not times for standing upon ceremonies, and the Austrian empire is a thing worth saving. You cannot do amiss by suggesting this to any persons who may have influence in such matters.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

And a few weeks later, in another letter, he says:—

“ How can an empire stand in these days without an emperor at its head? And by an emperor I mean a man endowed with intellectual faculties suited to his high station. A mere man of straw, a Guy Faux, like the present Emperor, may do very well in quiet times, when a Metternich, who never leaves his study, can govern a great country by his unopposed will, and can draw on, by his personal influence, various other governments despotic like his own to pursue the same policy, to prevent all improvement, to stifle all symptoms of life among nations, and to enforce the stillness of death, and to boast that such a state of tranquillity is a proof of contentment and a guarantee for happiness. But the present year has dashed Europe abruptly in a far different condition. There is a general fight going



on all over the Continent between governors and the governed, between law and disorder, between those who have and those who want to have, between honest men and rogues; and as the turbulent, the poor, and the rogues are in this world, though perhaps, not always the most numerous—at all events, the most active—the other classes require for their defence to be led and headed by intelligence, activity, and energy. But how can these qualities be found in a government where the sovereign is an idiot? Pray, then, tell Wesseberg from me, but in the strictest confidence, that I would entreat of him and his colleagues to consider, for the salvation of their country, whether some arrangement could not be made by which the Emperor might abdicate, for which his bodily health might furnish a fair reason, while some more efficient successor might ascend the throne in his stead. I fear that his next brother is little better than he is; but could not the son of that brother be called to the succession? And though he is young, he yet could mount his horse, and show himself to his troops and his people, could excite some enthusiasm for his person as well as for his official station, and, by the aid of good ministers and able generals, might re-establish the Austrian empire in its proper position at home and abroad. I am sure that Wesseberg will forgive the liberty I am taking, but the maintenance of the Austrian empire is an object of general interest to all Europe, and to no country more than England.”

Whatever chance, however, the Italians may have had of being able to cope singlehanded with the Austrians, was thrown away by a want of cordial co-operation between their different forces. They soon lost all the ground which they had gained. Complete victory crowned the efforts of Marshal Radetsky, and Milan surrendered on the 6th of August.

The question of mediation between Austria and Sardinia had been under discussion between France and England previously to the great reverses sustained by the Sardinian troops. When their utter destruction seemed inevitable, and intelligence of the capture of Milan was daily expected, the French Government represented that nothing but an assurance that England would join in mediation could prevent them from marching to the assistance of the Sardinians;\* and so urgent were they on this point, that Lord Normanby, before he received his instructions, found it indispensable, on the faith of a private letter from Lord Palmerston, to engage that England would concur. The instruction to this effect was sent to Lord Normanby on the 7th of August, and with it were sent instructions to be forwarded to Lord Ponsonby and Mr. Abercromby in the event of the French Government agreeing to the basis of mediation laid down by Lord Palmerston.

\* General Oudinot came to Paris for orders, and told Cavaignac that if he was not allowed to lead his army to Italy to assist Charles Albert, his army would go without him, and that many of his officers had already gone privately to offer their services.

Even if the French Government had not concurred, the instructions were to be sent on, in order that those ministers might tender the single mediation of England between the contending parties.

France, however, joined with England, and an armistice was concluded between the contending parties. Then ensued a long and infructuous negotiation. The object of Lord Palmerston was to persuade Austria, while retaining Venice, to give up Lombardy, and receive in money an equivalent for its loss.

“F. O., August 31, 1848.

“MY DEAR PONSONBY,

“The real fact is that the Austrians have no business in Italy at all, and have no real right to be there. The right they claim is founded upon force of arms and the Treaty of Vienna. The Treaty of Vienna they themselves set at nought when they took possession of Cracow, and they have never fulfilled their engagement to give national institutions and a national representation to their Polish subjects. They cannot claim the treaty when it suits their purpose, and at the same time, when it suits their purpose, reject it. Moreover, there was no guarantee in the Treaty of Vienna for any of its arrangements, except for those relating to Prussian Saxony and to Switzerland. But we offer them an equivalent for that which they are called upon to give up, and they get, therefore, a substitute for what the treaty assigned them.

“As to their title founded on force, force may be employed to defeat it, and with just as much right.

“But the people at Vienna think, perhaps, that force will not be so employed. If that is their opinion, the sooner they are undeceived the better. I know very well that Metternich and others here keep up an active correspondence with Germany, and no doubt amuse their correspondents at Vienna with all kinds of hopes and expectations of the support which Austria will receive on this Italian question from hence, and of the want of power in France to go to war. Wesseberg knows Metternich and England well enough not to be misled by these tales of emigrants. He well knows that private and personal intrigues can accomplish nothing here; and he will easily understand that Metternich will do no more than was Zuylen able to accomplish, nor even so much. Pray request him not to be misled on this point. And as to the interference of France, it will be given if Austria is stubborn; and if a French army enters Italy, the Austrians will be driven, not to the Mincio, or to the Adige, or to Piave, but clean over the Alps. I do not wish to see the French in Italy; there are a great many strong and weighty reasons why I should dislike it; but I would rather that they should go in than that the Austrians should retain Lombardy; and the people at Vienna may depend upon it that if, owing to their obstinacy, our mediation should fail, the French will enter Italy, and with

the consent of England, and we shall not then be content with Hummelauer's memorandum.

“ Providence meant mankind to be divided into separate nations, and for this purpose countries have been founded by natural barriers, and races of men have been distinguished by separate languages, habits, manners, dispositions, and characters. There is no case on the globe in which this intention is more marked than that of the Italians and the Germans, kept apart by the Alps, and as unlike in everything as two races can be. Austria has never possessed Italy as part of her empire, but has always held it as a conquered territory. There has been no mixture of races. The only Austrians have been the troops and the civil officers. She has governed it as you govern a garrison town, and her rule has always been hateful. We do not wish to threaten; but it is the part of a friend to tell the truth, and the truth is that Austria *cannot*, and *must not*, retain Lombardy; and she ought to think herself well enough off by keeping Venetia, if, indeed, that province is really advantageous to her. They will twit you at Vienna with Ireland, and say what should we reply if they were to ask us to give up Ireland; but the cases are wholly different. In Ireland the races are mixed, and almost amalgamated; and, at all events, the Celts are in Scotland, and Wales, and Cornwall, as well as in Ireland. The language is the same; for English is spoken all over Ireland, and the land, and wealth, and intelligence of the country is for the connection.

None of this can be said of Italy in regard to Austria.

“Time presses. The French are growing very impatient. We are holding them back, because we wish these things to be settled amicably; but they cannot be withheld much longer; and if the mediation is refused, some energetic decision will infallibly be taken. Exert yourself to the utmost to prevent a crisis, which must end in the humiliation of Austria.

“North of the Alps, we wish her all the prosperity and success in the world. Events have rendered it unavoidable that she should remain, in some shape or other, south of the Alps, and as far west as the Adige. Beyond that line, depend upon it, she cannot stay.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

Brussels, after many *pourparlers*, was fixed upon as the place of meeting for the mediation Conference. But Lord Palmerston writes to point out that at such a Conference nothing but matters of detail could be settled. The principles must be conceded beforehand.

“Brockton, November, 12, 1848.

“MY DEAR PONSONBY,

“The true and real seat of the negotiation is Vienna, and, unless the Austrian Government agree to our proposed basis for an arrangement, I foresee no good to come out of the mediation; and as sure as

fate Austria will find herself involved in a serious war before next Midsummer Day. It is totally and absolutely impossible that she can keep quiet possession of the Italian provinces; and all you hear at Vienna to the contrary is nothing but the *bon à dire* of the Metternich school, and is the result of the established practice of the disciples of that school, to go on asserting as facts that which they know to be false, but wish to be true, under the absurd notion that by frequent repetition falsehood may become truth. The only consequence of this system is, that those who act upon it and those who are misled by it govern their conduct upon entirely erroneous data; and the results of such false policy are, that men like Metternich and Guizot meet in exile in London; that sovereigns like Louis Philippe drink unwholesome water and sour small beer at Claremont, instead of champagne and claret at the Tuileries; and that ancient empires like Austria are thrown into anarchy and confusion, and are brought to the very verge of dissolution.

“If Austria can retain secure possession of her Venetian provinces by casting off Lombardy, she will have made the best bargain that any state ever yet made in a difficult crisis. My own opinion is, that she will not thus secure what she will retain; that even then she will lay up in store for herself difficulties, dangers, and mortifications in time to come; and that the really wise course for her to pursue would be to adopt the plan which we proposed to

Hummelauer, in reply to his second memorandum. But the proposed basis of our mediation does not go so far, and we do not, therefore, now press this upon her; but the proposed basis of mediation we do wish you most earnestly to press upon her, and you may confidentially assure her that, in all human probability, if she rejects it now, she will have to fight in the spring.

“I quite understand the drift and meaning of Prince Windischgratz’s message to our Queen; but pray make the Camarilla understand that, in a constitutional country like England, these things cannot answer; and that a foreign Government which places its reliance upon working upon the Court against the Government of this country is sure to be disappointed.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

Austria, however, was not in a temper either for reason or conciliation.

“Broadlands, Dec. 28, 1848.

“MY DEAR ABERCROMBY,

“I have received your letter with the Milanese paper enclosed in it. I am very glad that you prevented Campbell from taking any official notice of the attack upon me which that paper contains. All I should wish is that that attack should be circulated and read from one end of Italy, and from one end of Europe to another. As regards the Austrians, it



shows that our Austrian policy has excited the old-womanish anger of some very small minds at Vienna ; and the idea of punishing us for our course by not sending an Archduke to London to announce the accession of the Emperor is truly characteristic of the State policy of European China ; one should be tempted to laugh at it outright if one did not feel grieved to see the destinies of a great empire in the hands of men who can conceive and boast of such a childish revenge. Ponsonby wrote me word that Schwarzenberg had announced to him that no Archduke would be sent, because they would not place a member of the Imperial family in contact with a person who had proved himself so great an enemy as I have shown myself to be of Austria. I told Ponsonby in reply, that I am sincerely grateful to the Austrian Government for having spared me the trouble and inconvenience which, amid a heavy pressure of business, such a mission would have occasioned to me. I am almost afraid, however, from what I have since heard, that they have thought worse of their first determination, and that some Archduke is coming to us. As to the abuse of me and my policy in the newspaper of Milan, I look upon all it says, considering whence it comes, as a compliment ; and if there is any truth in the saying, *Noscitur a sociis*, I feel much obliged to the writers for classing me with three of the most enlightened statesmen of the present day—Espartero, Reshid Pasha, and Mavrocordato. As to the warlike an-

nouncements of the Italians, they must, I fear, end in smoke or in defeat. I heartily wish that Italy was *più forte*; but weak as she is, a contest single-handed with Austria would only lead to her more complete prostration, and I doubt whether France is as yet quite ready to take the field in her support. I do not wish to see Italy emancipated from the Austrian yoke by the help of French arms, but perhaps it would be better it should be so done than not done at all; and if it were so done at a time when England and France were well together, we might be able to prevent any permanently bad consequences from resulting from it. But the great object at present is to keep things quiet; to re-establish peace in Northern Italy, and to trust to future events for greater improvements.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

Austria never sent a plenipotentiary to Brussels. The mediation and the Conference fell to the ground. In the spring of 1849 the armistice came to an end, and the disaster of Novara sealed the fate of Italian independence for another ten years. The British Government, however, did not cease its efforts to obtain better terms for the conquered. There was the question of payment for the expenses of the war. This still offered an opportunity of being of service to the Italians.

The following letter was in reply to one from the

Premier finding fault with a despatch as being too "dry and disparaging" to Austria. Admiral Cecille was French minister in London. The Russians were occupying the Principalities, in consequence of their intervention on the revolt of Hungary.

"Broadlands, April 9, 1849.

"MY DEAR JOHN RUSSELL,

"I merely repeat in my draft what Cecille said a few days ago. He said that, as a Frenchman and looking merely to French interests, he could not object to the heaviness of the proposed payment, because it would necessarily tend to weaken Piedmont and drive her into the arms of France; but he thought it a measure as cruel and oppressive, as it was for Austrian interests impolitic. I do not see why we should follow the Tory example, and abandon our friends merely because they have been unfortunate; and if it is said that the Turin Government and Charles Albert made war against our advice and in defiance of common sense, it ought to be borne in mind that it is not Charles Albert nor the late Turin Government by whom the contribution is to be paid, and that the pressure of the infliction will fall upon those who had no share in the folly of which it professes to be the punishment. General recommendations of moderation will be of no avail; if we want to produce any effect at Vienna, we must come to specific details.

"There is no doubt that, as you say, the present

moment is one full of danger ; but I should hope that a firm attitude on our part, assumed in conjunction with France, may avert any serious or permanent consequences. Austria seems to have paused in Italy, and not to have sent troops as yet to Florence and Rome. But there is evidently a close connection between Austria and Russia, not closer, however, than has existed at any time since the French Revolution of 1830 ; and we are so far better off than we have hitherto been, that there are only two Powers linked together instead of three, as there used to be, as Prussia has broken off and looks to be the leading power of independent Germany instead of being the kettle tied to the tail of her two great military neighbours. When Minto was at Berlin, and wanted to know the policy and views of Prussia upon any great question, we used to be told that we must go and ask St. Petersburg and Vienna. That serfdom is now broken.

“ You say that we must either support France or court Austria. I believe that by the first course we may restrain France, and control both Austria and Russia ; by the second course, if pushed beyond civility, and carried to the extent of any sacrifice of truth, principle, or justice, we should lose France without gaining Austria, just as we should lose our supporters at home without conciliating a single Tory. Austria keeps hold on to Russia for the present, as a bad swimmer keeps close to a good one. She has hard and heavy work to do in Hungary,

Transylvania, and other provinces, and the Russian armies are at hand to help her, if need be. We cannot outbid Russia in these matters; no fair words of ours can outweigh the fine divisions of the Autocrat. It is unfortunate for Austria and for Europe that the Austrian Government should place itself in this state of dependence upon Russia, because it disqualifies Austria from being hereafter a check upon Russian ambition and encroachment. 'Hold your tongue,' the Russians will say, 'and remember that we saved you from dismemberment and ruin.' Perhaps the Austrians may not, if they become strong, mind such reproaches; but still this sort of military assistance must be paid for one way or another. However, we must hope for the best; and if England and France are steady, I have no doubt we shall get the Russians out of the Principalities. Austria, be she ever so subservient to Russia, cannot submit to see her get possession of those military positions; and Russia, not knowing the full extent of the moral prostration of England as a European Power, would not lightly encounter the risk of being opposed by England, France, and Turkey united; and Turkey is now in a much more respectable condition as to her army and navy than she was in during the campaigns of 1828-29."

In August, Massimo D'Azeglio sent from Turin an acknowledgment of Lord Palmerston's aid to Italy in the negotiation.

“ Au moment où nous venons de conclure la paix avec l’Autriche, je manquerais à un de mes principaux devoirs, si, interprète des sentimens dont le Cabinet de S. M. est animé, je ne m’empressais de faire parvenir à Votre Excellence le tribut de notre vive gratitude pour le bienveillant appui que, dans le sincère intérêt qu’elle porte à l’Italie et surtout au Piémont, Votre Seigneurie a bien voulu nous prêter, durant le cours de nos longues et difficiles négociations. Le Roi et son Gouvernement, qui avaient invoqué cet appui avec une entière confiance, se plaisent à reconnaître que c’est principalement à son efficacité qu’ils doivent d’avoir obtenu des conditions meilleures, et telles que pouvaient les admettre la dignité et l’honneur toujours intacts du Piémont. L’assistance soutenue que nous avons rencontré de la part de V. S. a d’autant plus de prix à nos yeux, qu’en réalisant l’espérance fondée que nous avions d’arriver avec son secours à ce résultat, elle nous a donné une nouvelle preuve de la constance et de la franche et loyale amitié qui unit, depuis tant de siècles, la Sardaigne et l’Angleterre, sa plus puissante et sa plus fidèle alliée.”

The occasion referred to in the following letter was a dinner given to the late Government, in order to celebrate their achievements in the cause of Free Trade. Sir Robert made a highly ornate speech, in the course of which he uttered a panegyric on the Duke of Wellington, and, describing his victories,

said, "The leopard never paused in his career until the British standard was floating over Paris!" Lord Palmerston's opinion of Peel's character will be read with curiosity.

"C. G., July 3, 1849.

"MY DEAR NORMANBY,

"Peel's speech at the Mansion House was in bad taste and very injudicious; so much so that one might almost fancy it was intended to do mischief. But I do not believe this. Peel is not by any means so really prudent a man as people think him. He is impelled strongly by sudden and violent impulses, and his reserved and apparently cold manner is, I really believe, not only the result of proud shyness, but is also purposely assumed to assist him in that self-control which he feels to be so constantly necessary.

"Another instance of his want of judgment on a sudden emergency was his famous declaration in the House of Commons, 'that ample reparation must be given for the gross outrage at Tahiti.' But you may tell the President that Peel's speech at the City dinner has been condemned here alike by his friends and his opponents, and that it represents no feeling except the feeling which prompted him to put a flourish into his speech, and a recollection, probably, of a much applauded speech which he made many years ago in the House of Commons, I believe in voting thanks to the Duke, and in which he described the Duke's patience and foresight when he stood

for so long behind the lines of Torres Vedras, with his back to the sea.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

Before the end of the session the leader of the Protectionist party in the Commons made a final effort to gain the sanction of the House to the principles of commercial policy which he had espoused. He accordingly moved for a Select Committee on the state of the nation. He asserted that distress and disgrace had been progressive since the accession to power of the Whig administration. Sir Robert Peel warmly supported the Government.

“C. G., July 7, 1849.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“Our session is drawing to a close, and will probably finish by the first week in August. After all the trumpeting of attacks that were to demolish first one and then another member of the Government—first me, then Grey, then Charles Wood—we have come triumphantly out of all debates and divisions, and end the session stronger than we began it. Our division this morning, on Disraeli’s motion ‘On the State of the Nation,’ was 296 to 156—a majority of 140! on a motion declared to be a question of confidence or no confidence in the Government.



“The French are by this time in Rome.\* I send you despatches explaining our views on these matters. If you have an opportunity of mentioning them to the Neapolitan Ministers, take those despatches for your text, and say that it is impossible that the Pope can return to Rome—or even if he returned, that he could permanently maintain himself—unless he grants, or confirms rather, to the Romans the Constitution which he gave them last year; and the Neapolitan Government would be contributing usefully to the peace of Italy, and would be promoting the interests of the Pope, if they were to concur with France in strongly urging the Pope to pursue such a course. It is by no means certain that he would be taken back by the Romans even on those conditions, but the probability is that he would; and it is almost a certainty that upon any other conditions he would be rejected.

“I was told the other day by an Irish Catholic priest, that the people of Rome say that if the Pope and his Cardinals are to be forced back upon them merely because they are Catholics, they will all declare themselves Protestants, and then that excuse will cease to have any weight.

“If it should be impossible to bring the Pope and his subjects to terms, a very inconvenient state of things will arise. The French will never allow

\* Lord Palmerston once said, when asked for an illustration of the difference between “business” and “occupation,” “The French undertook the occupation of Rome, but they had no business there.”

the Pope to be forced back unconditionally on the Romans; some other independent government must therefore be established at Rome, that would perhaps be a republic; and a republic at Rome would be an inconvenient neighbour for the King of Naples. But for my part, I should not see any insurmountable objection to acknowledging such a government, if the return of the Pope on the basis of a Constitution should be impossible. Colloredo has always said to me that the Austrians do not insist upon the unconditional return of the Pope. It seems quite clear that the Pope never can again be what he has been, and that his spiritual power will be much diminished by the curtailment or loss of his temporal authority. This is surely a good thing for Europe, both Catholic and Protestant, and if it ends in very much nationalising and localising the Catholic Church in every country, that alone will be a great point gained, and will be a material step in the progress of human society.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

Lord Brougham was this session in one of his harassing moods, and had given notice of a motion in the House of Lords, expressive of regret that the Government had shown in its conduct of foreign affairs a want of friendly feelings towards the allies of Great Britain. Lord Palmerston availed himself of the notice given to press on the French their questionable conduct at Rome.

“ F. O., July 16, 1849.

“ MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“ The debate on Brougham’s motion on Friday will turn chiefly on Italian affairs, and of course Sicily, Lombardy, and Rome will be the main topics on which Brougham, Stanley, and Aberdeen—the three witches who have filled the cauldron—will dilate. As to Sicily and Lombardy, our Peers will be at no loss what to say; but the Roman affair is not so clear, and it would be very useful—not only for us, but, as it seems to me, for the French Government—if Lansdowne and whoever else may speak on our side from the Ministerial bench, were able to say something positive and definitive as to the intentions of the French Government.

“ The questions which will naturally be asked are: In what character has the French army taken possession of Rome?—is it as conquerors of a city to be added to France? Of course not; that answer is easily given. Is it then as friends of the Pope, or as friends of the Roman people? This question it is hard to answer; and for us, unaided by the French Government, impossible.

“ The French Government declared by Drouyn de Lhuys’ despatches, communicated by Cecille, that they meant to impose restraint neither on the Pope nor on the Romans; but they also told us, when they consulted us as to the expediency of their joining the conferences at Gaëta, that they would make the maintenance of the Constitution given last

year a *sine quâ non* condition of the restoration of the Pope. Circumstances over which the Government of Paris had perhaps little or no control, have led the French army to put considerable constraint on the Romans, to the extent of besieging and capturing the city of Rome. Does the French Government mean to throw over its *sine quâ non* condition, and to take advantage of its military occupation of Rome, for the purpose of compelling the Romans to take back the Pope without any engagement on his part to maintain the Constitution, and to establish a real and *bonâ fide* separation between the temporal and spiritual power? I conclude that the French Government can have no intention of this kind, because such a course would be an entire change of policy, and would be an adoption of the system of Metternich and of Petersburg—a system which might do for Louis Philippe, but could hardly do for Louis Napoleon.

“My own belief is that the priestly and Absolutist party is beginning to prevail in the French Cabinet about the affairs of Rome, and that the French Government is preparing to re-establish the Pope, leaving it to his generosity (which is like the honour of Shakespeare’s knight) to grant *de novo* to his subjects such reforms of the Gregorian abuses as he may on reconsideration think expedient; but that they, the French, and he, the Pope, are to concur with the Cardinals, the priests, the Austrians, the Neapolitans, and the Spaniards in deeming all that

was done by the Pope last year as null and void. Now, such a course would be well enough for Schwarzenberg, Narvaez, Ferdinand of Naples, and Lambruschini, but it would be highly discreditable to the French Government.

“Tocqueville may say, ‘But if we propose conditions to the Pope, he will refuse them, and what are we to do then?—are we to remain for ever at Rome; or are we to go out, and let either the Austrians or Garibaldi in?’ My answer would be, that if they who are in possession of Rome make the Pope and his Cardinals and the Austrian Government clearly understand that the Pope cannot come back except upon the before-mentioned conditions, the Pope will put his allocution of the 20th April into a drawer, and will accept the conditions. But if he refuses; what then? Why, if I was the French Government, I would then say that I withdrew my interference, and should leave the Pope and the Romans to settle their disputes as they could; but that I would not allow Austria, or Naples, or Spain to exercise any interference either; and that, in withdrawing my troops from Rome, I would, if it was worth while, require from the Roman municipality, or whatever the ruling authorities were, that no foreigners—that is to say, no persons not Italians—should be admitted to power within the city. I say not Italians, for it is pedantry to call men belonging to other parts of Italy ‘strangers’ at Rome.

“But the French would say, ‘The result of this

would be the continuance of a republic at Rome.' Well, and what if it was? It would not be the first time that an Italian adopted a republican form of government; and it cannot be feared that the modern republic of Rome would conquer Europe, like its ancient predecessor.

“ My own belief is that, sooner or later, Rome will become a republic, and that nothing but overruling and foreign military force can prevent such a result. There are mutually repelling properties between a reasoning people and an elective priestly Government. The Roman people have tasted too much of the spring of knowledge, both religious and political, during the last fourteen months—or, I may say, now nearly three years—not to be determined to ‘ drink deep,’ and in the present state of Europe no human power can long prevent them from so doing. The Papal supremacy, both spiritual and political, has received an earthquake shake from which it never can recover, and all that can be done is to patch up the rent as well as circumstances permit, so that the fabric may last for a time; but there will be shock after shock, till it all crumbles to the ground. The Catholic Powers say to the Romans that they must submit to the worst and most anomalous government in the civilised world, because they are Papists; the Roman people will ere long reply by saying, ‘ We are no longer Papists; take your Pope and give him as sovereign to those who are Papists still.’

“ The Reformation in Europe was as much a move-

ment to shake off political oppression as it was to give freedom to religious conscience, and similar causes are apt to produce similar effects.

“Yours sincerely,  
“PALMERSTON.”

The reforms which were announced were not sufficient, in Lord Palmerston's opinion.

“F. O., July 24, 1849.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“The French evidently mean to be satisfied with those reforms for Rome which were proposed by the five Powers in 1832—Municipal and Provincial Assemblies, and a Consulta de Stato without legislative authority, the law-making power to be kept in the hands of the Pope. If the Pope and his ministers were likely to exercise with judgment and justice and integrity the absolute powers which such a system would give them, things might go on well enough upon such a footing; but as they are sure to abuse the power they will possess, one may safely predict another revolution as soon as the pressure of foreign troops is removed. I suppose, however, that this danger will be provided for by transferring to the Pope's service some two or three thousand foreign troops for the maintenance of order. As soon as the Pope returns to Rome we must think of sending a minister to him. Shall you have any means, through the nuncio at Naples, of ascertaining whether the Pope is of the same mind as last year as to receiving

a minister from us? We should not at all mind the Pope treating us as he does the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, and not sending us a minister in return; though of course we should be glad to receive one if it suited the Pope to send one. But if they ask whether we are likely to repeal the clause in the Act which prevents us from receiving an ecclesiastic, you may say that there is no chance or possibility of that being done.

“We are finishing our session; the prorogation will be next Tuesday or Wednesday. We end it triumphantly in the Lords as well as in the Commons; and I individually leave off, as I began, with a personal victory, for the motion by Brougham last week was in fact aimed at me specially.\*

“I had an opportunity on Saturday of paying off Aberdeen for his repeated and very ungentlemanlike attacks upon me. I just gave him enough to show him that, if I had thought it worth while, I could have given him more; and the House of Commons was quite with me, at least the members present.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

This was in a debate on the Hungarian war. Several Liberal members took the opportunity of replying to speeches made in a reactionary spirit in the House of Lords. Lord Palmerston, in the course of his remarks, said: “There are some persons

\* It was rejected by a majority of 12.



who see in the relations of countries nothing but the intercourse of Cabinets. It is not as the ancient ally of England during war; it is not as the means of resistance in the centre of Europe to any general disturbance of the balance of power; it is as the former symbol of resistance to improvement, political and social, that Austria has won the affections of some men in the conduct of public affairs. Sir, there are men who, having passed their whole lives in adoring the Government of Austria, because they deemed it the great symbol of the opinions which they entertained, at last became fickle in their attachment, and transferred their allegiance to the Government of France, because they thought that in that Government they saw an almost equal degree of leaning to the arbitrary principle, and because they, forsooth, suspected that Government of designs hostile to the interests of freedom. We have heard of persons of that sort making use of the expression *old women*.\* Public men ought not to deal in egotism, and I will not apply to them the expression that has fallen from their own mouth. I will only say that the conduct of such men is an example of antiquated imbecility."

The following letter to Mr. Charles Murray, the Consul-General at Alexandria—though stating what

\* Lord Aberdeen, a few days before, in a laboured attack upon Lord Palmerston's policy, had said that Lord Minto had only been received by the King of Naples for the same reason that the "old woman" of Syracuse "acquiesced in the tyranny of Dionysius—lest the devil should come next."

is well known to all Englishmen as the rule of our public service—would astonish the great men of some other countries, where presents are regarded as a considerable source of official remuneration :—

“ F. O., August 30, 1849.

“ MY DEAR MURRAY,

“ In working up the chaotic arrear which accumulates during a session of Parliament, I have come upon your letter of the 10th May, in which you say that Ahmed Bey, the eldest son of Ibrahim Pasha, had intimated an intention of sending me some horses as a present. I hope no inconvenience will have arisen from my not having answered your letter sooner; but if he should mention his intentions to you again, I wish you to say that you will make known to me his kind intention, and that you are sure that I shall be much flattered by the intended compliment, and much gratified by the friendly feeling of which it is a proof; but that you know that it is a positive and invariable rule for British ministers not to accept presents of any kind from anybody, and that, consequently, although there is nobody from whom I should be more gratified by receiving such a mark of goodwill, I should be obliged, as a matter of duty, to decline the present, and it is better, therefore, that he should let the matter drop.\*

\* The same rule applies to foreign “orders.” Queen Elizabeth used to say that she would not allow “her sheep to be tarred by another shepherd.

“ Abbas Pasha seems not to be a very enlightened governor, but he is evidently a good Turk, and disposed to cling to the Sultan; and that is a great political merit in our eyes, and covers and makes amends for a multitude of faults.

“ Mehemet Ali’s civilisation was, after all, nothing but a thin varnish which sank little into the substance of the country, and his political schemes and intrigues with France were constantly bringing Europe to the verge of an European war. I prefer Abbas twenty to one to old Mehemet.

“ Egyptian civilisation must come from Constantinople, and not from Paris, to be durable or consistent with British interests of a most important kind.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

There was one form of present, however, which his position did not forbid him to accept, and which, under the circumstances, was even more gratifying than a horse from a Pasha. Just before the end of the session he received a deputation of members of the House of Commons, who asked him to sit for a full-length portrait, to be given by them to Lady Palmerston, “as a small memento of his great abilities, high honour, noble-minded independent policy, warmheartedness, and worth.”

As soon as he gets out of town he sends his brother the local news, and an account of his country pursuits.

“ Brocket, September 23, 1849.

“ MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“ The present moment is the moment of reaction in Europe. The Revolutionists have had their swing ; the tide is turned, and the Absolutists are for the time in the ascendant. But this state of things cannot last, and the Governments of Europe cannot finally settle down into the same practice of abuses and oppressions which was the real cause of the outbreaks of last year.

“ Here in England everything is quiet. Our harvest is good, and the potatoes not much diseased ; trade and manufactures are rallying, and all interests tolerably well off. Cholera has been very active, and has been so spread over the country that hardly any place or town has been exempt from it. But it may almost everywhere be traceable to noxious effluvia, arising from accumulations of dirt and of animal and vegetable matter, choked-up drains, stinking sewers, and things of that kind ; and few persons have anywhere been attacked by it who have not been exposed to these operating causes. In almost all instances, moreover, prompt attention to incipient diarrhœa has stopped the evil, and the disease has assumed its bad form only when those premonitory symptoms have been neglected. Small doses of preparations of opium and some calomel have generally been sufficient to stop the first beginnings. There were several cases at Romsey at the end of July and in the beginning of August, but none since, and they were almost all

in Banning Street and in the hundred, where bad drainage, or rather no drainage at all, occasioned the presence of bad exhalations. Emily,\* who like other ladies, is nervous about these things, had a disinclination to go to Broadlands till cholera shall be quite over. We were detained in London till the end of August by Lady Ashley's confinement, and since then we have been at Panshanger and here. It does not much matter to me where I am, as red boxes make almost all places equal. I am, however, very well, and yesterday managed to take four hours' partridge shooting.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

“Broadlands, January 1, 1850.

“Our shooting has been but indifferent, owing to a bad breeding season following upon two previous years of the same kind, together with a good poaching season at Romsey; but I have been able to get out three or four times with the hounds, which always does me more good than anything else.

“Our session will begin the last day of this month. We shall, probably, have a sharp fire from the Protectionists at starting; but they can make no permanent or material impression either on the House or the country; and they are wholly unable to form a Government, even if the offer to do so could be made to them.

“How do you get on with your demands on the

\* Lady Palmerston.

Neapolitan Government for compensation for the merchants for losses during the civil war? We have given Parker instructions to go to Athens, when he leaves the seas of the Levant, and to back up Wyse in enforcing certain demands, which have been long pending before the Greek Government, for compensation for British subjects for various wrongs at different times done to them. When the account of Parker's visit to Athens reaches Naples, you may as well confidentially, and not in pursuance of instructions, but as the result of your own good wishes to avert disagreeable events from Naples, suggest to the Neapolitan minister the possibility that Parker might receive orders to pay a similar visit to Naples for a like purpose; and that it might be as well for the Neapolitan Government to prevent this by doing with a good grace that which, in such a case, they might find it best policy to do, although with a bad grace, and with some derogation to the dignity of the King."

We shall come later on to the history of these demands upon the Greek Government, but the foregoing passage shows that the strong measures which Lord Palmerston felt himself bound to take at Athens were prompted not merely by wrongs endured there, but also by his conviction that, at many other points, the prestige of England would suffer, and difficulties would arise if she allowed herself to be baffled in the East by a Power whose weakness was its strength, and duplicity its weapon.

## CHAPTER IV.

War in Hungary—Question of the Hungarian Refugees.

THE revolution at Vienna had been quickly followed by a rising in Hungary. The civil war raged for many months, and success had attended the Magyars, so far as operations in the field were concerned. In her dire strait Austria had called in the aid of Russia. The Emperor Nicholas quickly responded with 150,000 men, seeking to justify his act in the face of Europe by considerations of safety for his own possessions. This intervention decided the contest, and Hungary lay prostrate at the feet of the two great military empires. The sympathies of men like Lord Palmerston were with the Hungarians, because, if they were revolutionists, they were so in the same sense as the men to whose acts, at the close of the seventeenth century, it is owing that the present Royal Family of England, happily for the nation, are seated on the throne of these realms. Hungary had long had its separate Constitution, Parliament, and laws. The crowns of Austria and Hungary had devolved upon one head, because the

same person had by different and separate titles become, in order of succession, Sovereign of each of the two countries. The Emperor of Austria became King of Hungary only by virtue of his coronation as King of Hungary at Pesth, on which occasion he took an oath to observe and maintain its Constitution. The Austrian Cabinet wished entirely to destroy that Constitution, and incorporate Hungary with the aggregate mass of the empire. Whether this was or was not a good arrangement for the parties, the Imperial Government had no right to impose it by force without endeavouring to obtain the consent of the Hungarian Diet. This is, however, what they did, and the Hungarians were fully justified in resisting force by force. Supposing that at the time of the union of Scotland and England, the English Government, instead of proposing a Treaty of Union and obtaining the legal consent of the Scotch Parliament, had issued an order in council summarily terminating their separate existence and functions. The Scotch would have resisted. If then the King of England had sent his army over the Border to subdue the Scotch, and, finding the task too hard for him, had ended by calling in the French to help him, the parallel would have been complete.

In the earlier part of the year Lord Palmerston had vainly attempted to mediate between the contending parties in Hungary, so as to avert the Russian intervention, of which he here chronicles the result.



“ F. O., August 22, 1849.

“ MY DEAR PONSONBY,

“ We heard yesterday from Warsaw that which must be considered the conclusion of the war in Hungary. I must own I am glad that it is over, for though all our sympathies in this country are with the Hungarians, yet it was scarcely in the nature of things that they should be able, against such superior forces, to hold out long enough to compel the allies to treat with them on equal terms, and a prolongation of the war would therefore only have led to the same result after the slaughter of many more thousands of brave men on both sides, and after still greater devastation of the country than has already taken place. Now is the time for the Austrian Government to redeem itself in the opinion of Europe: a just and generous use of the success which has been gained would re-establish Austria in public estimation, and would again place her in the front rank among the great Powers of Europe. If the Austrian Government listens to passion, resentment, and political prejudice, they will enlist against them every generous and just mind in the civilised world, and will lay the foundation for permanent weakness and decrepitude in the Austrian empire. I shall write to you officially in this sense in a day or two; but, in the meanwhile, shape your language to this effect. The thing evidently to be done is to re-establish the ancient Constitution of Hungary, with the improvements

made in it last year, as to the abolition of feudal service, and exemption of privileged classes from public burthens, and to publish a real and complete amnesty. If Austria wishes for a legislative union with Hungary, it should be proposed in a legal way, like our unions with Scotland and Ireland, but I much fear that legislative assemblies are not in favour at present at Vienna ; and yet such assemblies founded upon election by intelligence and property, and not by universal suffrage, are the only sure foundations of public order and permanent monarchy. It will be curious if the Emperor of Russia should take the Hungarians under his protection as against the Austrians, just as he protects the Danube Principalities against the Turks.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

The fight between the master and the revolted subjects had not merely been a calm and strategical encounter : it had been a war of passion, bitter and ferocious. I quote the following letter to illustrate the warmth and strong sympathy of Lord Palmerston's character. He bounded like a boy at any cruelty or oppression. The youthful impulse of indignation against a cowardly bully never died out with him. It survived even in his old age, the advent of which is too often accompanied by cynical indifference to the sufferings of others :—

“ Panshanger, September 9, 1849.

“ MY DEAR PONSONBY,

“The Austrians are really the greatest brutes that ever called themselves by the undeserved name of civilised men. Their atrocities in Galicia, in Italy, in Hungary, in Transylvania are only to be equalled by the proceedings of the negro race in Africa and Haiti. Their late exploit of flogging forty odd people, including two women at Milan, some of the victims being gentlemen, is really too blackguard and disgusting a proceeding. As to working upon their feelings of generosity and gentlemanlikeness that is out of the question, because such feelings exist not in a set of officials who have been trained up in the school of Metternich, and the men in whose minds such inborn feelings have not been crushed by court and office power have been studiously excluded from public affairs, and can only blush in private for the disgrace which such things throw upon their country. But I do hope that *you* will not fail constantly to bear in mind the country and the Government which you represent, and that you will maintain the dignity and honour of England by expressing *openly* and *decidedly* the disgust which such proceedings excite in the public mind in this country; and that you will not allow the Austrians to imagine that the public opinion of England is to be gathered from articles put into the ‘Times’ by Austrian agents in London, nor from the purchased support of the ‘Chronicle,’ nor from the servile language of

Tory lords and ladies in London, nor from the courtly notions of royal dukes and duchesses. I have no great opinion of Schwarzenberg's statesmanlike qualities unless he is very much altered from what he was when I knew him; but, at least, he has lived in England, and must know something of English feelings and ideas, and he must be capable of understanding the kind of injury which all these barbarities must do to the character of Austria in public opinion here; and I think that, in spite of his great reliance upon and fondness for Russia, he must see that the good opinion of England is of some value to Austria; if for nothing else, at least to act as a check upon the illwill towards Austria, which he supposes, or affects to suppose, is the great actuating motive of the revolutionary firebrand who now presides at the Foreign Office in Downing Street.

“ You might surely find an opportunity of drawing Schwarzenberg's attention to these matters, which may be made intelligible to him, and which a British ambassador has a right to submit to his consideration. There is another view of the matter which Schwarzenberg, with his personal hatred of the Italians, would not choose to comprehend, but which, nevertheless, is well deserving of attention, and that is the obvious tendency of these barbarous proceedings to perpetuate in the minds of the Italians indelible hatred of Austria; and as the Austrian Government cannot hope to govern Italy always

by the sword, such inextinguishable hatred is not an evil altogether to be despised.

“The rulers of Austria (I call them not statesmen or stateswomen) have now brought their country to this remarkable condition, that the Emperor holds his various territories at the goodwill and pleasure of three external Powers. He holds Italy just as long as and no longer than France chooses to let him have it. The first quarrel between Austria and France will drive the Austrians out of Lombardy and Venice. He holds Hungary and Galicia just as long as and no longer than Russia chooses to let him have them. The first quarrel with Russia will detach those countries from the Austrian crown. He holds his German provinces by a tenure dependent, in a great degree, upon feelings and opinions which it will be very difficult for him and his ministers either to combine with or to stand out against.

“The remedy against these various dangers which are rapidly undermining the Austrian empire would be generous conciliation; but instead of that, the Austrian Government know no method of administration but what consists in flogging, imprisoning, and shooting. ‘The *Austrians* know no argument but force.’

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

As soon as Hungary was subdued, a joint demand

was made upon the Porte by Russia and Austria to deliver up the fugitives who had sought safety at Widdin, within the Turkish frontier. Prince Radzivil and Baron de Titoff for Russia, and Count Sturmer for Austria, urged at Constantinople the surrender of these refugees, among whom were Kossuth and Zamoyski. The Sultan, however, firmly resisted this attempt to induce him to violate the laws of humanity by giving up to the vengeance of the conquerors those who had fled to his territory for refuge. As no threats could shake the resolution of the Ottoman Government, the ambassadors notified to the Porte the suspension of all diplomatic intercourse between their own Courts and that of the Sultan. Lord Palmerston determined to support the Sultan.

“ Carlton Gardens, September 29, 1849.

“ MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“ I received yesterday afternoon, at Brompton, by a letter from Drouyn de Lhuys, the telegraphic message announcing the breaking off of diplomatic relations by the Austrian and Russian ministers at Constantinople. I am unable at present to send you anything but my own opinion of the matter. I am much inclined to think that this step of the two Imperialist ministers is only an attempt to bully, and that if it fails, as it seems hitherto to have done, it will be disavowed or retracted by their Governments. But then it seems to me that the only way of bringing

about that result is to give the Sultan the cordial and firm support of England and France, and to let the two Governments of Russia and Austria see that the Turk has friends who will back him and defend him in time of need. This might be done, first, by firm though friendly representations at Vienna and St. Petersburg, pointing out that the Sultan is not bound by treaty to do what has been required, and that, not being so bound, he could not have done it without dishonour. Secondly, we might order our respective squadrons in the Mediterranean to take post at the Dardanelles, and to be ready to go up to Constantinople if invited by the Sultan, either to defend Constantinople from actual or threatened attack, or to give him that moral support which their presence in the Bosphorus would afford. I feel the most perfect conviction that Austria and Russia would not, in the present state of Germany, Poland, and Northern Italy, to say nothing of only half-pacified Hungary, venture upon a rupture with England, France, and Turkey upon such a question as this. But all this is only my own personal opinion, and I cannot answer for the Broadbrims of the Cabinet; therefore do not, before you hear from me again, commit the Government to any opinion or to any course of action.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

The Russian ambassador in London lost no time in

calling on the Foreign Secretary. What took place is told in the following memorandum :—

“ Carlton Gardens, October 2, 1849.

“ I had a conversation of some length this afternoon with Baron Brunnow. His object at first was to show that the best course for England and France to pursue was to remain perfectly quiet, to wait for events, and to trust to the moderation and good feeling of the Emperor to settle the matter amicably with the Sultan, without any injury to the independence of the Porte. In other words, to leave the Emperor time to frighten the Sultan into acquiescence.

“ I said I agreed with him that the affair is in itself of very slight importance, and that I could not but believe with him that the moderation and good feeling of the two Imperial Governments would lead them to respect the Sultan’s repugnance to give up men who have thrown themselves on his protection ; and that Austria and Russia would be satisfied with that security which they had a right to ask, and which the Sultan is ready to afford them, and which would be given by sending into the interior of Turkey such of the refugees as may have no means of supporting themselves, and by requiring those who are better off to leave Turkey and come to France or England. With regard to our doing nothing, I said we could not take that course, because the Turkish Government had officially asked us for



help in their embarrassment, and we had determined to address a friendly representation in favour of the Sultan to the Austrian and Russian Governments. He said he hoped our representation would be carefully worded, in order that it might not do harm instead of good. That all men have their faults as well as their merits. That the fault of his Emperor is that he is very sensitive, and that anything like the language of menace might prevent him from doing what he might otherwise be disposed to do. I said that nothing of that kind would be sent; that we should express our hope, and the French Government would probably do the same, that the two Emperors would be satisfied with the removal of danger from their frontiers, and would not insist on the surrender of men whom they would not know what to do with when they got them. For it would not be supposed, for instance, that the Emperor of Russia could take any pleasure in shooting a cripple like Bem. Brunnow said it would be a pity that such representations should be made by England and France jointly or concurrently; that the joint action of the two would of itself have the appearance of something like menace. I said that this was the unavoidable result of the fact that the Porte had made application to the two Powers; but he should remember that this system of duality did not begin with us; that the two Imperial Governments have been jointly pressing and threatening at Constantinople, and the Sultan being hard driven by his two

great, strapping neighbours, naturally looked about him to see where he could find two friends to come and take his part. That the two Imperial ministers, no doubt from over-zeal, or from a wish to carry their point by a *coup de main*, and gain credit with their Governments, had gone probably further than they had been instructed to do, and had not only held very high and threatening language, but had suspended their diplomatic intercourse, a thing of no real importance, but meant as a means of intimidation. Brunnow agreed it was a foolish step to have taken, and repeated a story he had told me before, of how Lord Aberdeen had suspended his diplomatic intercourse with Aali Pasha when ambassador in London, because the Turkish Government would not pay two thousand pounds to Captain Walker for services performed; and how he, Baron Brunnow, had convinced Lord Aberdeen that he had done a foolish thing, and persuaded him to resume intercourse with the Turkish ambassador. I said that the two Imperial Governments were no doubt entitled to ask for the surrender of their respective subjects, though the Russian demand, being founded upon the events of the Polish war of 1832, and not upon the Hungarian war of 1849, was somewhat out of date; but that, on the other hand, the Sultan was entitled by his treaties to decline to surrender, and to prefer the other alternatives of either sending the refugees into the interior of his territory, or requiring them to leave Turkey. Brunnow entirely agreed with me

in this interpretation of the treaty between Russia and Turkey. He said the treaty of Kainardgi had, like all treaties between Russia and Turkey, been drawn up by the Russian negotiators, and that they had purposely and intentionally left a choice, because it was much more likely that Turks would fly to Russia than that Russians would fly to Turkey; and the Russian Government did not wish to be obliged to give up political refugees to be handed over to the bowstring. With men guilty of ordinary criminal offences the case was different, and the obligation more strict to give such persons up. Brunnow fully and distinctly admitted that the treaty, while it authorized the Emperor to demand surrender, equally authorized the Sultan to decline surrender, and to prefer the sending out of his country. And Brunnow's own opinion seemed to be that the Emperor would, or at least ought to, acquiesce in the Sultan's decision. But it must be borne in mind that his object was avowedly to persuade us to do nothing, and that he professed himself to be without communications from his own Government.

“PALMERSTON.”

There was considerable opposition in high quarters to any interference on the part of England, but Lord Palmerston's colleagues acquiesced in his proposals, and he sends to Paris the decision arrived at.

“ F. O., October 2, 1849.

“ MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“The Cabinet met to-day, and determined that the Sultan must be supported, and by all means and to all extent that may be necessary, and that for this purpose the co-operation of France must be sought. What we propose to do is that which I stated in my private letter a few days ago, namely, that a friendly and civil representation should be made by the two Governments at Vienna and Petersburg, to express a hope that the two Emperors will not press the Sultan to do that which a regard for his honour and for the laws of hospitality and the common dictates of humanity forbid him to do, and which no engagement of treaty binds him to do; and that, at the same time, the two squadrons should move up to the Dardanelles, with orders to go up to Constantinople if invited so to do by the Sultan, either for his immediate defence, or to afford him moral support by their presence. Of course this decision involves a determination to go all further lengths that circumstances may render necessary; and we trust confidently that we shall be able to rely entirely upon the co-operation of France, and also upon her being willing to be as moderate in the manner of making the first steps as she may be firm and determined as to ultimate results. In the meanwhile, it is very desirable that nothing should be said in public about our common decision, if it is a common one, beyond an intention to give the moral

support of our good offices to the Sultan. Nicholas does not like to be threatened himself, though he is addicted to threatening others, and threats held out might wound his vanity and prevent him from giving way. I have seen the Turkish ambassador, who has written me a note asking the moral and material assistance of England. I have told him the decision of the Cabinet, and that we are going to enter into communication with the French Government on the matter. He says that the Turkish squadron in the Bosphorus, and the Turkish military force round Constantinople, are quite sufficient to secure Constantinople against any surprise by the fleet from Sebastopol.

“I have since seen Brunnow, who professes to have heard nothing from Petersburg, and to know only what the papers report; but he seems uneasy. He endeavours to represent the matter as one of small real importance. His object was to persuade me that we ought to take no step, but wait to see what the Emperor would do, or at all events to delay; that is to say, he wants us to give the Emperor full time to bully the Sultan upon this question, as we let him do some months ago about the Wallachian occupation. I told him that the Cabinet has determined that representations should be made at Vienna and Petersburg, but that we should take care to make them in such a manner as not to justify any *mauvaise réponse*. I said that the threatening language and deportment of Radzivil, Titoff, and Stürmer had

compelled the Porte to ask us for support, and that we could not under such circumstances abstain from friendly representations to the two Imperial Governments. I of course abstained from saying anything about squadrons or material assistance, but joined with him in considering it impossible that the Emperor should not be satisfied with the departure of his Poles from Turkey, observing that they must be very unreasonable men if they did not prefer France or England to Turkey as a residence. I have not time to add another word.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

He also communicates the decision to the English minister at Constantinople, who had strongly urged the Turkish Government to remain firm.\*

“Foreign Office, October 2, 1849.

“MY DEAR CANNING,

“As it is of importance to relieve you as soon as possible from anxiety in regard to the responsibi-

\* “If I had suspended my support for a moment, the Porte, I have no doubt, would have given way; and on almost any question but one involving such obvious considerations of humanity, honour, and permanent policy, I might have been inclined, while left to myself, to counsel a less dangerous course, in spite of reason and right. As it is, I have felt that there was no alternative unattended with loss of credit and character. The dishonour would have been *ours*, for every one knows that even Reschid himself, with all his spirit and humanity, would not withstand the torrent without us, and France on almost every subject here follows in our wake, from the necessities of its position and in generous reliance on your policy.”—*Sir S. Canning to Lord Palmerston, Sept. 17, 1849.*

lity which you may think you have incurred by the advice which you have given the Porte, and as it is also essential not to lose an hour unnecessarily in relieving the Porte from its doubts as to whether it will find aid and support from its friends, I send you this private letter by a special messenger, to say that the Cabinet has to-day decided to give an affirmative answer to the application for moral and material support which the Turkish ambassador, by order of his Government, has presented to us. We are, therefore, going to enter immediately into communication with the Government of France, in order to settle the course of proceedings, assuming that which we cannot doubt, namely, that the French Government is willing and prepared to co-operate with us. What we mean to propose is, that the two Governments should make friendly and courteous representations at Vienna and Petersburg to induce the Imperial Governments to desist from their demands, urging that the Sultan is not bound by treaty to do what is asked of him, and that to do so would be dishonourable and disgraceful. We mean to propose, at the same time, that the two Mediterranean squadrons should proceed at once to the Dardanelles, with orders to go up to the Bosphorus, if invited to do so by the Sultan, either to defend Constantinople from actual or imminent attack, or to give him the moral support which their presence would afford. I think it possible, however, that the admirals may already have gone

up to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, in consequence of the letters they will have received from you and from Aupick. I think it, however, much better that the Porte should be advised *not* to send for the squadrons to enter the Dardanelles without real necessity. The example might be turned to bad account by the Russians hereafter; and it would be too much of an open menace, and the way to deal with the Emperor is not to put him on his mettle by open and public menace. In this affair we are trying to catch two great fish, and we must wind the reel very gently and dexterously, not to break the line. The Government have indeed resolved to support the Sultan at all events, but we must be able to show to Parliament that we have used all civility and forbearance, and that if hostilities ensue, they have not been brought on by any fault or mistake of ours. The presence of the squadrons at the outside of the Dardanelles, or in their neighbourhood, would probably be quite sufficient to keep the Sevastopol squadron at anchor or in port; and the Turks have besides some naval and military force at and about Constantinople sufficient to make a resistance till our squadrons could get up. We have steamers that could tow the line-of-battle ships. We have, I believe, six or seven liners; the French about the same number. The Russians, I believe, twelve or fourteen.

“What I wish you to impress upon the Turks is that this communication is confidential, to keep up their



spirits and courage; but that they must not swagger upon it, nor make it public till they hear it officially. From Brunnow's language, and I have also seen him since the Cabinet, I should infer the matter will be amicably settled.

“Railways will not wait, and I must finish.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

He makes Austria understand no less clearly and emphatically that England is going to stand by the Sultan.

“F. O., October 6, 1849.

“MY DEAR PONSONBY,

“I send you a despatch to be communicated to Schwarzenberg. We have endeavoured to make it as civil as possible, so as not to leave him any ground for saying that he cannot yield to threats. We make none; and in my verbal communications with Brunnow and Colloredo I have said nothing about our squadron being ordered up to the Dardanelles. But it is right that *you* should know and understand that the Government have come unanimously to the determination of taking this matter up in earnest, and of carrying it through. We have resolved to support Turkey, let who will be against her in this matter. It is painful to see the Austrian Government led on in its blindness, its folly, and its passionate violence into a course utterly at variance with the established policy of Austria.

If there is one thing more than another which Austria ought to do, it is to support Turkey against Russia; and here is Schwarzenberg, in his fondness for bullying the weak, co-operating with the Russian Government to humble Turkey, and to lay her at the feet of Russia.

“But you understand these questions so thoroughly that you will no doubt have been able to lay before the Austrian Government and Camarilla the full extent of the mistake they are making. They are besides uniting England and France in joint action, which is not what Austrian Governments have hitherto been particularly anxious to do. I cannot believe that the two Governments will push this matter further. The rights of the case are clearly against them. Both Colloredo and Brunnow, though I beg they may not be quoted, acknowledge that the Sultan is not bound by treaty to do what is required of him. Metternich, I am told, says it is a great mistake.

“What could Austria hope to gain by a war with Turkey, supported, as she would be, by England and France? Austria would lose her Italian provinces, to which she seems to attach such undue value, and she never would see them again. What she might gain to the eastward I know not; but perhaps she might not end by extending herself in that direction. At all events, I cannot conceive that, in the present state of Germany, it would suit Austria to provoke a war with England and France; and I do not think

that such a war would be of any advantage even to Russia. Pray do what you can to persuade the Austrian Government to allow these Hungarians either to leave Turkey, if they are able to do so, or to remain in Turkey quietly. The leaders would of course pass on to other parts of Europe; the bulk of the emigrants might be settled somewhere in the interior of Turkey, and would make a useful colony.

“There is a notion that Austria means to try to turn a penny by this transaction, and to call on the Turks to pay a large sum, which it suits the Austrian Government to say that these emigrants have carried away with them; but this dodge will not do, so pray try to persuade them not to attempt it.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

The bold attitude of England and France soon produced its legitimate effect.

“F. O., October 23, 1849.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“I have a private letter to-day from Ponsonby, in which he says that the Austrian Government has distinctly declared that it does not mean to insist on the surrender of the Hungarian refugees, and that the Russian Government has no objection to this decision of Austria. But he says that he cannot as yet officially announce this decision. We hear from Warsaw that the Russians are indignant at the

execution of the Hungarians who had given themselves up to the Russians, and that this feeling will probably make it more easy for Russia to desist from a demand which was made chiefly in support of Austria.

“Brunnow’s language has not altered. From the first he admitted that, although the treaty of Kainardgi gave Russia a right to demand the surrender, it equally gave Turkey a right to choose the other alternative. He asked me the other day, with what intention, and within what limits, our squadrons were to act? I said within the Mediterranean as at present ordered, and with the intention of giving comfort and support to the Sultan, who had been so vehemently threatened by their two men at Constantinople. That our sending one squadron up the Mediterranean was, for the Sultan, like holding a bottle of salts to the nose of a lady who had been frightened.

“He asked whether it would not have been better to have waited for the answer from Petersburg. I said that in that case we might perhaps have been too late to prevent accidents which might have happened before our fleets had arrived. But I said that as long as our squadrons were in that part of the Mediterranean they could threaten nobody. If England and France had sent large fleets into the Baltic, then, indeed, Russia might have said this must be intended for me; what does it mean? And I have desired Ponsonby to say that if our squadron had

gone up the Adriatic, it might have been a threat against Austria. But our ships, where they are, threaten nobody, and only hold out to the Sultan assistance at hand in case of need.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

An indirect benefit accrued from the action of our Government in this matter. The unanimity of public feeling elicited in its support, as soon as it had declared its intention of supporting Turkey to the full extent of going to war, had a great and excellent effect in Europe, as showing that we were not quite so incapable of being moved to manly action as some speeches in Parliament and at peace congresses might have led people to suppose.

A cavil was now raised that we had violated the terms of a treaty by the presence of our fleet at the Dardanelles. Lord Palmerston controverts this.

“ F. O., October 23, 1849.

“ MY DEAR PONSONBY,

“ We are quite aware that the treaty of the Dardanelles of July, 1841, forbids foreign ships of war from entering either the Dardanelles or Bosphorus while the Porte is at peace. But that treaty does not prevent succour from being ready at hand, to help the Sultan in case war should come suddenly upon him. And the two Imperial Governments should remember that Stürmer and

Titoff declared to the Porte that if the Turkish Government allowed a single man of the refugees to escape, it would be considered by *Austria and Russia as a declaration of war.*

“Such a communication may not have been authorized, though, from the arrogant and insolent tone of the despatches from Schwarzenberg and Nesselrode, which were communicated to the Turkish Government, I am inclined to think it was; but, at all events, such a communication having been made, there was evidently no time to be lost by those Governments which meant to defend Turkey against the two Imperial and imperious bullies.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

Lord Palmerston, when he had undertaken the task, was not the man to leave it halfway to take care of itself. Even to please an ally he was not disposed to run the risk, however small, of having to begin all over again. He felt sure that he had won, but would leave nothing to chance.

“F. O., November 7, 1849.

“MY DEAR CANNING,

“I may, I think, now congratulate you upon the peaceful termination of the question about the refugees. Brunnow has just been with me, and says very quaintly, that it has from the first been

raised to undue proportions, and that it ought to have been treated as an 'affaire de police, et non pas comme une affaire de politique.'

“The three demands, as we understand them, now are, 1st, the expulsion of the Poles from the Turkish territory; 2nd, the removal of the converted Poles to Diarbekir; 3rd, an engagement that the Porte should apply to foreign Governments, and specially to England and France, to consent that Russian subjects who may become naturalised or denizens in England or France should not thereby be exempted from being treated in Turkey according to their original nationality. The first condition is just what the Sultan proposed to do. The second seems as a temporary arrangement unobjectionable, it being always understood to be only temporary, and that these men are not to be kept for the rest of their lives at Diarbekir. To the third we shall probably not be found willing to consent: a foreigner acquires by naturalisation the character, and with it the rights, of a British subject; he acquires these by law, and I do not see how the English Government could undertake to withhold from any man the protection to which he has become legally entitled. Naturalisation would not give a Russian subject British rights in Russia, but it would do so in every other country; but this is a question to talk about, and not to be fought about. I therefore look on peace as secure, and as soon as we get the next despatches from you we shall send orders

to Parker to return to his usual station. The French are impatient to get their ships back, in case they should want them against Morocco, where a petulant and self-sufficient consul of theirs has been trying to get up a quarrel with the Moors. I am glad their squadron has been out of reach; this may give time to settle the dispute peaceably. Buchanan, who has just come from Petersburg, says that the Russians in general are much nettled at the check which their Emperor has received in his Turkish policy, and that they say he will take some opportunity to pay us off; and the way in which they anticipate that this will be done, is by fomenting insurrections in Bosnia and elsewhere among the Christian subjects of the Porte; and even Brunnow cannot refrain from adverting to this, as a way in which Russia holds in her hands the good and evil destinies of the Turkish empire. The Turkish Government ought to be made well aware of this, and should lose no time in preparing measures to remove from the Christian subjects of the Porte all just cause of discontent, and should thus place the Sultan's throne upon a broad and solid foundation.

“ These late changes of ministers in France will make no other change in the foreign policy of the country except to render it more conformable with the personal feelings and views of the President, and he is more disposed than some of his late ministers were (though we have no great fault to find with them) to follow a course of foreign policy



calculated to create community of views and action between England and France.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

“ Broadlands, November 16, 1849.

“ MY DEAR CANNING,

“ The French are in a monstrous hurry to get their fleet back from the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles. They pretend that it is on financial and economical grounds, and that it is important that they should be able to announce to the Assembly that the fleet is recalled. This, of course, is partly fudge, though, of course, everything that saves money and savours of peace must be useful to them for parliamentary purposes at the present moment. But as you know they hesitated much about ordering their fleet up, and the Cabinet was equally divided, and though the Cabinet, so divided, has been turned out on account of its internal differences of opinion, the present Government may not be quite at ease on the subject. In fact, the French seem to be in the same condition in which I understand the Prussian minister at Constantinople described the Turkish Government as being, that is to say, much frightened at their own courage, or, at least, at the notion of its possible consequences.

“ Brunnow read me, ten days ago, a despatch in which Kisseleff\* says that Hautpoul had posi-

\* Russian minister at Constantinople.

tively assured him that orders either had been sent, or would immediately be sent, for the return of the fleet. I suspect that Hautpoul did, unguardedly, say something of the kind; but by the same post almost came a despatch from Normanby, saying that the French Government wished to bring their fleet back, but would not act separately on that matter, and desired to know what we were willing to do. We said, in reply, that we wished to wait, and not to decide till we heard from Constantinople. But yesterday I received from Normanby a proposal from the President that we should give you and Aupick discretionary power to send away the squadron whenever and as soon as you should think their presence no longer necessary, and this was so reasonable a proposal that we at once closed with it.

“ Our own view is that it is desirable that our squadron should return towards Malta whenever its presence near the Dardanelles is no longer wanted; but that it should stay where it is as long as its presence is of importance as a moral support for the Sultan. Whenever the Porte and the two Imperial Courts have come to an agreement upon the main points, the squadron might well come away; but it would not do for us to bring it away while any material point was unsettled, and that we should thus have the appearance of leaving the Sultan in the lurch.

“ Moreover it would not do that the Russian agents at Constantinople should have a pretence for saying

that Russia had ordered our fleets off, and that as we had thus yielded to the demands of Russia, the Porte had better do so too, because experience in this instance would show her that though we might swagger at first, yet when it came to the point, we were sure to knock under, and that thus Turkey would always find us ready to urge her on to resistance, but backing out ourselves when Russia began to hold high language to us and to show us a bold front.

“They would represent us a barking cur that runs off with its tail between its legs when faced and threatened. We should thus lose all we have gained and most of what we had before.

“You will, of course, not fail to bear all this in mind in using the discretionary authority now sent to you; and though we shall be glad to find the presence of the fleet no longer necessary, it is better that it should stay there a week or a fortnight too long than that it should come away too soon.

“If you should think the continuance of our fleet for a further time important and essential, and Aupick should, under his instructions, declare himself of opinion that the fleets are no longer necessary, and if he should make a great difficulty in coming round to your opinion, there would be no great harm done if you were to split the difference, and if the French fleet—which has been specially ordered to keep separate from ours—was to work its way to-

wards Toulon, while ours remained a little while longer, cruising or anchoring in the Archipelago.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

“Broadlands, November 14, 1849.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“It would have been quite ridiculous and mean to have ordered back our ships at the bidding of Russia, and merely upon her assertion of what she had sent as an answer to the Porte. Great countries ought not to act with such precipitate levity, and should put some degree of method and deliberation in their conduct. We sent our fleet up to the Dardanelles to be ready to support the Sultan in case of attack, and in order that his knowledge that our fleet was there for that purpose might give him courage to hold his own in his negotiations with Russia. That negotiation had not yet reached Constantinople when our last accounts came away; it would turn upon demands some of which the Porte might object to; the bullying system might again be resorted to, if our ships came away before everything was settled, and their departure during the negotiation would be represented by the Russian agents at Constantinople as an abandonment of Turkey in deference to the remonstrances of Russia. We ought either never to have sent our fleet, or to keep it there till matters are settled. The French, however, are of course at liberty to do what they like

with their own; but they ought to have pointed out to them that the hasty retreat of their squadron will be represented by the Russians at Constantinople as a concession by France to Russia.

“Of course, as you say, disappointed ambition will try to turn popular feeling against an English alliance which thwarts personal projects; but we must deal with this as best we can. There is always some difficulty or other to be striven against in public matters, ‘For the current of politics doth seldom run smooth.’

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

With reference to our alleged infraction of treaty stipulations, Lord Palmerston writes :—

“Broadlands, November 22, 1849.

“MY DEAR CANNING,

“Do not let Parker again anchor or enter within the outer castles of the Dardanelles; his doing so has a very bad effect; it is difficult to argue that it is not entering the Straits of the Dardanelles, and that therefore it is not a violation of the Treaty of July, 1841.\* Nesselrode seems to have taken the matter quietly, and no wonder; for such a nibbling at our Dardanelles Treaty is just what the Russians would like to see us establish as a precedent, and they

\* The words of the Treaty were: “All ships-of-war of all nations coming to the Dardanelles are to stop and wait at the anchorage between the outer and inner castles till they know from Constantinople whether a firman will or will not be granted to allow them to proceed further on.”

would not be slow to follow our example. The port regulation of the Turkish Government by which the anchorage within the outer castles is allotted for ships-of-war of all nations to wait in till they know whether they can be permitted to go up to Constantinople, can fairly and logically be applied only to such ships-of-war as may by permission go up to Constantinople; but those are only light vessels for the use of the embassies and missions, and that port regulation cannot be deemed to apply to a squadron of line-of-battle ships, which cannot, according to treaty, go up to Constantinople while the Porte is at peace: at all events, it is close shaving and nice steerage, and exposes us to a disagreeable discussion about words, and puts us to prove that being within the Straits is not entering the Straits; and that is not an easy demonstration to make good. If Parker is blown away from Besika Bay, let him go to Enos, or Jaros, or anywhere else where he may find shelter, never mind how far off; for wherever he goes he can always be back in time, and any attack of the Turkish territory by a Russian fleet or army is at present quite out of the question. We shall send you on in a few days our decision about the demands of the two Emperors. I should guess, from Brunnow's language to me to-day, that the Russian Government would be content to have the renegade Poles *eloignés* from the frontier, and made to reside—but not as prisoners—in Asia Minor; and Brunnow affected to treat very lightly the Austrian demand,

representing that as a matter the Porte could easily dispose of if she had settled satisfactorily with Russia. Of course it would not answer for the Porte to stand out unnecessarily on matters of minor importance, but still she might make her representations about conditions to which she is not bound by any treaty to accede.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

When the two Powers were baffled in their demand for the surrender of the fugitive Poles and Hungarians, Austria substituted a request that Turkey should keep them in confinement, and not allow them to emigrate to any other country. The Sultan indeed had originally proposed something of the sort when their extradition was summarily demanded, although he had never offered to keep his captives at the good pleasure of a foreign Government, but only for a time, and at his own discretion. In the following letter Lord Palmerston protests against the Austrian demand.

“ F. O., November 27, 1849.

“ MY DEAR PONSONBY,

“ I have only time to write two lines before the post goes. You say you do not understand what the objections are which Canning alludes to as liable to be urged against the demand now made by Austria upon Turkey about the refugees. Those objections are, that it is unreasonable and incompatible with the

dignity and independence of the Sultan that he should be made the gaoler of the Emperor of Austria, to take charge of persons whom the Austrian Government may consider politically dangerous; and that the performance of his duties as such gaoler should be subject to the superintendence of the agents of a foreign Power, and should continue until that foreign Power should consent to the cessation of his gaoler's duties. The Treaty of Bucharest does not give Austria a right to exact this servitude from the Sultan, and the duties of good neighbourhood do not require it at his hands. That which the Sultan is bound to do, is to prevent his territory from being made a place of shelter from whence machinations should be carried on to disturb the internal tranquillity of neighbouring states; but this obligation would be fully performed if the Sultan sends out of his dominions those subjects of foreign Powers who may justly be suspected of having intention so to abuse his hospitality. All, therefore, that Austria can require on the score of good neighbourhood—and this is more than by treaty she can demand—is that the Hungarian refugees should be sent out of Turkey; but to require that they should be detained and kept under restraint in Turkey is an unreasonable demand, and one which if Turkey were to comply with, it would do more harm to Austria in public opinion in Europe than could be counterbalanced by any conceivable advantage to be derived from it. As to publications which these Hungarians might



make in France or England, there are Hungarians enough come away to publish everything that can be said or revealed; and as to the sympathy which Kossuth would excite here or in France, they may depend upon it that he will be a much greater object of interest while unjustly detained in Turkey than if he was living at a lodging in Paris or London. It is bad policy in the Austrian Government, as well as injustice. Pray endeavour to persuade them of this, and to prevail upon them to be content with the expulsion of these Hungarians.

“ I write you this, and desire you to do your best, though I hear from many quarters that you oppose instead of furthering the policy of your Government, and that you openly declare that you disapprove of our course. No diplomatist ought to hold such language as long as he holds his appointment. It is idle trash to say that we are hostile to Austria because we may disapprove of the policy of a Metternich or the cruelties of the Manning administration which now governs Austria; you might as well say that a man is the enemy of his friend because he tells that friend of errors and faults which are sinking him in the esteem of men whose good opinion is worth having.”

And three days after to the same :—

“ F. O., November 30, 1849.

“ MY DEAR PONSONBY,

“ The requirement of Austria about the Hungarian refugees is preposterous, and quite inconsistent

with a due regard to the dignity and independence of the Sultan. It is as incompatible with the dignity of an independent Sovereign to make himself the gaoler for the state offenders of his neighbours as it would be for him to make himself purveyor for the executioner of that neighbour. Schwarzenberg, in his note of reply to Musurus, in pretending to quote what Musurus had said, put words into Musurus's mouth which Musurus did not use, and which materially alter the sense of the offered engagement. Musurus did not use the word 'Dorenavant;' and he said nothing about the arrangement lasting as long as the Austrian Government might choose. But what a childish, silly fear this is of Kossuth. What great harm could he do to Austria while in France or England? He would be the hero of half a dozen dinners in England, at which would be made speeches not more violent than those which have been made on platforms here within the last four months, and he would soon sink into comparative obscurity; while, on the other hand, so long as he is a state *détenu* in Turkey he is a martyr and the object of never-ceasing interest. As to any exposure which he might be able to make of the misdeeds of the Austrian Government, generals, and troops, there are others enough coming to England to lay bare to the public of Europe everything of that kind, and the detention of Kossuth would only infuse greater bitterness into the feelings with which such disclosures will be made. The Austrian Government, therefore, would

do well, for its own sake and with a view to its own interest, to consent to the expulsion of the Hungarians from Turkey. But whether it consents or not, you may rely upon it that get away they will, by hook or by crook, and the Austrian Government will then cut a silly figure by being outwitted.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

The contents of the following letter illustrate the imperious and sensitive character of the Emperor Nicholas, which, later on, came out so forcibly and painfully during the Crimean war. The audience, however, was given to the English ambassador a few days later; but it is probable that when Prince Menschikoff was sent to Constantinople in 1853, his Imperial master had not forgotten the mortification of 1849.

“Broadlands, November 27, 1849.

“MY DEAR BLOOMFIELD,

“I have received your letter of the 8th, in which you say that the Emperor has not given you the usual audience on your return to your post, and that you have been privately informed that he means to see you only on public occasions. I am sorry for this, because I regret that these late Turkish affairs should have produced such an effect upon the Emperor's conduct towards the British representative at his Court, but still I scarcely think that it would be

useful that the Queen should retaliate upon Brunnow. But, indeed, the habits of our Court scarcely leave room for retaliation. The Queen sees the foreign ministers at levées, at concerts, and at balls, when all, or nearly all are generally present, and about once a year she has the representatives of the principal Courts to dinner; but that would be later in the year, and by that time the Emperor may have altered his conduct towards you. We must make great allowances for the effect which a great political check must have produced upon the Emperor's mind; and his annoyance at so public a thwarting is probably increased by the circumstance that it has been in some degree brought upon him by the injudicious zeal of Titow and Radzivil, who probably went beyond their instructions, and committed the Emperor further than he intended.

“The mortification also is the greater because it has followed so quickly upon his great successes in Hungary, and has entirely dimmed the lustre of those successes; and moreover, it must be galling to the lord and master of so many hundred thousand men and of near fifty sail of the line to be baffled by a squadron of seven sail of the line and by the time of the year. Our best course is not to take much notice of his ill-humour, and to try to bring him right again.

“There are many ways in which he might worry and annoy us, though he could not do us any serious mischief, and it would be bad policy for us to accept

a quarrel as an established thing, unless it was absolutely forced upon us in a way which made it impossible for us to decline it.

“But though the Emperor will probably long remember what has happened, and will be long ready to take advantage of any opportunity to pay us off, yet when the Constantinople business is settled he will probably resume his usual cordiality, at all events in outward manner; and it may be some good long time before he may find an opportunity of giving us any serious embarrassment.

“Yours sincerely,  
“PALMERSTON.”

Nearly two years elapsed, however, before the Turkish Government could muster up courage to fly in the face of its powerful neighbour and liberate Kossuth with his companions. During this interval they were kept in honourable captivity at Kutayah. Much interest was taken in their fate, both in the United States and in England. Lord Palmerston writes to urge their release.

“C. G., February 10, 1851.

“MY DEAR CANNING,

“I have written you a despatch about Kossuth and his fellow exiles. I have made it as gentle as was possible; but pray let Reshid and Aali know privately that it is but a faint expression of the public feeling in this country on that subject.

“ You will have seen how the matter was noticed in the House of Commons in the debate on the Address ; and I have representations coming in from large towns and small—from England, Scotland, and Wales.

“ There was last year great enthusiasm throughout the whole country in favour of the Sultan, because people here believed that the Turkish Government was animated by a generous and manly determination not to be the executioner or the gaoler of either of the Emperors ; and it was that belief which led the country, from one end of it to the other—Whigs, Tories, Radicals—to applaud and back up the defiance which, by our advice and our squadron, we flung in the teeth of the two Imperial Governments. But the ground on which we took our stand is fast sinking under our feet, and the bright hopes which the nation entertained are rapidly fading away. The Sultan has certainly rescued the Poles and Hungarians from the rope and the bullet ; but he is making himself the degraded slave of Austria to consign the Hungarians to the lingering but not less certain doom of the prison.


“ I am ashamed of our protégés, the Sultan and his white-livered ministers ; and you may tell the ministers, confidentially but confidently, that if they go on in this way, not only not a squadron but not a cockboat would we, or could we, send in any case to their assistance, and the enthusiasm of last year is rapidly turning into contemptuous disgust at their

servile consent to perform the most degrading office of turnkey for Prince Schwarzenberg.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

In September the men were freed. Shortly afterwards a deputation from Islington that went to the Foreign Office, to congratulate Lord Palmerston on the event, caused some stir, owing to the language of the address and the tone of Lord Palmerston's reply. Among other things, he said that to gain the day “much generalship and judgment had been required, and that during the struggle a good deal of judicious bottle-holding was obliged to be brought into play.” This simile, borrowed from the prize-ring, tickled the fancy of the public, and for many a day after, Lord Palmerston, drawn with a sprig in his mouth, figured in the pages of ‘Punch’ as the “judicious bottle-holder.”



## CHAPTER V.

## Greek Affairs and "Don Pacifico" Debate.

JUST as some unsightly knoll or insignificant stream has won imperishable fame by the accident of its crest or banks being the scene of a great battle, so did the name of a paltry adventurer become famous, in 1850, by its connection with a memorable debate. The fate of the Ministry, as well as that of a minister, was involved, for the wrongs of Don Pacifico and the manner of their redress were only the battle-field on which a policy was attacked and bitter antagonisms fought out. The allied troops who led the attack were English Protectionists and foreign Absolutists. Victorious in their first onset among the Lords, they met with signal defeat in the House of Commons, after one of the most remarkable displays of eloquence and feeling that the walls of Parliament have witnessed.

Although the matters at issue were far wider than the narrow boundaries of Greece, it was round that centre that the contest principally raged; and it will be necessary, therefore, briefly to scan the ground-



plan of the fight, and to recall the course of events which at last led the British Government to employ force.

The Greek revolt began in 1820. After it had lasted some years, England, France, and Russia interposed, and brought Turkey to acknowledge the independence of Greece. The three Powers then settled that the form of government for the new kingdom should be a monarchy; but England attached to her assent as an indispensable condition that it should be a constitutional monarchy. Consequently, when Prince Otho of Bavaria, then a minor, was called to the throne, the three Powers, on announcing the choice they had made, declared at the same time that constitutional institutions would be given by Otho as soon as he came of age. This declaration was ratified by the King of Bavaria, in the name and on behalf of his son, the young King of Greece.

This promise was not kept. The despotic courts of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, naturally averse to constitutions, gladly availed themselves of the plea that the Greek was not yet ripe for representative government, in order to avoid pressing on Otho the fulfilment of his pledges. France kept aloof on the same ground, Guizot philosophising the while with his favourite simile, that if a six hundred horse-power engine is placed in a small skiff, it must tear it to pieces instead of moving it forward. England, therefore, stood alone in her remonstrances, and naturally

incurred the dislike of those whom she considered that it was her invidious duty to reproach. In other matters, also, she was on the unpopular, while France, for her own objects, took the popular, side. Monsieur Guizot, in his *Memoirs*,\* tries to distinguish in the following words between their respective attitudes:—

“ Tandis qu’à Londres on acceptait l’indépendance de la Grèce comme une malencontreuse nécessité, nous n’acceptons à Paris que comme une nécessité fâcheuse les étroites limites dans lesquelles on resserrait cette indépendance.”

But then he points the moral of his reflections by a very significant remark:—

“ Mais en repoussant toute tentative d’extension contre la Turquie, nous n’entendîmes point interdire aux Grecs les grandes espérances.”

Thus, while England saw well enough the difficulties which the Greeks would find in self-government, and considered the important matter was to urge them to learn the habits and practice of a constitutional monarchy, France, in order to retain a special influence, was secretly fostering hopes of future conquests and idealised glories.

On England, therefore, fell the burden of remonstrance against the evils of a constitution without free government, the fruit of which was licence without liberty. In the words of Lord Palmerston, the whole system grew to be full of every kind of abuse. Justice could not be expected where the

\* Vol. vii. p. 324.

judges were at the mercy of the advisers of the Crown. The finances could not be in any order where there was no public responsibility on the part of those who were to collect or to spend the revenue. Every sort of abuse was practised, from brigandage in the country to "compulsory appropriation" in the capital itself, and the tyranny of the police was almost unbearable.

There were in every town of Greece a number of persons whom England was bound to protect—Maltese, Ionians, and others. It became the practice of this Greek police to make no distinction between them and their own fellow-subjects. Compensation was from time to time demanded for many acts of violence to Ionians, but all in vain, till at length an outrage on the boat's crew of Her Majesty's ship 'Fantôme,' and the cases of Mr. Finlay and Don Pacifico, exhausted Lord Palmerston's patience, and determined him to insist on an immediate compliance with his just demands. Mr. Finlay was a Scotchman, whose land was taken to round off the palace gardens at Athens, and no payment could be wrung from the appropriators. Unlike Frederick the Great, who pointed with pride to the mill in his grounds at Sans Souci as a proof that in his empire the rights of every subject, however humble, were respected, Otho could only show a heap of diplomatic notes and private petitions seeking justice, as a proof that in his kingdom it could nowhere be found.

M. Pacifico was a Jew native of Gibraltar, whose

house was pillaged and gutted, in open day, by a mob headed by the sons of the Minister of War. While it was occurring no attempt was made by the authorities of Athens to protect him. During three years Sir E. Lyons and Mr. Wyse had pressed his claims for compensation without success. That some of his demands were extortionate there can be little doubt; but there can be even less doubt that he had been most grossly injured and had a right to redress.

It was not without giving notice that Lord Palmerston determined to act. As long before as August, 1847, he had written to Lord Bloomfield, our ambassador at Petersburg:—

“No orders have as yet been sent to Parker to compel the Greek Government to comply with our various demands; but you should not conceal from Nesselrode and the Emperor that such orders must soon be sent, if Coletti does not render them unnecessary by voluntary compliance. There is not the slightest danger that Joinville should give Parker the trouble of giving him a passage to Portsmouth, because we are too palpably in the right to make it possible for France to oppose us by force of arms; and we are stronger than she is in the Mediterranean, and therefore there is the best possible security for her good behaviour. Tell Nesselrode and the Emperor that if they think the enforcement of our demands would be injurious to the stability of Greece, an opinion which we in no degree share, the only

way of preventing it is to persuade Coletti to do what we require, as the Greeks have ample means to pay us if they choose."

Monsieur Coletti, "chef de Pallicares," the crafty physician of Ali Pacha, and erewhile the adventurous chief of half-savage insurgents in Epirus, having been for eight years Greek minister at Paris, had returned to Athens after the constitutional revolution in 1843, and was now Prime Minister. He was a fit subject for a pen such as Monsieur About's. His character is thus traced by Lord Palmerston:\*

"I have no doubt that Coletti would, as Wallenstein says, prefer France to the gallows, but I do not see why he should be reduced to that alternative. To be sure, St. Aulaire said to me the other day that Coletti was a necessary minister, for that he is the chief and leader of all the robbers and scamps of Greece, and that if he was turned out of office, he would put himself at their head, and either make incursions into Turkey or ravage the provinces of Greece. To this I replied that it seemed an odd qualification for a minister that a man was a robber by profession, but that I did not share St. Aulaire's apprehension of what might happen if Coletti was turned out, because if in that case he invaded Turkey he would probably be shot, and if he plundered Greece he would no doubt be hanged. But he will not be turned out; Otho loves him as a second self, because he is as

\* To Lord Normanby, F. O., 20 April, 1847.

despotic as Otho himself; and as long as a majority can be had for Coletti in the Chambers, by corruption and intimidation, by the personal influence of the King and by money from France, Coletti will remain minister. With this we cannot meddle; all we can insist upon is justice for our subjects and payment of the interest on that part of the debt which we have guaranteed. If we cannot get these things, we must have recourse to compulsion. If we do get them, we cannot interfere further; and I daresay Coletti will be wise enough to satisfy our demands, and not to drive us to extreme measures.

“As to Lyons, there has been a standing conspiracy against him for several years past among all his diplomatic colleagues, headed by the Greek Government. Lyons has been looked upon as the only advocate of constitutional government. Otho and Coletti wish it at the devil. Piscatory detests it, because the French Government think they can exercise more influence over ministers and courts than over popular assemblies; the Bavarian minister has, like his King, been hitherto all for despotism; Prokesch, obeying Metternich, goes into convulsions at the very notion of popular institutions; the Prussian minister has been told implicitly to follow the Austrian; and the Russian only dares support the Constitutional party when there is a chance of Otho being frightened away and of his making room for the Grand Duke of Oldenburg. All these gentlemen, therefore, combined to suppress all information as to

the disorders and abuses going on in Greece, and united to run down Lyons."

Lord Palmerston at last notified formally to the English minister at Athens that the end of British forbearance had arrived.

" F. O., December 3, 1849.

" MY DEAR WYSE,

" I have desired the Admiralty to instruct Sir William Parker to take Athens on his way back from the Dardanelles, and to support you in bringing at last to a satisfactory ending the settlement of our various claims upon the Greek Government. You will of course, in conjunction with him, persevere in the *suaviter in modo* as long as is consistent with our dignity and honour, and I measure that time by days—perhaps by some very small number of hours. If, however, the Greek Government does not strike, Parker must do so. In that case you should embark on board his fleet before he begins to take any hostile steps, in order that you and your mission may be secure against insult. He should, of course, begin by reprisals; that is, by taking possession of some Greek property; but the King would probably not much care for our taking hold of any merchant property, and the best thing, therefore, would be to seize hold of his little fleet, if that can be done handily. The next thing would be a blockade of any or all of his ports; and if that does not do, then you and Parker must take such other steps as may be

requisite, whatever those steps may be. I remember that at one time it was thought that a landing of marines and sailors at some town might enable us to seize and carry off public treasure of sufficient amount. Of course Pacifico's claim must be fully satisfied.

“ You should intimate to the Greek Government that although we do not this time come to levy the amount due to us on account of the Greek loan, yet we abstain from doing so in order to give them an opportunity of doing the right thing of their own accord; but that we cannot go on requiring the people of this country to pay fifty thousand a year to enable King Otho to corrupt his Parliament, bribe his electors, build palaces, and lay up a stock purse for evil times, which his bad policy may bring upon him.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

The fleet arrived at Athens, but the demands made upon the Greek Government were not complied with. The French and Russian ministers were furious at our prompt action, and did their best to spirit up the King of Greece to resistance.

“ F. O., February 1, 1850.

“ MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“ An agricultural speech of Granby enables me to leave the House and add a few lines to what I have already written to you about Greek affairs. I think you may put to Lahitte what a contrast there



is between the conduct of English agents towards France and that of French agents towards England. The French representative in Morocco, partly out of his own head, and partly by instructions from home, made demands on the Morocco Government, some of which were unusual and some exaggerated, and which the Moorish Government was most unwilling to accede to. Our Consul-General, Mr. Hay, first spontaneously, and then by instructions from me, bestirred himself with as much zeal and activity as if the case had been one in which his own Government had been concerned, and by an infinity of trouble persuaded the Morocco Government to comply with the French demands, and thus saved France from the necessity of employing force to obtain redress. In Greece we have demands for redress which have been pending for years, and the neglect and refusal of which we have borne with most exemplary patience, and when at last we find it necessary either to abandon or enforce them, and not being able consistently with our duty to give them up, we send our fleet to support the demands of our diplomatic agent, we find the French minister, faithful to the course which French diplomacy has for years past pursued in Greece, encouraging the Greek Government to refuse, and thus doing all he can to drive us to the necessity of employing force to obtain redress. I must say that we have good ground for complaining of the ungrateful return which we receive for our good offices in aid of France.

“As to the melodrama which you talk of, it seems to me to have been quite the right course. Our squadron arrived, and Parker would not have been justified in assuming beforehand that the demands, which Wyse was to repeat, would be refused. Parker, therefore, on his arrival saluted as usual, and with his officers paid his respects to the King before Wyse repeated his demands. This was in good taste and well judged, because it took off from his arrival the public appearance of a menace, and left the Greek Government at liberty to yield without the appearance of constraint.

“I should have blamed Parker if he had come in with a swaggering air of threatening preparation, with his tompions out and his men at their quarters, so as to have made it impossible for Otho not to appear to be passing under the Caudine Forks. But French diplomacy has ever been bitterly hostile to us in Greece; and as the French Government has chosen to retain there its former diplomatic agent, the same spirit of petty jealousy and national enmity prevails in the French mission at Athens which we have had to lament and to cope with during the whole reign of Louis Philippe.

“What is it the French object to as to our proceedings? We have demanded redress for wrongs committed towards our subjects; our demands have been long treated with neglect, silence, or refusals. We send at last our squadron to enforce them. Does not France act in a similar way in similar cases, only

with far more violence and less justice? Witness her exploits at Tahiti and Sandwich Islands, where she, on false pretences, bullied the Queen of the first into a surrender of her independence and plundered the King of the other because he would not alter his tariffs on brandy and compel his Custom-house officers to learn French.

“But we have all along been thwarted in Greece by the intrigues and cabals of French agents, who have encouraged the Greek Government to ill-use our subjects and to refuse us satisfaction, and of course Thouvenel is frantic that we have at last lost patience.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

On the refusal of the Greek Government to accede to our demands, the British admiral proceeded, according to his instructions, to lay an embargo upon certain vessels at the Piræus. Lord Palmerston thus communicates these proceedings to Drouyn de Lhuys, French minister in London:—

“C. G., February 8, 1850.

“MON CHER AMBASSADEUR,

“Voici un extrait d'une dépêche de l'amiral Parker au Chevalier Baring, en date du 22 janvier.

“‘The Greek vessels herein referred to (as having been detained) include, I believe, all that the Greek Government have in commission. The whole are of little value, and in the present temper of the Greek

Government, supported, as it seems, by the counsels of the French minister and of the Prussian chargé d'affaires, the mild measures hitherto adopted, I fear, are not likely to produce the desired compliance with our demands.'

“ Je suis peiné de voir que l'action de la mission française à Athènes continue à nous être si hostile, mais du moins ceux qui nous forcent à des mesures de sévérité ne doivent pas nous en faire un sujet de reproches.

“ Mille amitiés,

“ PALMERSTON.

“ Je viens d'apprendre que M. de Thouvenel a appelé l'escadre française à Athènes; nous souhaitons rester bons amis, mais cela pourrait devenir sérieux.”

Monsieur Thouvenel had called upon the French fleet to come to Athens. The admiral had, however, sufficient discretion to wait for further instructions from home. Lord Palmerston writes to Lord Normanby:—

“ F. O., February 14, 1850.

“ MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“ I have had despatches and letters from Wyse up to the 30th January. Thouvenel was continuing to pursue his system of reckless hostility, and doing all the mischief he could by stimulating Persiani to join him in improper notes to Wyse, and in encouraging Otho to refuse compli-

ance with our demands. Thouvenel had written to the French admiral to come to Athens, of course to oppose our proceedings; but the admiral having more sense than the diplomatist, declined to do so without orders from home.

“Some of the notes written by Thouvenel, and, at his suggestion, by Persiani, are really laughably absurd and ridiculously impertinent. As an instance of the latter, he expresses his astonishment that Parker should have presumed to detain a Greek steamer before the eyes of the commander of a French corvette, which was actually lying in the Piræus at the time; and, as an example of the former, he protests against our getting compensation for wrongs done to British subjects, because he says the Greek Government is bound to apply the first produce of its revenues to the interest and sinking fund of the guaranteed debt, an engagement which the Greek Government has *never* fulfilled, which we should be glad if France would join us in compelling King Otho to fulfil, and which, if fulfilled, would still leave ample funds out of which our demands could be satisfied. This protest is really a burlesque. In the meanwhile the Greeks were beginning to understand the rights of the case, and when they saw us detaining the ‘Otho,’ they said we were taking away the wrong one.

“Parker had been obliged to begin reprisals on merchant ships, and he expected to have in that way sufficient value to cover our claims.

“The surprise of Lahitte\* that we were going on with reprisals is like the exclamation of the Neapolitans about the Austrian troops, ‘Ma cè Canone!’ or the reply of the aide-de-camp sent out, when our troops first landed in Portugal, to see what the outpost firing was, who came back and said, ‘Why, they are actually firing ball cartridge.’ I think it not unlikely that Otho (for it all depends on him) may have given way before the French negotiation begins, but we cannot suspend our operations more than such time as may be reasonable to allow the French negotiator a fair opportunity to persuade Otho to give in.

“Our case is good; our right indisputable; Greece is an independent state and responsible for the acts and misdeeds of her Government, and redress must be had. If the French are unreasonable and angry, I am sorry for it; but justice to our own subjects is a paramount consideration.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

The French Government, finding we were in earnest, and that we were not to be intimidated by any action of the Powers at Athens, began to fear lest the matter should be settled without their having any share in it. They had, accordingly, offered their good offices. Lord Palmerston had accepted their offer, but only on the understanding that there was

\* Gen. Lahitte, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

to be no discussion on the principle of our demands, and even on the amount only as to some of them.

Baron Gros was ordered to Athens by the French Cabinet as mediator. The blockade and reprisals were to be suspended during the continuance of his efforts to accommodate matters. Lord Palmerston writes to his brother:—

“ F. O., February 15, 1850.

“ MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“ We accept the good offices of France in regard to Greece in the same way in which we did so in the case of Naples in 1840, to obtain for us satisfaction, but not to arbitrate about our claims. King Otho is the *enfant gâté de l'absolutisme*, and therefore all the arbitrary Courts are in convulsions at what we have been doing; but it is our long forbearance, and not our precipitation, that deserves remark. The papers to be laid before Parliament will be ready in a day or two, and will show this. What has happened may serve as a hint to other Governments who turn a deaf ear to our remarks and think to wear us out by refusals or evasions.

“ I conclude that by this time Parker will have got together Greek vessels enough belonging to the Government and to private individuals to be a sufficient security for payment of what is claimed. And, of course, we shall not let this security out of our hands till the money we claim is actually paid to the persons for whom it is demanded.

“ Political matters are looking well here. Our majorities in the two Houses have been decisive, and the measures we have brought in and announced seem to give satisfaction. There will be no change of Government this year, nor probably the next. Peel finds it impossible to discover a party who will accept him as leader to form a Government; and Stanley, though he has a party as Opposition leader, is judged by them as by his own son, who says, ‘ My father is a very clever man, but he has no judgment, and would not do for a minister of this country.’

“ Yours affectionately,

“ PALMERSTON.”

And the same day to Mr. Wyse at Athens:—

“ Nothing could be better than the manner in which you and Sir William Parker have conducted the affair to which your communications relate. You have both of you combined firmness, decision, and promptitude with all the moderation, forbearance, and courtesy compatible with the execution of your instructions. My despatches give you full instructions for the future. Baron Gros is, I believe, as good a choice as the French could have made, but he is a Frenchman, and of course an Othoist. I have purposely fixed no time for the duration of the suspension of reprisals, but you will put him on his honour to tell you when he has failed, if fail he should. Perhaps, however, he may succeed. All



depends on his instructions. We accept good offices to procure a settlement of our demands, and not arbitration as to the amount of them. In fact, the only one which could admit of discussion in regard to its amount is that of Pacifico; but if his documents are right, as I believe them to be, his claim is as clear as the rest. We must have money, *toccante sonante*, and not promises to pay. Those promises would infallibly be broken, and we should have to begin all over again. The word of the Greek Government is as good as its bond, and the bondholders can tell us what that is worth. Besides, after the systematic violation of the article of the treaty of 1832, as to applying the first proceeds of the revenue to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the debt, no confidence can be placed, even in a treaty engagement, if such should be offered to us. The plea of poverty cannot be listened to at a moment when fresh expenses, diplomatic and military, are without any necessity incurred."

Monsieur Thouvenel, however, did not cease from his active though secret opposition to the action of the British Government. Such an old diplomatist as Lord Normanby should hardly have required such a hint as the following:—

"F. O., February 22, 1850.

"MY DEAR NORMANBY,

"One word more about Thouvenel and I have done with him. In your private letters and public

despatches you argue that Thouvenel cannot have done certain things because *you are told* by the French ministers that he has not reported having done so ; or because you have had shown to you despatches in which he makes no mention of having done such things ; or because you have seen or have heard of private letters written by him to his friends implying that he has pursued a different line of conduct. All I can say in reply is, that against these negative inferences I place the positive assertions of our minister and admiral and the tone and substance of Thouvenel's own notes, which latter are quite irreconcilable with the statements in his private letters. But you are surely too good a diplomatist not to be aware that there are such things as private letters and public despatches written expressly that they may be shown, and you must, moreover, be aware that the mere fact that a foreign agent is said by his employer not to have mentioned that he did a particular thing, is no proof that he did not do it. Nesselrode stoutly asserted that Titow had never told the Turkish Government that the escape of any of the refugees would be tantamount to a declaration of war against Russia and Austria, but we are morally certain that such a declaration was made both by Titow and Stürmer. Thouvenel may be a very gentlemanlike man in private society, but that does not prevent his being a reckless intriguer in a political crisis, and there is nothing in the political habits of French

diplomatists, especially of those of the Guizot school, that can render it improbable that he should be so.

“Yours sincerely,  
“PALMERSTON.”

A fortnight later, the same accounts arrive :—

“F. O., March 12, 1850.

“I have just received despatches from Wyse.

“Thouvenel had continued *qualis ab incepto processerat*, and was acting as ridiculously, as impertinently, and as hostilely as his intellectual faculties gave him the means of behaving.

“I am somewhat afraid that when Gros gets to Athens, he will find France so engaged in support of the Greek Government that he will scarcely be able to disentangle himself from the meshes spread for him by Thouvenel ; but if he does not do so, his mission will be a failure. We have got, I imagine, vessels enough to make good our demands, and we shall certainly not let one of them go till we, or those on whose behalf we make our demands, have been paid in hard cash the amount of their just claims.”

The Russian Government was not less hostile than France, although more decorous in its hostility. It had expressed its disapproval in a strongly-worded

despatch. Lord Palmerston writes to the English minister at St. Petersburg :—

“ C. G., March 27, 1850.

“ MY DEAR BLOOMFIELD,

“ We do not mind the Russian swagger and attempt to bully about Greece. We shall pursue our own course steadily and firmly, and we must and shall obtain the satisfaction we require. The amount of money which we demand is really so small that the bottleholders of Greece ought to be ashamed of the rout they make about it. But it is not the money that makes the essential part of the case in their eyes; they are furious at seeing that the spoilt child of Absolutism, whom they have been encouraging on for many years past to insult and defy England, should at last have received a punishment from which they are unable to protect him. It is not the number of stripes that he has received which they care about, but the fact that we have laid our stick over his back and that they have not been able to prevent it. As to Nesselrode’s mysterious hints of evil consequences which may follow if we continue to detain the Greek merchant ships, he may be assured that we shall detain them till we get paid, or rather till the persons for whom we make our demands shall have been paid, barring the Portuguese claims of *Pacifico*, which are matters for investigation, and may probably admit of considerable abatement. But

the number of merchantmen detained has been much exaggerated, and does not, I believe, exceed forty, or at the utmost, fifty.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

The Russian ambassador having written to complain of the language of ‘The Globe’ and ‘Morning Post’ about the Emperor’s acts and policy, Lord Palmerston’s answer is as follows :—

“ F. O., May 16, 1850.

“ MY DEAR JOHN RUSSELL,

“ I return you Brunnow’s letter. Any articles in the newspapers to which he alludes were drawn upon the Russian Government by the unprecedented publication of Nesselrode’s despatch of the 17th March, and by the boastful threats made by the ‘Times’ newspaper as to what Russia would do to put a stop to our proceedings in Greece. This war of words is, no doubt, much to be deprecated, but the responsibility for any evils which it may produce must rest with those by whom it is begun. With regard to the Russian despatch, the feeling in this country has been but one, and that one universal; and I happen to know that a leading man among our opponents in Parliament said lately that he must withhold his approval of our conduct with regard to Greece until he knew whether we had answered it in a manner befitting the dignity of England.

“ As to Russian ships or cargoes in the Greek ports

and waters, Sir William Parker and Wyse have done everything which justice and right could require.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

Baron Gros was very dilatory, and by his conduct gave colour to the suspicion that he meant to fail in his good offices, trusting that the English Government would not venture to renew the embargo, and that thus the whole matter would be transferred for consideration to London or Paris. It was gall and wormwood to the French and Russians that the negotiations should be going on at Athens, with the guns of the British fleet on the spot ready to support the minister, and to coerce if all proposals were refused.

“F. O., May 7, 1850.

“MY DEAR WYSE,

“Gros had, up to the date of your last received despatches, been perpetually trying to slide out of his character of organ of good offices, and to place himself in the position of arbiter. He was sent, under our acceptance of the good offices of France, to endeavour to prevail upon the Greek Government to agree to our demands, and his whole labour and exertions seem to have been directed to prevail upon you to give up, or greatly to modify, those demands. In short, he has acted as the avowed advocate of Greece; and I much admire the coolness with which, when asked by you whether, if you agreed to his

required abatements, he could answer for the consent of the Greek Government, he replied that he could do no such thing. His game was first to beat you down as low as he could, and then to come back and to say that he could not bring the Greek Government up to that point, and that you must therefore come down lower still, or else he must go away. When Drouyn\* has held this sort of language, and said that Gros would be obliged to renounce his task, I have always said, 'Well, what of it? so much the worse for the Greeks, that's all.' Drouyn, however, has behaved very well all along.

"I must say that, for a beginner in diplomacy, thrown at once into a very difficult position, and pitted against an old stager, you have done yourself very great credit by the moderation, good temper, firmness, and sagacity with which you have maintained your ground.

"As to the claims of foreigners, Prussians or others, on account of the detention of their cargoes in Greek vessels, our answer would be, that a man who chooses to put his property on board a vessel belonging to another country must take his chance as to any difficulties into which that country may get with other Powers, and all the remedy which he can justly have is to get his cargo back again on proof that it really belongs to him. Last year, during the Danish hostilities against Germany, many of our merchants had cargoes on board German ships. Those

\* French ambassador in London.

ships were captured by the Danes, and the only remedy our merchants had was to prove ownership before the Prize Court at Copenhagen, and thus to get their goods delivered up to them.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

While the convention with the French Government—which was to form the basis of their exercise of good offices—was being settled in London, matters were advancing at Athens. Baron Gros, after long and tedious negotiations, threw up his office as mediator, and thereupon Mr. Wyse renewed the embargo and seized anew several vessels. This at length brought the Greeks to terms, and they finally agreed to send a letter of apology for the affair of the ‘*Fantôme*,’ to pay a sum of 180,000 drachmas for *Finlay* and *Pacifico*, and not to aid or put forward any claims for compensation for the ships that had been detained, which were, in return, to be immediately released. This was a great triumph for Lord Palmerston. His resolution and calm persistency had attained the desired end, in spite of difficulties and opposition which might well have daunted a smaller man. But his troubles were not yet over. The French were beyond measure annoyed that the dispute should at last have been settled by our own means and not by their good offices. They tried to fix a quarrel upon England on the ground of breach of faith, in recurring to the employment of force



without waiting for the result of their intervention. As Baron Gros had notified both to Mr. Wyse and to the Greek Government, two days before the renewal of hostilities, that his mission was at an end, this was an entirely baseless charge. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, however, was recalled from London; and General Lahitte, the French Foreign Minister, read a despatch in the Chambers in which he openly charged the British Government with duplicity. Anxious questions were put in both Houses of Parliament, and many thought we were on the verge of war.

Lord Palmerston knew better, and writes to Lord Normanby, who was just recovering from a fall with his horse:—

“F. O., May 17, 1850.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“It is clear that the French Government think a quarrel with us would be useful to them at home. In my answer in the House yesterday I purposely abstained from stating that Drouyn was ordered back to Paris as a mark of dissatisfaction, because it would have been very improper in me to proclaim a difference which I hoped might be adjusted. Of course, Lahitte was at liberty, if he thought fit, to announce the terms of his own instructions to his own ambassador. It was not for me to do so unless I had intended to widen the breach.

“I am sorry to hear of your accident, but hope it will not be serious in its consequences; you have been so much occupied of late years in politics, that

you have not thought of your classics, otherwise you would have remembered the recommendation—

“ ‘Solve senescentem mature sanus equum, ne  
Peccet ad extremum.’

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

“ C. G., May 19, 1850.

“ MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“ Drouyn came to me on Tuesday, and I spent four and a half hours in going through the papers with him, and in explaining our course. On Wednesday he came back to me, and began by reading to me Lahitte’s despatch. Nevertheless, we went on for a couple of hours going through some of the papers which we had not gone through sufficiently the day before. As he was leaving me he said he should start that evening, as the next day his Government would lay papers before the Assembly, and it was important that he should be able to communicate with his Government before the Chamber met. I said I thought he was quite right, and I begged him to give the substance of the explanations I had given him.

“ I further assured him that we never had intended any disrespect to the French Government, and did not think that we could be justly charged with having broken any engagement; and I said that, considering the many great and important interests, not merely English and French, but also European, which require that a good understanding should be

maintained and a close connection kept up between England and France, I did earnestly hope that his Government would not set up a *querelle d'Allemand* between the two countries; but that the decision rested with them, as there were certain things which we could not do, and which they ought not to ask us to do. We parted with many friendly personal assurances mutually exchanged; though I by no means pretend to assert that on the points at issue I succeeded in satisfying him.

“The best and shortest account of the matter of Drouyn’s recall was given by the Duke of Wellington, at a party given at Lord Anglesey’s, on Thursday evening, to celebrate his, Lord Anglesey’s, birthday. When the Duke came in, several people flocked round him and asked him what he thought of the matter. His reply was, ‘Oh, oh, it’s all right; it’s all nonsense!’ I see clearly that there was a combined and conjoint operation, and that it was preconcerted somewhere, and by some of our good friends and allies, that Drouyn should receive his order to return on the Queen’s birthday, and that Brunnow and Cetto should send excuses and not attend my dinner on that day. All this was what the Americans would say ‘cruel small,’ and savours much of the strategy of the ‘Tambour Major’ of Paris, as I am told our old friend the Princess\* is called. The Duke of Devonshire, when

\* Princess Lieven, whose husband had been Russian ambassador in London.

he heard, at his party on Wednesday evening, that Brunnow and Cetto had excused themselves from the dinner, said it was a proof how far democratic principles and feelings had spread, for that in former times no diplomatists would have been guilty of so great an impropriety. I have seen neither of them since.

“The bolt has missed its aim, however, and people here pretty plainly understand the whole affair. I suppose that by this time the Parisians also begin to see through the millstone. However, those who meant to punish me have in one respect gained their object, for I cannot, in the present state of things, go down to Broadlands for the four days of Whitsuntide.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.

“I suppose you will retort my quotation upon me, and say that your horse, though old, has proved himself not to be *ridendus*.”

Lord Palmerston had now to exercise his diplomatic ingenuity in order to smooth over French susceptibility. He sought, therefore, some means of putting France forward as a successful mediator, and he managed it thus. There were some further claims of Pacifico's which were based upon the loss of papers which were his vouchers for certain demands upon the Portuguese Government. In the agreement with Mr. Wyse it had been ar-

ranged that a joint inquiry of the two Governments should ascertain whether they were well founded or not, and that meanwhile a deposit should be paid by the Greek Government. Lord Palmerston wished to propose to France, that, instead of a joint inquiry by the two Governments concerned, there should be arbiters and an umpire, to be named by the joint concurrence of the British, French, and Greek plenipotentiaries. There was besides, as we have seen above, an engagement entered into with Mr. Wyse that the Greek Government should not put forward or support any claims for compensation for the detention of ships. Lord Palmerston suggested that there should be substituted for this engagement the good offices of France, who should advise the King of Greece neither to start nor to aid any such claims. The French Foreign Minister was, however, in no humour to be appeased.

“C. G., May 22, 1850.

“MY DEAR JOHN RUSSELL,

“I send you Normanby's despatches, received to-day. You will see that Lahitte, who, I take it, is pretty nearly the mere organ of Piscatory and Thiers, simply refuses our proposal, without giving reasons or proposing anything else.

“His view of the matter seems to be that ‘the quarrel is a mighty pretty quarrel as it stands, and it would be a pity to spoil it by explanation.’ As far as Lahitte is concerned, we should have nothing

to do but to wait till the election law is passed, and till Drouyn de Lhuys has taken Lahitte's place.

“But Normanby's conversation with the President brings another question under the consideration of the Cabinet. Louis Napoleon would be satisfied, as I infer, if to the arbitration we added the restitution of the deposit, and this the Cabinet will have to consider to-morrow. The reasons for and against seem to me to be much as follows. In favour of it, may be said that the Parliament and the public would be glad of a settlement of the dispute, and would not examine very minutely the conditions of the arrangement; that they would not much like a prolonged estrangement between England and France, merely on account of the question as to the manner of settling the very doubtful claims of Pacifico in regard to his Portuguese documents, and they might not easily understand why we should face a quarrel with France rather than accept now a diplomatic security which we were willing to think sufficient on the 19th of last month. This would, probably, be the broad view of the matter taken by those who look only to the surface of things, and they are the majority here as well as elsewhere.

“On the other hand, it must be owned that if, in order to appease the anger of the French Government (I do not say France, for I do not believe the French people care a straw about the matter), we return to Otho the deposit which he was compelled

to place in our hands, the relanding of that sum from the British steamer in the Piræus will be looked upon in Greece and in Europe generally as an act of submission by England to France, as a *baisse de pavillon*, and that it will very much affect our moral position among the nations of the world; at least this would be the tendency of the act, as regards the impression to be produced upon those classes of men whom I have mentioned who do not look below the surface of things, and who take only a broad view of affairs. France would be in some degree acting the part of the constable who comes up and bids Griffin restore twenty pounds which he had compelled Pigskull to lend him against his will.

“This objection might to a certain degree be obviated if the arbitration and restitution of the deposit were accompanied by the same formal engagement on the part of the Greek Government which the convention would have required; that is to say, an engagement in the form of a regular convention between the English and Greek plenipotentiaries in the presence of the French plenipotentiary, and therefore France acting as a witness and indirectly as a guarantee to the engagement, and the convention being ratified in the usual way by the Sovereigns of the two signing ministers. This is what we proposed by the convention of the 19th April. It is rather a cumbersome process for one single arrangement, but I think it would save our honour. It is possible, indeed, that the Greek Government might

object to it; but I do not well see how the French Government could.

“If such a plan were to be proposed, perhaps it would be best to propose it in the first instance privately, through Normanby, to the President, and it might then either be offered by them or by us, as might be deemed best.

“There are two letters in town from Madame Lieven, one to Beauvale, the other to Lady Holland, overflowing with the bitterness of disappointment that Normanby was not brought away from Paris in retaliation for Drouyn’s having left London.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

He writes to St. Petersburg :—

“F. O., May 24, 1850.

“MY DEAR BLOOMFIELD,

“I have been so busy fighting my battle with France that I have been obliged to put off for a time taking up again my skirmish with Russia, but I have written a short answer to Nesselrode’s last long despatch about Greek affairs and a reply to Brunnow’s protest, and you shall have them both by the next opportunity. I think we shall be able to come to an understanding with France, unless the French Government want to pick a quarrel with us, and if that is their intention, of course they can carry it into effect. This storm got up at Paris has had



however a double object, first to knock me over, next to sever the connection between England and France. The Orleanist clique and Madame Lieven aimed at the first result, the Russian party, led and aided by Madame Lieven, calculated upon the second. There have been in London, within the last week, letters from Madame Lieven to friends of hers here abusing me like a pickpocket, and full of indignation and disappointment that we did not send for Normanby the moment the French Government sent for Drouyn. She was unable to suppress her mortification that they had not succeeded in producing a decided rupture between the two countries; of course, she and Kisseleff\* hunt in couples, and we well know that Kisseleff's language at Paris and Brunnow's at London are both of them adapted to the purposes of the Russian Government at each place.

“ All the accounts which come from Greece state that the Greeks complain, not of what we have done, but of what we have not done; they say the English brought Otho, the English ought to have taken him away.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

The French were delaying coming to a settlement, knowing that the Opposition were stirring in England, and hoping to get some aid from the debates in Parliament. On the 17th of June Lord Stanley

\* Russian ambassador in Paris.

moved in the House of Lords the following resolution :—

“That while the House fully recognises the right and duty of the Government to secure to Her Majesty’s subjects residing in foreign states the full protection of the laws of those states, it regrets to find, by the correspondence recently laid upon the table by Her Majesty’s command, that various claims against the Greek Government, doubtful in point of justice or exaggerated in amount, have been enforced by coercive measures directed against the commerce and people of Greece, and calculated to endanger the continuance of our friendly relations with other Powers.”

Lord Stanley’s fervid attack upon the conduct of the Foreign Secretary was supported with much energy by Lord Aberdeen and Lord Brougham. His motion was carried by a majority of thirty-seven ; and Lord Palmerston wrote next morning to Paris as follows :—

“F. O., June 18, 1850.

“We were beaten last night in the Lords by a larger majority than we had up to the last moment expected, but when we took office we knew that our opponents had a larger pack in the Lords than we had, and that whenever the two packs were to be fully dealt out, theirs would show a larger number than ours.

“When the Protectionists have thought that a defeat on any particular question in the Lords would make us resign, such as would have been the case with regard to the Navigation Laws for instance last year, they have carefully abstained from muster-

ing their whole strength. Last night they felt confident that we should not go out on account of an adverse vote of the House of Lords, and they brought up all their men, even the hospital invalids.

“What the Commons may do remains to be seen, but I greatly doubt the Protection party there venturing to propose resolutions similar to those of the Lords. If they do, I think we know pretty well what the result would be.”

Not only was no adverse motion made in the House of Commons, but, on the 24th of June, Mr. Roebuck moved, as a reply to the vote of the Lords the following resolution:—

“That the principles on which the foreign policy of Her Majesty’s Government have been regulated have been such as were calculated to maintain the honour and dignity of this country; and in times of unexampled difficulty, to preserve peace between England and the various nations of the world.”

A debate of four nights’ duration followed. On the second night Lord Palmerston rose, and in a speech of four hours long, which was a masterpiece of argument and of detailed reasoning, vindicated his whole policy.

He began by expressing his opinion that those by whose act the question had been brought under the discussion of Parliament had not conducted themselves with a sufficient sense of the gravity and importance of the issues involved.

“For if that party in this country imagine that they are strong enough to carry the Government by storm, and to take

possession of the citadel of office, or if, without intending to measure their strength with that of their opponents, they conceive that there are matters of such gravity connected with the conduct of the Government, that it becomes their duty to call upon Parliament solemnly to record its disapprobation of what has passed, I think that either in the one case or in the other, that party ought not to have been contented with obtaining the expression of the opinion of the House of Lords, but they ought to have sent down their resolution for the consent and concurrence of this House; or, at least, those who act with them in political co-operation here should themselves have proposed to this House to come to a similar resolution. But, be the road what it may, we have come to the same end; and the House is substantially considering whether they will adopt the resolution of the House of Lords or the resolution which has been submitted to them by my hon. friend the member for Sheffield.

“Now, the resolution of the House of Lords involves the future as well as the past. It lays down for the future a principle of national policy which I consider totally incompatible with the interests, with the rights, with the honour, and with the dignity of the country, and at variance with the practice, not only of this, but of all other civilised countries in the world. The country is told that British subjects in foreign lands are entitled to nothing but the protection of the laws and the tribunals of the land in which they happen to reside. The country is told that British subjects abroad must not look to their own country for protection, but must trust to that indifferent justice which they may happen to receive at the hands of the Government and tribunals of the country in which they may be.

“Now I deny that proposition, and I say it is a doctrine on which no British minister ever yet has acted, and on which the people of England never will suffer any British minister to act. Do I mean to say that British subjects abroad are to be above the law, or are to be taken out of the scope of the

laws of the land in which they live? I mean no such thing. I contend for no such principle. Undoubtedly, in the first instance, British subjects are bound to have recourse for redress to the means which the law of the land affords them when that law is available for such purpose. . . . It is only on a denial of justice or upon decisions manifestly unjust that the British Government should be called upon to interfere. But there may be cases in which no confidence can be placed in the tribunals, those tribunals being, from their composition and nature, not of a character to inspire any hope of obtaining justice from them.

“I will take a transaction that occurred not long ago, as an instance of a case in which, I say, the people of England would not permit a British subject to be simply amenable to the laws of the foreign country in which he happened to be. I am not going to talk of the power of sending a man arbitrarily to Siberia; nor of a country, the Constitution of which vests despotic power in the hands of the Sovereign. I will take a case which happened in Sicily, where, not long ago, a decree was passed that any man who was found with concealed arms in his possession should be brought before a court-martial, and, if found guilty, should be shot. Now, this happened. An innkeeper of Catania was brought before a court-martial, accused under this law by some police officers, who stated that they had discovered in an open bin, in an open stable in his inn-yard, a knife, which they denounced as a concealed weapon. Witnesses having been examined, the counsel for the prosecution stated that he gave up the case, as it was evident there was no proof that the knife belonged to the man, or that he was aware it was in the place where it was found. The counsel for the defendant said, that such being the opinion of the counsel for the prosecution, it was unnecessary for him to go into the defence, and he left his client in the hands of the court. The court, however, nevertheless pronounced the man guilty of the charge brought against him, and the next morning the man was shot.

“Now, what would the English people have said if this had been done to a British subject? and yet everything done was the result of a law, and the man was found guilty of an offence by a tribunal of the country.

“I say, then, that our doctrine is that, in the first instance, redress should be sought from the law courts of the country; but that in cases where redress cannot be so had—and those cases are many—to confine a British subject to that remedy only would be to deprive him of the protection which he is entitled to receive.”

He then proceeded with a short sketch of English relations with the Greek kingdom and of the deplorable state of law, justice, and police in that country, and continued:—

“We shall be told, perhaps, as we have already been told, that if the people of the country are liable to have heavy stones placed upon their breasts, and police officers to dance upon them; if they are liable to have their heads tied to their knees, and to be left for hours in that state; or to be swung like a pendulum, and to be bastinadoed as they swing, foreigners have no right to be better treated than the natives, and have no business to complain if the same things are practised upon them. We may be told this, but that is not my opinion, nor do I believe it is the opinion of any reasonable man. Then, I say, that in considering the cases of the Ionians, for whom we demanded reparation, the House must look at and consider what was the state of things in this respect in Greece; they must consider the practices that were going on, and the necessity of putting a stop to the extension of these abuses to British and Ionian subjects by demanding compensation, scarcely indeed more than nominal in some cases, but the granting of which would be an acknowledgment that such things should not be done towards us in future.

“ In discussing these cases, I am concerned to have to say that they appear to me to have been dealt with elsewhere in a spirit and in a tone which I think was neither befitting the persons concerning whom, nor the persons by whom, nor the persons before whom, the discussion took place. It is often more convenient to treat matters with ridicule than with grave argument, and we have had serious things treated jocosely, and grave men kept in a roar of laughter for an hour together at the poverty of one sufferer, or at the miserable habitation of another, at the nationality of one injured man or the religion of another, as if because a man was poor he might be bastinadoed and tortured with impunity, as if a man who was born in Scotland might be robbed without redress, or because a man is of the Jewish persuasion, he is fair game for any outrage. It is a true saying, and has often been repeated, that a very moderate share of human wisdom is sufficient for the guidance of human affairs. But there is another truth, equally indisputable, which is, that a man who aspires to govern mankind ought to bring to the task generous sentiments, compassionate sympathies, and noble and elevated thoughts.

After relating the story of Finlay and Pacifico in some detail, he proceeded :—

“ M. Pacifico having, from year to year, been treated either with answers wholly unsatisfactory, or with a positive refusal, or with pertinacious silence, it came at last to this, either that his demand was to be abandoned altogether, or that, in pursuance of the notice we had given the Greek Government a year or two before, we were to proceed to use our own means of enforcing the claim. ‘ Oh ! but,’ it is said, ‘ what an ungenerous proceeding to employ so large a force against so small a Power !’ Does the smallness of a country justify the magnitude of its evil acts? Is it to be held that if your subjects suffer violence, outrage, plunder in a country which

is small and weak, you are to tell them when they apply for redress that the country is so weak and so small that we cannot ask it for compensation? Their answer would be that the weakness and smallness of the country make it so much the more easy to obtain redress. 'No,' it is said, 'generosity is to be the rule.' We are to be generous to those who have been ungenerous to you; and we cannot give you redress because we have such ample and easy means of procuring it."

But, it was urged, Pacifico is such a notorious scoundrel.

"I say with those who have before had occasion to advert to the subject, that I do not care what M. Pacifico's character is. I do not, and cannot admit, that because a man may have acted amiss on some other occasion, and in some other matter, he is to be wronged with impunity by others.

"The rights of a man depend on the merits of the particular case; and it is an abuse of argument to say that you are not to give redress to a man because in some former transaction he may have done something which is questionable. Punish him if you will, punish him if he is guilty, but do not pursue him as a pariah through life."

He then entered on a long and lucid history of the various transactions already recounted, justifying both his action towards the Greek and his negotiation with the French Government.

Having thus disposed of the matter of Greece, he turned to the affairs of Portugal and Spain, about which he had been attacked by Sir James Graham, then member for Ripon. He pointed out that "his little experimental Belgium monarchy,"



as it had been sneeringly called, had been constituted by British intervention not dissimilar in kind from that employed in the former countries; that it had proved a secure and beneficial creation; and that he hoped for Portugal the same prosperity and happiness. He then went on:—

“Portugal is now in the enjoyment of a Constitution, and practically, it is working as well as under all circumstances, and considering how recently it has been established, could perhaps have been expected. ‘Oh, but,’ said the right hon. Baronet, ‘you have Costa Cabral as minister, and your object was to get rid of him.’ Now, the fault I find with those who are so fond of attacking me either here or elsewhere, in this country or in others, is, that they try to bring down every question to a personal bearing. If they want to oppose the policy of England, they say, ‘Let us get rid of the man who happens to be the organ of that policy.’ Why, it is like shooting a policeman. (Laughter, and cries of hear, hear.) As long as England is England, as long as the English people are animated by the feelings, and spirit, and opinions which they possess, you may knock down twenty foreign ministers one after another, but depend upon it no one will keep his place who does not act upon the same principles. When it falls to my duty, in pursuance of my functions, to oppose the policy of any Government, the immediate cry is, ‘Oh, it’s all spite against this man, or that man, Count this, or Prince that, that makes you do this!’

After reciting the events in Spain which induced the British Government to interfere under the Quadruple Treaty, he added:—

“If England has any interest more than another with reference to Spain, it is that Spain should be independent, that

Spain should be Spanish. Spain for the Spaniards is the maxim upon which we proceed in our policy with regard to Spain. Much evil must ever come to this country from the fact of Spain being under the dictation of other Powers. It is eminently for our interest that when we have the misfortune to be in dispute or at war with any other Power, we should not, merely on that account, and without any offence to or from Spain herself, be at war with Spain also. We considered that the independence of Spain was more likely to be secured by a Government controlled by a representative and national Assembly than by a Government purely arbitrary, and consisting merely of the members who might form the Administration. Therefore, on grounds of strict policy, independently of the general sympathy which animated the people as well as the Government of this country towards Spain at that time, we thought it our interest to take part with Isabella, and against the pretensions of Don Carlos. That policy was successful; the Carlist cause failed; the cause of the Constitution prevailed."

Very dexterous was the next part of his speech, in which, while apparently talking of France and Guizot, he drew an unmistakable picture of England and her Foreign Minister. The House caught the portrayal at once and showed their appreciation by loud applause.

"However, sir, the right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham) says that these affairs of Spain were of long duration, and produced disastrous consequences, because they were followed by events of the greatest importance as regards another country, namely, France. He says that out of those Spanish quarrels and Spanish marriages there arose differences between England and France which led to no slighter catastrophe than the overthrow of the French monarchy. This

is another instance of the fondness for narrowing down a great and national question to the smallness of personal difference. It was my dislike to M. Guizot, forsooth, arising out of these Spanish marriages, which overthrew his administration, and with it the throne of France! Why, sir, what will the French nation say when they hear this? They are a high-minded and high-spirited nation, full of a sense of their own dignity and honour—what will they say when they hear it stated that it was in the power of a British minister to overthrow their Government and their monarchy? (Much cheering.) Why, sir, it is a calumny on the French nation to suppose that the personal hatred of any foreigner to their minister could have this effect. They are a brave, a generous, and a noble-minded people; and if they had thought that a foreign conspiracy had been formed against one of their ministers—(tremendous and prolonged cheering, which prevented the noble Viscount from concluding the sentence)—I say, that if the French people had thought that a knot of foreign conspirators were caballing against one of their ministers, and caballing for no other reason than that he had upheld, as he conceived, the dignity and interests of his own country, and if they had thought that such a knot of foreign conspirators had coadjutors in their own land, why, I say that the French people, that brave, noble, and spirited nation, would have scorned the intrigues of such a cabal, and would have clung the closer to, and have supported the more, the man against whom such a plot had been made. If, then, the French people had thought that I, or any other foreign minister, was seeking to overthrow M. Guizot, their knowledge of such a design, so far from assisting the purpose, would have rendered him stronger than ever in the post which he occupied. No, sir, the French minister and the French monarchy were overthrown by far different causes. And many a man, both in this country and elsewhere, would have done well to have read a better lesson from the events which then took place.”

Leaving, to use his own words, the sunny plains of Castille and the gay vineyards of France, he next betook himself to the mountains of Switzerland, and entered on an elaborate justification of the charges brought against him in connection with the civil war between the cantons. After that, in his own language again, travelling from the rugged Alps into the smiling plains of Lombardy, he pleaded his cause as follows:—

“With regard to our policy with respect to Italy, I utterly deny the charges that have been brought against us of having been the advocates, supporters, and encouragers of revolution. It has always been the fate of advocates of temperate reform and of constitutional improvement to be run at as the fomenters of revolution. It is the easiest mode of putting them down; it is the received *formula*. It is the established practice of those who are the advocates of arbitrary government to say, ‘Never mind real revolutionists; we know how to deal with them; your dangerous man is the moderate reformer; he is such a plausible man; the only way of getting rid of him is to set the world at him by calling him a revolutionist.’

“Now, there are revolutionists of two kinds in this world. In the first place, there are those violent, hot-headed, and unthinking men who fly to arms, who overthrow established Governments, and who recklessly, without regard to consequences, and without measuring difficulties and comparing strength, deluge their country with blood, and draw down the greatest calamities on their fellow-countrymen. These are the revolutionists of one class. But there are revolutionists of another kind: blind-minded men, who, animated by antiquated prejudices, and daunted by ignorant apprehensions, dam up the current of human improvement until the irresistible pressure of accumulated discontent breaks down

the opposing barriers, and overthrows and levels to the earth those very institutions which a timely application of renovating means would have rendered strong and lasting. Such revolutionists as these are the men who call us revolutionists. It was not to make revolutions that Lord Minto went to Italy, or that we, at the request of the Governments of Austria and Naples, offered our mediation between contending parties."

He then dealt successively with Lord Minto's mission to Italy, with the events in Sicily, and with the support given to Turkey in the matter of the Hungarian refugees, and ended as follows:—

"I believe I have now gone through all the heads of the charges which have been brought against me in this debate. I think I have shown that the foreign policy of the Government in all the transactions with respect to which its conduct has been impugned has throughout been guided by those principles which, according to the resolution of the hon. and learned gentleman, ought to regulate the conduct of the Government of England in the management of our foreign affairs. I believe that the principles on which we have acted are those which are held by the great mass of the people of this country. I am convinced these principles are calculated, so far as the influence of England may properly be exercised with respect to the destinies of other countries, to conduce to the maintenance of peace, to the advancement of civilisation, to the welfare and happiness of mankind.

"I do not complain of the conduct of those who have made these matters the means of attack upon Her Majesty's ministers. The government of a great country like this is, undoubtedly, an object of fair and legitimate ambition to men of all shades of opinion. It is a noble thing to be allowed to guide the policy and to influence the destiny of such a country; and if ever it was an object of honourable ambition, more than ever must it be so at the moment at

which I am speaking. For while we have seen, as stated by the right hon. Baronet, the political earthquake rocking Europe from side to side—while we have seen thrones shaken, shattered, levelled, institutions overthrown and destroyed—while in almost every country of Europe the conflict of civil war has deluged the land with blood, from the Atlantic to the Black Sea, from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, this country has presented a spectacle honourable to the people of England, and worthy of the admiration of mankind.

“We have shown that liberty is compatible with order; that individual freedom is reconcilable with obedience to the law. We have shown the example of a nation in which every class of society accepts with cheerfulness the lot which Providence has assigned to it, while at the same time every individual of each class is constantly striving to raise himself in the social scale—not by injustice and wrong, not by violence and illegality, but by persevering good conduct, and by the steady and energetic exertion of the moral and intellectual faculties with which his Creator has endowed him. To govern such a people as this is indeed an object worthy of the ambition of the noblest man who lives in the land, and, therefore, I find no fault with those who may think any opportunity a fair one for endeavouring to place themselves in so distinguished and honourable a position; but I contend that we have not in our foreign policy done anything to forfeit the confidence of the country. We may not, perhaps, in this matter or in that, have acted precisely up to the opinions of one person or of another; and hard indeed it is, as we all know by our individual and private experience, to find any number of men agreeing entirely in any matter on which they may not be equally possessed of the details of the facts, circumstances, reasons, and conditions which led to action. But, making allowance for those differences of opinion which may fairly and honourably arise among those who concur in general views, I maintain that the principles which can be traced through all our foreign transactions, as the

guiding rule and directing spirit of our proceedings, are such as deserve approbation. I therefore fearlessly challenge the verdict which this House, as representing a political, a commercial, a constitutional country, is to give on the question now brought before it—whether the principles on which the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government has been conducted, and the sense of duty which has led us to think ourselves bound to afford protection to our fellow-subjects abroad are proper and fitting guides for those who are charged with the government of England; and whether, as the Roman in days of old held himself free from indignity when he could say, '*Civis Romanus sum*,' so also a British subject, in whatever land he may be, shall feel confident that the watchful eye and the strong arm of England will protect him against injustice and wrong."

As Lord Palmerston sat down the House greeted him with loud and prolonged cheers, echoing, as it seemed, by anticipation, the words extorted later on in the debate from his generous antagonist, Sir Robert Peel, when he declared, "It has made us all proud of him." This, as is well known, was Peel's last appearance in the House. He was killed next day by a fall from his horse.

Towards the early dawn of the fifth day of discussion a division of 310 against 264 gave a majority of 46 in support of his conduct of foreign affairs. In the following letters he announces the result to his correspondents:—

"F. O., June 29, 1850.

"MY DEAR NORMANBY,

"Our debate in the House of Commons finished at near four o'clock this morning, and we had about

the majority which we had reckoned upon ; our calculation fluctuated between forty and fifty. Our triumph has been complete in the debate as well as in the division ; and, all things considered, I scarcely ever remember a debate which, as a display of intellect, oratory, and high and dignified feeling, was more honourable to the House of Commons.

“ John Russell’s speech last night was admirable and first-rate ; and as to Cockburn’s,\* I do not know that I ever, in the course of my life, heard a better speech from anybody, without any exception.

“ Gladstone’s was also a first-rate performance, and Peel and Disraeli both spoke with great judgment and talent with reference to their respective positions.

“ But the degree of public feeling which has been excited out of doors upon the matters on which the debate and division turned is most remarkable, and would have led to very strong manifestations if the result of the division had been to throw the Government into the hands of our opponents.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

“ C. G., July 8, 1850.

“ MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“ You will have seen before this time how completely the House of Commons have reversed the

\* Now Lord Chief Justice of England.



petulant and factious and foolish vote of the House of Lords, but you cannot appreciate from newspaper reports, nor know from newspaper columns, the admirable and enthusiastic spirit displayed on this matter by the majority of the House of Commons, and by all the leading county papers, and by the nation at large. The attack on our foreign policy has been rightly understood by everybody, as the shot fired by a foreign conspiracy, aided and abetted by a domestic intrigue; and the parties have so entirely failed in the purpose, that instead of expelling and overthrowing me with disgrace, as they intended and hoped to do, they have rendered me for the present the most popular minister that for a very long course of time has held my office.

“The speech I had to make, which could not be comprised within a shorter time than from a quarter before ten to twenty minutes past two, was listened to very patiently and attentively by the House, and has had great success with everybody.

“Two hundred and fifty members of the Reform Club have invited me to a dinner next Saturday to celebrate my victory, and if we had not thought it better to limit the demonstration to a small scale, the dinner would have been given in Covent Garden Theatre, and would have been attended by a thousand people.

“I myself, the Government, and the country are

much indebted to the Burgraves and to Stanley. But the House of Lords has been placed in an unfortunate position, and Stanley has not raised his reputation as a statesman.

“Peel’s death is a great calamity, and one that seems to have had no adequate cause. He was a very bad and awkward rider, and his horse might have been sat by any better equestrian ; but he seems, somehow or other, to have been entangled in the bridle, and to have pulled the horse to step or kneel upon him. The injury to the shoulder was severe but curable ; that which killed him was a broken rib, forced by great violence inwards into the lungs.

“ Yours affectionately,

“ PALMERSTON.”

Immediately after this successful combat the portrait of Lord Palmerston, by Partridge, which was so well known in later years to the frequenters of Cambridge House, where it hung on the staircase, was presented to Lady Palmerston by a hundred and twenty Members of the House of Commons. They added to it a written address, expressive of “their high sense of his public and private character, and of the independent policy by which he maintained the honour and interests of his country.”

It was altogether a great triumph for Lord Palmerston. “His speech,” according to the testimony

of Sir George Lewis,\* “was an extraordinary effort. He defeated the whole Conservative party, Protectionists and Peelites, supported by the extreme Radicals, and backed by the ‘Times,’ and all the organised forces of foreign diplomacy.”

Every element of hostility and of pent-up animosity which had been long gathering against him were on this occasion brought into one focus, but he only expanded the more instead of shrivelling under the burning-glass. He vindicated both with courage and, as we have seen, with eloquence all his actions at the Foreign Office as being dictated solely by his care for the position and well-being of his country, and stamped himself upon the minds of the English people, according to Lord John Russell’s long remembered words, as emphatically and in a special sense, a *Minister of England*.

\* Sir G. Lewis to Sir E. Head. Page 227 of Letters.

## CHAPTER VI.

Letters—General Haynau at Barclay's Brewery—Ecclesiastical Titles Bill—National Defences—Mr. Gladstone's Letters about Neapolitan Prisons—Ionian Islands—Defence in Parliament—Question of "Holy Places."

WHILE still detained in town by the arrears of the session of 1850, he sends to his brother a report of his own position and of the state of parties. His estimate of Lord Aberdeen's capacity for the Premiership was destined to be tested within two years.

"C. G., September 1, 1850.

"MY DEAR WILLIAM,

"I have been more entirely swamped by business during the whole of this last session of Parliament than I ever was at any former time, and I have not even yet been able to work up the arrear of various matters which has accumulated by the regular overflowing of almost every day. But I have no reason to find fault with the session, for it has left me at its close in a very satisfactory and gratifying position. I have beaten and put down and silenced, at least for a time, one of the most widespread and malignant and active confederacies that ever conspired against one man without crushing him. But

I was in the right, and was able to fight my battle; and John Russell and my colleagues behaved most handsomely and honourably, and my triumph has been in proportion to the magnitude of the struggle. The death of Louis Philippe delivers me from my most artful and inveterate enemy, whose position gave him in many ways the power to injure me; and though I am very sorry for the death of Peel, from personal regard, and because it is no doubt a great loss to the country, yet as far as my own political position is concerned, I do not think that he was ever disposed to do me any good turn. It is difficult to say what effect his death will have on the state of parties in Parliament. He had not much of a following latterly, though the men who still stuck to him, such as Goulburn, Robert Clive, Cardwell, and Banks, and the like, were the most respectable of the party. Perhaps Sidney Herbert, or Aberdeen, or Gladstone may set up for leader of the Conservative Free Traders, or the Free Trade Conservatives; and perhaps Stanley may invite a junction with him by some compromise about putting off Protection. I have been told by a person who had it from Stanley himself, that during the time when a change of Government was expected, Aberdeen said to Stanley that in that case he, Aberdeen, would be commissioned by the Queen to form a Government! This would have been a curious dish to set before a Queen! On the whole, I rather am inclined to think that the Government is made stronger by the events of last

session, and that we may look forward to getting successfully through the session of next year.

“Emily and I are going to-morrow to Broadlands, and we shall probably fix our headquarters there for the next six weeks, as I can always come up to town for a day when wanted.

“I made acquaintance lately with a Sicilian Princess—Montevoyo, I think, she calls herself—a widow, and one of the ladies of the Queen of Naples. She spoke highly of you; but then I must add she spoke also highly of the King of Naples, which makes her praise of less value.

“I have been greatly amused and delighted by the accounts you have sent me of the Sicilian claims conferences. It is charming to have Austria and France acting upon principles which they found so much fault with me for enforcing; but we will not say *quattro* before it is in the *saccho*.

“Good bye.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

What Lord Palmerston, a wise friend to Turkey, thought and said about it, is still of so much interest that I here quote three or four letters on its affairs written about this time. They at any rate show that she has not continued to sink for want of warning.

“Broadlands, October 29, 1849.

“MY DEAR CANNING,

“Some differences and discussions have arisen in Syria on the subject of the conversion of con-

gregations from the Greek Church to the Protestant religion, and the Turkish authorities have set their faces against such conversions. It would be well, however, for the Turkish Government to consider whether it is not for their interest to encourage such conversions rather than to endeavour to prevent them. The Greek and the Catholic church are merely other names for Russian and French influence, and Russian and French influence are dissolving agents for the Turkish empire. Protestantism is merely emancipation from Russian and French influence; and if all the Greek Rayahs in Turkey, and all the Maronites in Syria could become Protestants, such a change would be much in favour of the political authority of the Sultan. The great difference which distinguishes the Protestant religion from the Greek and the Catholic, as bearing upon political obedience is, that the Greek and Catholic hierarchy are ready instruments for foreign influence, while the Protestant clergy are far less likely or fit to be so used.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

Turkey, as is seen by the next to Sir Stratford Canning, was contemplating a loan for the first time. Lord Palmerston's prognostications have proved somewhat correct.

“ C. G., August 7, 1850.

“ I am sorry to hear so indifferent an account of ‘ progress ’ in Turkey as that which your letter of

the 19th July contains. I will exhort through the ambassador here. But how is it supposed that a foreign loan would help the Porte? Would not such a loan add, by the amount of its interest and sinking fund, to the burthens of the State? and would there not be a danger that a large part of it would somehow or other find its way into the pockets of private individuals? As to Douad Pasha, or Douad Effendi, he has, I think, lost all power of doing mischief here, and perhaps that may be the reason why he tarries in the East; or maybe he thinks that, as the wise men are said to have come from thence, he may pick up there some of that wisdom which he so much lacks. But the Arabs have a proverb which says you may send a jackass to Mecca, and he will come back a jackass still."

Lord Palmerston's "exhortation" was as follows:—

"Broadlands, September 24, 1850.

"MON CHER AMBASSADEUR,

"Permettez que je vous renouvelle par écrit la prière que je vous ai faite verbalement pour vous engager à tirer l'attention la plus sérieuse de votre Gouvernement au mémorandum que Sir S. Canning a présenté au Sultan; je voudrais y ajouter la demande que votre Gouvernement veuille bien prendre en considération des observations que le Colonel Rose\* a faites au sujet de votre armée, et que Sir S. Canning aura déjà soumises au grand vizier.

\* Now Lord Strathnairn.



“ Pardonnez-moi si j’ai l’air de m’ingérer dans des affaires qui ne me regardent pas, et croyez bien que ce que je dis, je le dis uniquement dans l’intérêt du Sultan et de son Empire. L’Empire Ottoman n’est pas encore en état de maintenir son indépendance, et de défendre son vaste territoire contre les ennemis qui le menacent sans l’aide et l’appui de temps en temps de la Grande-Bretagne. Le Gouvernement anglais a le sincère désir et la ferme intention de vous donner toujours dans des momens de difficulté l’appui dont vous aurez besoin. Mais le Gouvernement anglais ne peut agir qu’en autant qu’il est soutenu par le Parlement et par l’opinion publique ; et ces soutiens nous manqueraient si nous ne pouvions pas démontrer que le Gouvernement ottoman a fait tous les efforts en son pouvoir pour mettre toutes les branches de l’administration de la Turquie dans le meilleur état possible, et n’a rien omis qui pourrait contribuer à mettre la Turquie en état de se défendre en développant toutes les grandes ressources naturelles dont la Providence l’a douée.

“ Jusqu’à présent il faut l’avouer ceci ne peut pas se dire. Votre Gouvernement a eu sans doute à lutter contre maints obstacles ; mais pour accomplir de grands résultats il faut de grands efforts et de la détermination, et de la persévérance.

“ À Constantinople on chancelle, on hésite, on s’arrête. Mais le moment actuel est favorable pour faire des réformes et des améliorations. Le proverbe anglais dit qu’il faut faire le foin pendant que le

soleil luit. Il faut réparer sa maison pendant qu'il fait calme, afin d'être en mesure contre l'ouragan.

“ Les points principaux que je voudrais signaler comme demandant l'attention *pratique* de votre Gouvernement sont :

“ Une perception plus exacte du revenu, sans exiger de qui que ce soit plus qu'il ne doit payer ; et cessation du système par lequel on afferme la collection des impôts.

“ Économie dans les dépenses, choisissant d'abord les dépenses nécessaires et remettant ce qui ne l'est pas.

“ Par conséquent ne perdant pas de temps à construire des Routes de Commerce, des fortifications pour le Bosphore, à réparer les forteresses sur la frontière, à établir des ouvrages pour la défense de la capitale.

“ L'administration de la justice devrait être sans reproche ; on prétend que maintenant cet état de choses n'existe pas, et les preuves en sont nombreuses.

“ Toute distinction politique et civile entre les différentes classes des sujets du Sultan par raison de différence de religion devrait être abolie, afin que le Sultan puisse devenir également le Souverain de toutes les populations qui habitent son Empire.

“ Quant à l'armée il paraît que l'artillerie est excellente, les hôpitaux admirables ; mais que l'infanterie est susceptible d'améliorations, et que la cavalerie en a grand besoin. Que les cavaliers ne

sont pas bien armés, ayant quitté une excellente épée qu'ils avaient autrefois pour en prendre une assez mauvaise, et qu'en général ils ne sont pas fort adroits dans le maniement ni de l'épée ni de la lance.

“Bon voyage. Je vous souhaite personnellement tout le bonheur possible, et je fais des vœux pour que votre pays attienne une prospérité rapide et avec cela solide.

“Mille complimens,

“PALMERSTON.

“S. E. MEHEMET PASHA.”

“Broadlands, September 24, 1850.

“MY DEAR CANNING,

“I have just taken leave of the Turkish ambassador, who starts on Thursday for Constantinople. I took the opportunity of requesting him to impress upon his Government the necessity of improvement and reforms, and of putting an end to the prevalent system of corruption and injustice; and I begged him to recommend strongly to the attention of his Government the memorandum which you had given to the Sultan. There is obviously a great deal wanting to be done in every way and in every branch of administration to bring Turkey into line with other Powers, and to put her into a condition to defend herself. But much has already been accomplished, perhaps more than ever yet was done in the same space of time in any country in which there was so much room for improvement; and I am not

discouraged, therefore, by the apparent slowness of progress, but only encouraged to urge them on to further advance. It may be true that much of what has hitherto been done exists more in regulations and orders than in actual execution; but one ought not to undervalue the worth of rules, and laws, and institutions, even when they are not practically acted upon to the extent of their letter and spirit. As long as forms remain they are a fixed point to refer to; and as men improve and opinion grows more powerful, those forms become more and more the guide for conduct and events, and that which at first is only theory in course of time is converted into practice.

“Rose’s report seems to me to be ably drawn up, and gives, in a condensed form, many useful suggestions. It may be true, as he says, that foreigners introduced into the army as officers have not as much influence for good as they might have, unless they are backed by the authority of some Government; but still it is impossible not to think that much improvement might arise from infusing a good number of Poles and Hungarians and Italians into the Turkish service.

“Such men would necessarily impart to the Turkish officers notions and knowledge that would be very useful; and the mere fact of Christians serving in this way in the Turkish army would have its effect in breaking down that exclusive and fanatical feeling which is represented as a bar to the admission

of Christian subjects of the Porte to situations of military command.

“I am very glad you have got such a good arrangement made for Slade and his subordinate. They will be able to render useful service to the Turkish navy.

“Why does the Turkish Government not get some Prussian instructors for their cavalry? The Prussian cavalry is excellent; and, indeed, the Turkish infantry could not be drilled and organised upon a better model than that of the Prussian service.

“I remember at the reviews in 1817 or 1818 of the armies of occupation in France, the Duke of Wellington being asked which he thought the best army, the Austrian, the Russian, or the Prussian, his reply was: ‘To say which are the best troops is to say a great deal more than I will take on myself to affirm; but I will tell you which of the three I should like best to command in action. I should decidedly prefer the Prussians; they are the handiest, the best organised, and the most intelligent.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

Lord Palmerston was always especially emphatic in his declarations that it was necessary for the prosperity of Turkey that her Christian population should be placed and treated on a footing of absolute equality with the Mussulman. He urges it in the foregoing

communication to Mehemet Pasha, and a year later he repeats it to M. Musurus, in reply to a note expressing the ambassador's regret at the events which caused Lord Palmerston's retirement from the Government. The letter is dated 30th December, 1851, and runs as follows:—" Agréez, je vous en prie, mes remercîments les plus sincères de votre aimable lettre, et soyez persuadé que, quelle que soit la position politique dans laquelle je pourrai me trouver, je serai toujours fidèle aux principes qui me font voir un intérêt non-seulement anglais, mais européen dans l'indépendance et le bien-être de l'Empire ottoman, et vous connaissez bien mon intime conviction que la prospérité de cet empire ne reposera jamais sur une base vraiment solide tant que les sujets chrétiens du Sultan ne sont pas placés sur un pied d'égalité devant la loi avec les sujets de la religion musulmane."

I add also a passage from a letter to Sir Stratford Canning:—

" Ought not this consideration to show the Turkish Government how important it is that they should lose no time in removing all civil and political distinctions between Mussulmen and Rayahs. I pressed this yesterday on the Turkish ambassador, and represented that, at present, the Sultan not only deprives himself of the use of his left arm, but runs constantly the risk of being himself belaboured by

it. Mehemet Pasha acknowledged the justice of the remark." \*

An attack upon General Haynau by the men of Barclay's brewery gave Lord Palmerston some trouble in the autumn of this year. General Haynau, an Austrian general, who had won an evil reputation in the Hungarian war for great cruelties and alleged flogging of women, came to London and went to visit the premises of Barclay and Perkins. As soon as his presence was known, a number of draymen came out with brooms and dirt, shouting out, "Down with the Austrian butcher." He fled with the mob at his heels, and took refuge in a public-house by the river-side, till the police came to his rescue and took him away in a police-galley to a place of safety. The following letter about it is to Sir George Grey, who was then Home Secretary :—

" Broadlands, October 1, 1850.

" MY DEAR GREY,

" Koller † is very reasonable about the Haynau matter, and I believe that Schwarzenberg makes his move more to satisfy the feelings of the Austrian army than from any interest he himself takes about Haynau, who is in disgrace with the Austrian Government, and has been much blamed in Austrian society at Vienna for his atrocities.

" I told Koller that it is much better that no

\* To Sir Stratford Canning. F. O., October 11, 1849.

† Austrian ambassador.

prosecution should take place, because the defence of the accused would necessarily be a minute recapitulation of all the barbarities committed by Haynau in Italy and Hungary, and that would be more injurious to him and to Austria than any verdict obtained against the draymen could be satisfactory.

“ I must own that I think Haynau’s coming here, without rhyme or reason, so soon after his Italian and Hungarian exploits, was a wanton insult to the people of this country, whose opinion of him had been so loudly proclaimed at public meetings and in all the newspapers. But the draymen were wrong in the particular course they adopted. Instead of striking him, which, however, by Koller’s account, they did not do much, they ought to have tossed him in a blanket, rolled him in the kennel, and then sent him home in a cab, paying his fare to the hotel.

“ Metternich and Neumann strongly advised him, as he passed through Brussels, not to come to England at present ; and Koller tried to persuade him to cut off his long yellow moustaches. But he would not shave, and he professed to think that his presence in England could turn public opinion in his favour.

“ I explained to Koller that the people of this country treat with respect, and even with kindness, their bitterest political enemies, when duty or necessity brings them here. Buonaparte received no



insult at Plymouth, Soult was received with enthusiasm, Metternich, Louis Philippe, and Guizot with courteous and kind hospitality; but Haynau was looked upon, no matter wrongly or rightly, in the same light as the Mannings and Tawell, and he ought to have had a couple of policemen to go about with him to protect him from the honest indignation of the mob. The Austrian Government, however, think that the proceedings at Barclay's were got up by a Dr. Trencke, formerly editor of a Liberal paper at Vienna, now an exile here, and employed as clerk in Barclay's establishment.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

The rivalry between Austria and Prussia for the leadership of Germany was complicating matters in that country. On the question of the entrance of Austria into the German Confederation, France and England had initiated an understanding. Both Governments feared the effect that might be produced on the relations of the great Powers by the carrying out of the Austrian plan.

Lord Palmerston had been engaged during the year in a tedious and vain mediation between Denmark and Prussia about the interminable Sleswig-Holstein dispute. The details of all these events are no longer of interest; but the contents of

the following letter foreshadow the events of 1866 :—

“ F. O., November 22, 1850.

“ MY DEAR COWLEY,

“ German affairs are indeed come to a state of chaos. The only thing that seems pretty clear is, that all parties are more or less in the wrong. But Prussia seems to bear away the palm in this respect. Her course has been, indeed, dishonest, inconsistent, and irresolute and weak. In regard to the Sleswig-Holstein question, she has throughout acted with the greatest duplicity and bad faith; in regard to German affairs, her only object from beginning to end seems to have been her own aggrandisement, which, at moments when much was within her grasp she had not courage or steadiness successfully to pursue. Her partisans try to make out that the contest between her and Austria is a struggle between constitutional and arbitrary Government, but it is no such thing; it is only a conflict between the two leading Powers in Germany as to which should be politically preponderant. We should have had no objection to see Prussia take the first place; on the contrary, a German Union embracing all the smaller states, with Prussia at its head, and in alliance with Austria as a separate Power, would have been a very good European arrangement; but when the Empire was offered to Prussia the King shrank from the hazardous position thus proposed to him, and declined to accept it

till he should be asked to do so by the Sovereigns. That decided the question, for it was pretty certain that the Sovereigns would never trouble him with such a request. But the Empire having been thus negatived, Prussia ought to have taken at once the only other possible course, and to have come to an agreement with Austria for reconstructing the German confederation on the principle of the treaty of 1815, with such modifications as the establishment of parliaments in Prussia and Austria, and all the other states might render necessary. Instead of this, Prussia went on pottering about an Erfurth Union, which never could end in anything but smoke, and then she chose deliberately to expose herself to the humiliation of being obliged, by military threats, to retreat step by step from all the positions she had taken up in regard to almost all pending affairs. All this is lamentable, and is a fresh proof that honesty is the best policy. What Austria means to do remains to be seen. The Austrians declare that they mean to have a Parliament of their own, and not to put down constitutional government in any other country. We shall see. In the meanwhile enormous armies have been put into the field on both sides just as winter is setting in, and without any intelligible question to fight about. The only thing that both sides ought immediately to do is to send these useless soldiers home to their stoves and provision stores. In the meanwhile, Russia on one side and France

on the other, notwithstanding their fair professions, must be inwardly chuckling at seeing Germany come down in so short a time from *Einheit* to intense exasperation and to the brink of civil war. Poor Bunsen\* is stung to the quick at the failure of all the fine schemes which he and Stockmar, and Gervinus and Gagern, and the rest of them had so loudly proclaimed as certain of success, and Bunsen accordingly shuts himself up and is seen by nobody.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

The Papal aggression and the passing of the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill was now occupying public attention. Lord Palmerston expounds his views of the question to his brother.

“ C. G., January 27, 1851.

“ MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“ Here we are all prosperous, and during the month at Christmas that we spent at Broadlands I broke loose, and instead of working all day long in my north room, and only rushing out at sunset, as I did in September and October, I took a fling, and went out several days hunting and shooting in the fine of the early day, coming home, of course, for work earlier than if I had been only a sportsman.

“ Public affairs are going on as well as they can ever at any time be expected to do. Food has been

\* Chevalier Bunsen, Prussian minister in London.

abundant and cheap, the labouring classes fully employed, and, in all respects, better off than they have been for a very long period of time. Poor rates are greatly reduced; and though farmers complain, and rents have been generally lowered, yet, all things considered, neither the owners nor the occupiers of land have any great cause to complain. The cheapness of all things makes up in some degree for small diminutions of income. In Ireland, too, things are looking better, and rent is not that absolutely unknown quantity which it has been for some years past. The revenue has been productive, and we shall have a surplus of about two millions. This will not, however, enable us to take off the income tax, which will expire this year, and which we must propose the renewal of. This will produce some troublesome debates, but I have no doubt of its being carried; we shall be assisted in carrying it by many who want particular taxes taken off, which cannot be repealed or modified if the income tax is not renewed, because in that case, instead of a surplus to scramble for, there would be a deficit to provide for. The income tax produces upwards of five millions.

“The Papal aggression question will give us some trouble, and give rise to stormy debates. Our difficulty will be to find out a measure which shall satisfy reasonable Protestants, without violating those principles of liberal toleration which we are pledged to. I think we shall succeed. But all the newspaper

stories of divisions in the Cabinet on this or any other question are pure inventions, wholly devoid of any foundation. The Pope, I hear, and the people about him by whom at present he is guided, affect to treat lightly the excitement which his measures have produced in this country, and they represent the clamour as a thing got up by the Church—a parson agitation. They deceive themselves; the feeling is general and intense all through the nation, and the sensible Catholics themselves lament what has been done.

“The thing itself, in truth, is little or nothing, and does not justify the irritation. What has goaded the nation is the manner, insolent and ostentatious, in which it has been done. The Catholics have a right to organise their church as they like; and if staff officers called Bishops were thought better than staff officers called Vicars Apostolic, nobody would have remarked or objected to the change, if it had been made quietly and only in the bosom of the church. But what offended—and justly—all England, was the Pope’s published Allocution and Wiseman’s announcement of his new dignities. The first representing England as a land of benighted heathens; the second proclaiming that the Pope had parcelled out England into districts—a thing that only a sovereign has a right to do—and that he, Wiseman, and others were sent, and to be sent, to govern those territorial districts, with titles belonging thereto. This could not and would not have been done or attempted

in any other country without the consent of the Government.

“The Pope or his advisers pretended at first that they had the consent of the English Government, through Minto, in November, 1847—*three years ago* ; but they were soon driven out of that assertion ; and then Wiseman brought it down to a mere statement that the intention was made known to Minto in 1847, and that he said nothing and made no observation.

“Now even this did not take place ; and if it had, in a matter of such importance, silence cannot be construed into consent. Moreover, Minto was at Rome upon quite another matter, and had no instructions on this subject ; and if the Pope wanted the consent of the English Government, he should have asked for it ; and not having asked for it or obtained it, he should not quote it as a justification of his course. He might in the three years have asked the question ; and there was one opportunity specially of doing so, for in August, when Wiseman was on the point of setting out for Rome to settle all these matters, he wrote to ask an interview with John Russell, and was with him more than half an hour ; that was the time to have ascertained from the head of the Government himself what would be thought of the cut-and-dry measure ; but not a word did Wiseman say on the matter, and his excuse for his silence now is that he did not then think the measure likely to be so immediate. But he must have thought it as near, as the

Pope is supposed to have thought it in November, 1847, when he pretends to have spoken to Minto about it (which, however, he did not); and so far from Wiseman not supposing the measure to be near, we know full well that the Pope's excuse, as put forward, is that Wiseman pressed the measure upon him, said he knew England and the English people, and would be answerable that it would go off smoothly.

“ We must bring in a measure ; the country would not be satisfied without some legislative enactment. We shall make it as gentle as possible. The violent Protestant party will object to it for its mildness, and will endeavour to drive us further. The Pope might help us to resist that pressure if he would do certain things that would allay public feeling. For instance, if he would disclaim any pretension to govern by his bishops any but the Catholics in the districts to which those bishops are appointed. It sounds almost childish to suggest such a truism ; but many people, forgetting that he can no more claim jurisdiction or authority over Protestants than over the winds and waves or the tides of the ocean, and looking to the words of the Allocution and of Wiseman's announcements, imagine that he does, and some public disclaimer would be useful. Again, offence has been taken at the territorial titles. These are unnecessary. Instead of appointing an Archbishop of Westminster, and Bishops of this or that place, the Pope might have appointed Archbishops and Bishops for the



governance of the *Roman* Catholics (the word *Roman* is essential) in Middlesex, Hertfordshire, &c., as the case might be, their episcopal locality for titles continuing to be places in *partibus infidelium*. These two measures, if adopted by the Pope, would go far to allay the storm and restore harmony between Protestant and Catholic. But what would complete the calm would be his writing to Wiseman to say that he would not go on without his personal advice at Rome. The departure of the Cardinal would be the pledge of restored peace. If you should have an opportunity by chance of meeting the nuncio, you might throw out these suggestions; not as demands made by the English Government; not as a commission given you from hence to be executed, but as what you know to be, and what you know in consequence of communications made to you from hence; and you may say that what you tell him is quite private and confidential, to be made known by him to his Court or not, as he may think best, but that you throw out the suggestion in the most friendly spirit, and that you know that the British Government are most desirous of maintaining for the Roman Catholics in the Queen's dominions all the freedom and civil and political rights which existing laws have conferred upon them. If you should have no natural opportunity of speaking to the nuncio, it would be better not to go out of your way to create one. Anything which the Pope might do ought to be done before our Bill has made much progress

through Parliament, or it would not be of much use.

“Yours affectionately,  
“PALMERSTON.”

Lord Palmerston was always very earnest in his view of the necessity for England being strong in her home defences on land as well as by sea. Sir John Burgoyne had, in May, 1850, written a memorandum which called attention to our deficiencies in this respect. Lord Palmerston sends it to the Premier with the following observations:—

“I send you, to keep and ponder over at your leisure, a copy of a memorandum on our want of national defence, drawn up by Sir John Burgoyne, and lent to me some months ago by Lord Anglesey. It is worth reading, though it is only a repetition of the opinions entertained and expressed by all men who know what war is, either by sea or by land. But I am well aware that it is almost as difficult to persuade the people of this country to provide themselves with the means of defence as it would be for them to defend themselves without those means, and that although our internal condition may still be the ‘envy of surrounding nations,’ yet we have neither

“ ‘Hearts resolved nor hands prepared  
The blessings we enjoy to guard.’ ”

He also writes to Sir Charles Wood, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, about fortifications:—

“ C. G., January 22, 1851.

“ MY DEAR WOOD,

“ I am glad to hear that you mean to take £8000 for going on with the fortifications at Pembroke, in addition to what is to be taken for the detached outworks at Portsmouth; but could you not take a sum, however small, to make a beginning, for similar defences at Plymouth? Burgoyne will tell you that Plymouth Dockyard is, if possible, still more exposed than the Portsmouth yard to be destroyed by shells from a small force landed in its neighbourhood. If 8000 or 10,000 men were landed at Whitesand Bay, or anywhere thereabouts, they might establish mortar batteries on shore opposite Plymouth yard without, I believe, being under fire from any existing work. Cronstadt, Sebastopol, Cherbourg, Brest, and Toulon bristle with guns, and are secure against any attack by sea or land. Our yards, full of valuable materials, and containing the elements of our naval defence, are now indeed pretty safe from any attack by sea, but still at the mercy of an enemy on the land. The French proverb says, ‘ C’est l’occasion qui fait le larron ;’ and the more the French shall see that our most important points are safe against a surprise, the greater will be our chances of continued peace. A session of Paliament is always full of unforeseen and unforeseeable accidents; and it would be a good thing, in the event of our official life being unexpectedly cut short, that we should leave behind us indisputable proofs that we had made at least

beginnings for the full protection of all our great dockyards.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

“ C. G., January 24, 1851.

“ We shall have, no doubt, a great cry for economy; but I do not think the House of Commons will grudge a reasonable defence for the security of our dockyards.

“ As to Head’s\* book, I own I think it contains matter deserving of the most serious consideration of every Englishman, and more especially of all those who are charged with the destinies of the country. I mean those parts of his book which detail the aggressive means of Powers who may become hostile, and the slenderness of our own means of defence, together with the ruinous effects of even the temporary occupation of the country by a foreign army. As to his remedy, the amount of standing army which he proposes is not to be attained; but I hold that no Government will have done its full duty to the country which has not organised some dormant but partially trained force, of the nature of a militia or *landwehr*, which could be called out under arms in a fortnight or three weeks to the aggregate number of one hundred thousand in the two islands upon the first breaking out of a war. Every other country that deserves to be called a Power has this kind of reserve force—France, Austria, Prussia, the United

\* Sir Francis Head.

States. Russia has it not, but merely because she keeps up a war establishment in time of peace; though she, too, has in time of peace part of her regular army on furlough. England alone, with a peace establishment inadequate for the defence of the country against invasion, has no means of increasing her defensive garrison on the outbreak of a war except by the tardy process of voluntary enlistment into the line, or the equally slow operation of passing a Bill to repeal the Act suspending the ballot, going through the tedious and complicated operation of a ballot, of assembling, clothing, arming, officering, and training an army of men who never handled a musket or fixed a bayonet. Then we are told that in a moment of crisis the nation would rise *like one man*—a mere bitterly sarcastic truism; for a nation armed, as the English would be, with broomsticks and pitchforks would be against a disciplined army about as formidable as *one man* would be.”

On the 1st of May the Great Exhibition of all Nations was opened in Hyde Park. Lord Palmerston went to the ceremony and gives an account of the scene. England was still full of refugees, cast upon her shores by continental revolutions, and their presence had inspired those who were responsible for the maintenance of order with some anxiety.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“C. G., May 2, 1851.

“Many thanks for your friendly good offices about ‘La Patrie.’ Such articles, however intrinsically

silly, ought certainly not to appear in newspapers known to be in partial communication with the Government; but Léon Faucher has, I know, always had a dislike to me, or at least to my particular doings; and as to Guizot, I make allowances for and forgive the rancour of his feelings toward me. Winners can not only laugh, but pardon.

“But yesterday is the topic of thought and of word with everybody in London. It was indeed a glorious day for England; and the way in which the royal ceremony went off was calculated to inspire humility into the minds of the representatives of foreign Governments and to strike despair into the breasts of those, if any such there be, who may desire to excite confusion in this country. There must have been nearer a million than any other number of people who turned out to post themselves as they could to see some part of the show; and Mayne, the head of the police, told me he thought there were about thirty-four thousand in the glass building. The Queen, her husband, her eldest son and daughter, gave themselves in full confidence to this multitude, with no other guard than one of honour and the accustomed supply of stick-handed constables, to assist the crowd in keeping order among themselves. Of course there were in reserve, in proper stations, ample means of repressing any disorder if any had been attempted; but nothing was brought out and shown beyond what I have mentioned; and it was impossible for the invited guests of a lady’s

drawing-room to have conducted themselves with more perfect propriety than did this sea of human beings.

“The royal party were received with continued acclamation as they passed through the parks and round the Exhibition House; and it was also very interesting to witness the cordial greeting given to the Duke of Wellington. I was just behind him and Anglesey, within two of them, during the procession round the building, and he was accompanied by an incessant running fire of applause from the men and waving of handkerchiefs and kissing of hands from the women, who lined the pathway of march during the three-quarters of an hour that it took us to march round.

“The building itself is far more worth seeing than anything in it, though many of its contents are worthy of admiration. You ought to contrive to run over to take a look at it before its final close.

“Though this first day of the campaign has passed off so well, of course we shall have to keep a watchful eye during the whole four months upon those who might be disposed to take advantage, for purposes of mischief, of the congregation of foreigners in London; but with the means we have of making such people pay dearly for any such attempt, I do not entertain any apprehension as to the result of any schemes they may plan.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

The Ministry had been in rather a tottering condition for the last twelvemonth. Lord Palmerston's triumph on the Greek debate had acted as a decided tonic, but still its health was feeble. On the 13th of February it had a majority of only eleven against a Protectionist motion of Mr. Disraeli's; and a week later it was defeated on a motion for the extension of the county franchise. Accordingly, on the 22nd of February, Lord John Russell resigned. Lord Stanley tried in vain to form a Ministry. Lord John in vain tried to form a coalition with the Peelites; so it ended in the Whig Ministry coming back just as it was before, though only to survive for one more year—the usual fate of Cabinets which come back after a defeat. Lord Palmerston says to his brother:—

“ C. G., April 3, 1851.

“ All things, politically, are looking tolerably well, and I think we may reckon ourselves pretty secure of remaining in office till next year. It would be ridiculous for us to resign now, after the failures to form another Government, unless the House of Commons were to pass a vote of censure or a resolution of no confidence, and that they are not likely to do. We may have some changes forced upon us in our financial arrangements for the Budget; but that will not much signify. I see the Roman papers exulted greatly at our fall; they will have learnt soon afterwards the melancholy news of our restoration. Gladstone and Molesworth are full of the abominable tyranny exer-



cised by the Neapolitan and Roman Governments. Gladstone says the Neapolitan is a *Governo infernale*, and that, as a gentleman and a Christian, he feels it his duty to make known what he has seen of its proceedings. Both of them say that they were wrong last year in their attacks on my foreign policy; but they did not know the truth. This is satisfactory as far as I am concerned, though very unsatisfactory as regards the state of Italy.

“Our Papal Aggression Bill will be carried in spite of the opposition of the Irish members, who are driven on by the influence of the priests over the Irish electors. But the feeling in England against the Catholics is deep, strong, and general, and what the Pope and his priests have lately done has materially injured the Catholic cause. I do not on that account regret it. All these exposures, morèover, about Miss Talbot and Mr. Carré have tended to throw great discredit on the Catholic priesthood; and I am sorry to say the Shrewsburys come in for their share.

“I went one day to hear Gavazzi’s harangue against the abuses of the Catholic Church. He spoke in Italian for an hour and a half to several hundred hearers, with much eloquence and effect.”

Soon after this, two letters, addressed to Lord Aberdeen by Mr. Gladstone on the subject of the State prosecutions and the State prisons of the Neapolitan Government, were published in the form of a

pamphlet. The effect produced by these letters was very great. The high character and position of the author gave authority to his narrative of facts, attested as they were by personal observation. He asserted that vast numbers of innocent and untried men were confined in the prisons of Naples for alleged political offences under circumstances of great barbarity. Lord Palmerston, in the House of Commons, paid an emphatic tribute to the course taken by Mr. Gladstone. He added that, concurring with the author of these letters that the influence of public opinion in Europe might have some effect in setting such matters right, he had sent copies of the publication to the British ministers at the various courts of Europe, directing them to give copies to each Government.

When the Neapolitan envoy in London saw the account of what Lord Palmerston had said in the House about the Gladstone letters, he wrote, forwarding a pamphlet which had been written to order by a Mr. Macfarlane, in reply to Mr. Gladstone, and requested Lord Palmerston to send it round also to the several European courts. Lord Palmerston declined being accessory to giving circulation to a document which he characterised as "only a tissue of bare assertion and reckless denial, mixed up with coarse ribaldry and commonplace abuse of public men and political parties." He then added, that as Prince Castelcicala had addressed him on the subject, he felt compelled to say that "Mr. Glad-

stone's letters to Lord Aberdeen present an afflicting picture of a system of illegality, injustice, and cruelty, practised by the officers and agents of the Government in the kingdom of Naples, such as might have been hoped would not have existed in any European country at the present day; and the information which has been received upon these matters from many other sources leads, unfortunately, to the conclusion that Mr. Gladstone by no means overstated the various evils which he describes. But Mr. Gladstone's letters were evidently written and published not, as the pamphlet which you have sent me insinuates, in a spirit of hostility to the King of Naples, or with feelings adverse to the parliamentary and monarchical constitution which his Sicilian Majesty has granted to his subjects and has confirmed by his royal oath. Mr. Gladstone's object seems, on the contrary, to have been the friendly purpose of drawing public attention to, and of directing the force of public opinion upon, abuses which, if allowed to continue, must necessarily sap the foundations of the Neapolitan monarchy, and prepare the way for those violent revulsions which the resentments produced by a deep sense of long-continued and wide-spread injustice are sure sooner or later to produce. It might have been hoped that the Neapolitan Government would have received those letters in the spirit in which they manifestly were written, and would have set to work earnestly and effectually to correct those manifold and grave

abuses to which their attention has thus been drawn. It is obvious that, by such a course, the Neapolitan Government would do more to frustrate the designs of revolutionists, and to strengthen the monarchical institutions of their country, than could be effected by the most vigorous proceedings of the most vigilant minister of police."

While he thus addressed the Neapolitan minister, he wrote as follows to his brother:—

" Broadlands, September 7, 1851

"MY DEAR WILLIAM,

"Your account of the effect produced by Gladstone's pamphlet is highly interesting and curious. The Neapolitan Government will not have been much pleased and edified by my answer to Castalcicala about Macfarlane's pamphlet, nor would they be much gratified if they were to receive a collection of all the articles which have appeared on this subject in the various newspapers in England and in Germany.

"I still hope that the discussion may do some good and excite some shame in their minds; one might almost hope it would work some change in their conduct.

"The French, as you say, defend as well as they can the Neapolitan Government; but they every now and then let out things which undermine their defence. Walewski told Milnes the other day, as a proof of the goodness of heart of the King of Naples,

that at his, Walewski's, request the King had at one time promised to set free three hundred prisoners against whom no charge or no proof had been established. 'How grateful,' said Milnes, 'these men must have been; did they not come to thank you for their release?' 'Why,' said Walewski, 'you see, after the King had made the promise, the chief of the police came to him and said that if the men were set free, he could not answer for the King's life; and so you see the men were not set free.'

"I sent you a copy of my answer to Castelcicala to be given to the Neapolitan Government, because I thought that my friend the Prince would probably not send them exactly a correct copy, but would probably leave out the words about the King's oath.

"We must have interest on the sums due for compensation; and if they, the Neapolitans, quote the sulphur case as a precedent against interest, you may quote the more recent case of our claims on Greece, in regard to which interest was claimed and paid; and the last is the correct principle. If a man is to be compensated, he ought to be compensated for what he has lost; and this is not done if he loses interest on his capital for three years and a half. In fact, common interest does not really indemnify him, because if his goods had not been destroyed, he would in the ordinary course of trade have made much more than five per cent. upon their value in each year that has since elapsed. No man could carry on trade to a profit who only made five per cent. on his

capital, considering risks of shipwreck, damage to goods, and other casualties.

But you need not stay at Naples to battle these points out; you may leave them in the hands of Napier, for if you mean to see the Exhibition you must make haste to come home, as it closes on the 10th of October, and it would be foolish to come home and find yourself just too late to see it at all, or to see it with attention. One or two short visits are really not enough to give to it; to see it thoroughly requires at least a week.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

This “answer to Castelcicala” was kept back from the King by his ministers. Lord Holland, writing from Naples, about two months afterwards, says :\* “The ministers keep back from the King any despatches that are disagreeable. He had only heard of your answer to Castelcicala, but had never seen it till last Wednesday. It had only been described to him as ‘*uno delli solite impertinenze di Lord Palmerston*’—one of his usual impertinences! Sabatelli read it to him; it made a deep impression on him, and he said that it was a most important and ‘*bien redigé*’ document.”

To his brother, still British minister at Naples, he again writes about Neapolitan affairs.

\* Lord Holland to Lord Palmerston, October 13, 1851.

“ Brocket, November 6, 1851.

“ MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“ I am very glad you have so well settled our Sicilian claims. This will give great satisfaction to our merchants. Walewski was very anxious that we should not press the points which he had given up, fearing that he might be thought to have cared less for French interests than you and I for English. But as the French are to come in for their share, he will probably be content. What a picture you give of the state of things in Naples! Can such a condition of things last? But the French—at least the society of Paris—are all for the Neapolitan Government, but only out of general spite and hatred to us; and a cousin of Gladstone’s was black-balled the other day at a club in Paris because he bore the same name as the writer of the letters to Aberdeen.

“ As to Castalcicala’s recall, I am neither glad nor sorry. He is a vulgar, coarse-mannered man; but I do not suspect him of political intrigue beyond a certain average amount, and he gave me no trouble. As to Casini, we shall probably be able to keep him in order; and I believe it is rather useful than not that ultra Tories of other countries should be sent here; it generally has the effect of somewhat modifying their violence.

“ Kossuth’s reception must have been gall and wormwood to the Austrians and to the Absolutists generally. His reception would probably have been

much better if he had not published or written that absurdly violent production at Marseilles. But it has been remarked that at none of the meetings which have been held to greet him have any gentlemen appeared except Dudley Stuart, and, on one occasion, John Abel Smith. He is going to the United States on the 14th; and I believe that, after remaining there some little time, he intends to return here. But perhaps he may stay there longer than he now proposes to do, for his avowed Republican theories of government will find more sympathy there than here.

“We have unpleasant accounts from the Cape; but these are only small and partial checks, and Sir Henry Smith, when he wrote last, said that as soon as the reinforcements then on their way should have reached him, he should be quite able to deal with the Caffres, and he would get a battalion more than he expected. Still, however, this war costs us some valuable lives, and will absorb a large part of our surplus revenue.

“I do not see any rock ahead which is likely to wreck the Government; we shall have some difficulty, perhaps, about the extension of suffrage next session, but I understand, privately, that Lord Derby finds himself so liable to repeated attacks of gout, that he begins to be less desirous than he used to be to become Prime Minister. Perhaps also the possession of a large estate gives him as much employment as he wants, and he may think it enough to be able



to make flashy speeches now and then in the House of Lords.

“I fear that Panizzi will not have been able, even with the assistance of Aumale, to persuade the King of Naples to change his system towards his wretched subjects. Really, such sovereigns as those who rule over Naples and Greece are enough to make men Republicans.\* Adieu.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

The Ionian Islands had recently received a new and more liberal constitution. With the enlarged opportunities for agitation thereby acquired the Ionian Parliament had become unmanageable, and attempted to pass a resolution in favour of annexation to Greece. Sir Henry Ward, the British Commissioner, had much trouble in keeping matters quiet. Lord Palmerston corresponds with him on the subject, and favours the retention of Corfu, whatever might be done with the other islands. He naturally saw that it would be useless to hand over Corfu to any great Power that was not a great maritime Power. Hence, when on one occasion the question was raised of giving it to Austria, he summarised his opinion by saying, “To give Corfu to Austria would be like entrusting a duckling to a respectable old hen.”

\* This reminds one of Madame de Coigny, who, when asked by the Prince of Wales (afterwards George IV.), “Pourquoi donc êtes-vous si démocrate?” replied, “Mais c’est que j’ai vécu tant avec des princes.”

“ Broadlands, December 26, 1850.

“ MY DEAR WARD,

“ I have received yours of the 13th, with the copy of the resolution for union with Greece. If we wished really to punish the Ionians, we should grant this request and hand them over to the constitutional Government of King Otho. But this would be too severe a chastisement upon a nation for the sins of a few. There is, as you probably well know, a foolish and pedantic notion among some of the clerks in the Colonial Office that it would be better to *get rid* (as they term it) of the Ionian Islands. This notion was, I believe, first taken up by Stephen,\* an excellent and very learned, but exceedingly wrong-headed, man. My opinion is very different. I consider Corfu as a very important position for Mediterranean interests, in the event of a war, and I hold that it would be a great act of folly for us to give it up. It could not be kept permanently by any Power that was not strong at sea, and it would therefore, sooner or later, fall into the hands of Russia or France, to neither of which it could belong without much damage to us.

“ I have no doubt, however, that you are right, and that a little firmness will enable us to pull through our difficulties there as well as elsewhere.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

\* Sir James Stephen.

And, a little later on, to the same.

“ F. O., February 18, 1851.

“ Thank you for your letter of the 7th. You will have no visit from a Russian fleet this year. We are on the best possible terms with Russia, and she will do nothing openly to disoblige us. I should even doubt her being the instigator of the disturbances which give you trouble, though it would be quite in keeping with her standing policy to have fomented them by money and intrigues. But just at the present time I think Austria is more likely to have done us an ill turn.

“ Schwarzenberg and the Vienna Camarilla, Archduchess Sophia, and others hate us with the bitterest hatred for the part which the English Government, Parliament, and people have taken during the last three years about Italy, Hungary, and Germany, and these worthies would be glad to revenge themselves for our sympathy in favour of their insurgents, by creating insurrection anywhere and anyhow against British authority; and though the Austrian Government is nearly bankrupt, yet, like other spendthrifts, it can always bring out money for its *menus plaisirs*.”

About the plots which were going on, he says to the High Commissioner:—

“ C. G., November 19, 1851.

“ These conspirators may be confident—as all conspirators are apt to be—that the day of their

triumph is approaching; so say the French Red Republicans in England; but those days of triumph will recede as time advances, just as the mirage of the desert retires before the slow march of the caravan. It is well, however, to be on our guard, for it is only over-confidence and apathy in governors that can give such ragamuffins a chance of success. I am amused at the notion that I am to be accused of having excited and paid for the recently attempted inroad upon the Ionian Islands. I remember to have heard that, in former times at Cambridge, it was the fashion for the young men to *mob* each other's rooms, that is, to turn everything topsy-turvy; and one foolish fellow got drunk and mobbed his own rooms, not being able to get at a friend's. I am still, however, sober enough not to play such pranks with our own house. I daresay the Greek Government is very angry with me for having shown them up about robbery to all the Governments of Europe, and no doubt they have had admonitions even from those Governments which pretended to us that they would not and could not meddle in the matter. The more angry they feel, however, the more likely it is that they will bestir themselves to improve matters; still, I fear that as long as Otho sits like an incubus on the Greek throne, no great progress will be made in that career of improvement which the Greek nation is destined ultimately to run.

“For my part, I should not object to an arrange-

ment by which Corfu should be annexed to the British Empire and the other islands added to Greece. Corfu is an important military and naval post, and ought never to be abandoned by us ; the other islands might go to Greece without inconvenience, I should think, to us, though at present such a transfer would be attended with much inconvenience to them. No such arrangement, however, could be made without the formal concurrence of all the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Vienna, by which the Seven Island State was placed under our protection ; and it is not very likely that France, Austria, and Prussia would consent to give us Corfu ; and perhaps Prussia would not fancy any addition to the Greek State, though she may like to keep up a disturbing agitation in the Ionian Islands. All this, however, is a speculation in the clouds ; but whenever you write to me again, let me know what you think of it."

Lord Palmerston, however, modified his views later on, and, in 1862, cordially agreed to hand over all the Ionian Islands to the new kingdom of Greece if the Greeks would choose a king approved of by England, which they accordingly did. The neutrality of the islands was, however, to be declared by the great Powers, and the fortifications of Corfu demolished, both of which conditions were observed.

Meanwhile things in France were hurrying to a crisis : Lord Palmerston watching the game, and

not concealing his preference for the cause of the President.

“ C. G., November 20, 1851.

“ My DEAR NORMANBY,

“ Your accounts of what is passing in Paris are very full and satisfactory as conveying all details. Satisfactory as to details which they announce is another thing. But it seems to me that Louis Napoleon is master of the field of battle, and will carry the day. I have always thought that such a result would be the best thing both for France and for England. There is no other person at present competent to be at the head of affairs in France; and if Louis Napoleon should end by founding a dynasty, I do not see that we need regret it, as far as English interests are concerned. The family of Bourbon have always been most hostile to England, and those members of that family who have owed us the greatest personal and political obligations have, perhaps, in their hearts hated us the most. What should we gain by substituting Henry V. or the Orleans family for the race of Buonaparte? At all events, I say of Louis Napoleon *laudo manentem*. If he should fall, we should of course endeavour to be on equally good terms with those who, after him, might be the official organs of the French nation; but we have no wish to see him fall. If success is any test of measures, he has not as yet played his cards ill; and some of the things which he has done, and which have been represented as mistakes, have perhaps contributed to

his success. *Je marche, suivez-moi* was certainly a good declaration, and showed that he knew the faintness of heart of those who were trying to overthrow him. If the Bourgraves would fairly say they want to re-establish a monarchy, one might wish them success; but they do not seem to be ready for that, and yet they want to overthrow that which, in the present state of affairs, seems the next best thing to a monarchy, and the only thing calculated to give any chance of order.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

During the session of 1851 Mr. Cobden renewed his motion, having for its object a pacific understanding among nations, by a mutual reduction of armaments. Lord Palmerston took occasion in this debate to vindicate himself from the charge of being a promoter of war and an enemy to peace.

He said that however little he might think the method by which Mr. Cobden endeavoured to give effect to his principles the best calculated to attain the end he proposed, he subscribed implicitly to the general tendency of his views. He first, however, claimed some credit for the results of his own policy.

“I trust the part it has been my lot to take in administering one department of the affairs of this

country has shown that there has been nothing in my conduct in any degree inconsistent with the opinions I am now professing; for however much it may be the fashion with some persons, in that easy, colloquial, jaunty style in which they dismiss public matters, to declaim against modern diplomatic and international intermeddling, yet at least I can appeal to facts. I can appeal to the fact that during the considerable period for which I have been responsible for the conduct of the foreign relations of this country, though events have happened in Europe of the most remarkable kind, and attended with great commotions of public feeling, and great agitation in the social and political system of the Continent—although during that period events have happened which have brought the interests of England, I will not say into conflict, but into opposition to the interests of other great and powerful nations, yet, at least, the fact is that we have been at peace; and that not only has peace been preserved between that country and other nations, but there has been no international war of magnitude between any of the other great Powers of Europe. If, then, on the one hand, we are taunted with perpetually interfering and meddling in the relations of other countries, we ought at least, on the other hand, to have the credit of the fact that that interference and intermeddling have been accompanied by the continuance of peace. It is too bad that we should be accused, on the one hand, of interfering constantly in the transactions of other countries, and



at the same time that we should be denied the credit of those results which accompanied that course of policy.”

But now a cloud, no bigger at first than a man's hand, was growing on the horizon; but, small as it was, it was fated to burst eventually into the Crimean war. So fully recorded are all the details of the dispute, of which Lord Palmerston notes the commencement in the following letter, that they need not be repeated here; but it may be well just to recall their outline. France had in 1740 obtained from the Sultan “capitulations” securing to the Latin Church in Palestine certain privileges in connection with the Holy Shrine. Since that date the Greeks, supported by Russia, had obtained firmans granting them advantages in derogation of the Latin capitulations. These firmans had been long acquiesced in. Suddenly, for no apparent cause, the French ambassador at Constantinople, M. de Lavalette, was instructed to demand that the grants to the Latin Church should be strictly executed. This was impossible, without annulling some of the privileges of the Greek Church. *Hinc illæ lachrymæ!*—Which of the two sets of monks at Jerusalem should have the keys of certain doors; and whether the Latins might have a cupboard and a lamp in the tomb of the Virgin! Such were the questions which convulsed diplomacy on the Bosphorus, and, in the opinion of the French ambassador, justified his threats of force.

Lord Palmerston tries a little oil for the troubled water :—

“ C. G., November 25, 1851.

“ MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“ I was in hopes from the manner in which Walewski had spoke of this Church question between the French and Russians in Turkey, that the French Government took a quieter view of it than seems to be the case. Walewski agreed with me that *le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle*, and that it would be very unwise for France, in the present critical and unsettled state of affairs all over Europe, to get into a quarrel with Russia and Turkey about a matter in itself of such very trifling importance ; and he quite admitted that Lavallette had gone much too far, and he seemed to agree with me that this is a discussion which might prudently be adjourned, and be allowed, in the Turkish fashion, to sleep till a fitter season. As to the merits of the case, I am not able to state or form an opinion, for Stratford Canning has kept studiously aloof from the discussion, and has only from time to time explained the general outline of the points at issue. But the broad way in which you put it to the President is the just way to look at it. Here are a few Catholics in Turkey, and many millions of Greeks ; here is a colossal Power close on the Sultan's back, and here is France a long way off ; here are fourteen or fifteen Christian churches in Asia Minor, of which the greater number are in

the possession of Greek Christians, and the smaller number in the hands of the Catholics; and the French Government insists that the Sultan shall, by making a half-and-half distribution of these holy places between Greeks and Catholics, give a division unequal as with reference to the relative numbers of the two Christian communities, disgust a large body of his own subjects, and offend a powerful neighbour who can plague and annoy him in a hundred ways and places beyond the reach of France to protect him. This seems an unreasonable course to pursue unless really the object in view were of essential national importance; but if I mistake not, there can be but very few Frenchmen locally interested in this matter; the few who are in the Levant must be chiefly monks in some convents—men who have abandoned their own country and never think of returning to it. The real object which the President has in view must of course be to get favour with the Catholic clergy in France; but he should seriously consider whether he is not paying too dear for that addition of favour from them by engaging France in a great quarrel about so small a thing. But suppose he goes on, and sends a fleet to the Dardanelles, what is that fleet to do? It must either blockade the Dardanelles or force them and make its way up to Constantinople, in order to give the law at the cannon's mouth at the Seraglio point. Now, a blockade of the Dardanelles is, of course, a very easily accomplished thing. The French fleet would take

up its position within the outer castles in Barber's Bay, where Parker anchored, and it could there effectually prevent any vessel from going up or coming down. But the maritime trade up and down those straits communicating with the Danube, with Odessa, with Taganrog, and with Trebizond is a matter of most important interest to many nations of Europe, and especially to us English; and an interruption of that trade, without any real and adequate necessity, would raise an immense outcry against France all over Europe and even in America, for it must be borne in mind that such a blockade would differ essentially from blockades in general. In ordinary cases, when you blockade a port, you blockade that port, and that port or country only; but here the blockade would apply, not merely to Constantinople and Turkey in Asia, but to the southern ports of Russia and to the Danube-bordering countries; and if the French should find themselves obliged—as, probably, in point of justice and international right they would be—to let the Russian flag pass and repass, then the blockade of the Turkish ports would of course be reduced to a nullity. But supposing they were to try to force the Dardanelles, that would be an operation not to be performed without much loss, if attempted by ships alone. The batteries have been greatly strengthened of late years, and the wind and current downward to the Mediterranean generally expose ships going upwards to long-continued fire from the land batteries. They might send

also a land force to disembark and take the batteries, but that would make the operation one of time.

“In the meanwhile the Russians would not be idle, and somehow or other they would probably contrive to send succour to the Sultan; and if it should so happen that, by reason of any of these obstacles and resistances, the attempt should fail, the French Government would have lost caste in Europe and would have made itself ridiculous; and, moreover, the French Government would have done more than Russia unaided could do in half a century to counteract and upset the policy which England and France have hitherto pursued in regard to Turkey—a policy the great object of which has been to foster the independence of Turkey and to get her out of the hands and influence of the Russian Government.

“Well, then we come to the method which you suggested to the President, and which we should very willingly consent to, namely, that Sir S. Canning’s good offices might be made use of. It must be recollected, however, that good offices cannot be usefully employed unless both parties consent to accept them; and I should much suspect that the Emperor would not be very likely to agree to such a proposal. It might nevertheless be tried; at all events the making it would gain time and would postpone violent measures, and somehow or other a way might be found for letting the question sleep, if no arrangement more satisfactory to the French could be accomplished; but it might be possible that when the

menacing and violent language of Lavallette had ceased, and the matter had become the subject of calmer discussion, some compromise might be arrived at which would enable the French to say that they had bettered the condition of the Catholics. You may therefore say that, although we should prefer keeping out of the matter, yet if the President thinks that we can be of use to him, we will cheerfully do what we can to help to settle the difference; not, indeed, as partisans of either side, but as sincere well-wishers to all three, and as earnest promoters of peace on earth.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

But a few days later he finds that Russia was not in a humour for “good offices.”\*

“I see, by despatches lately received from Stratford Canning, that the question about the churches in the Levant is still under discussion and consideration at Constantinople, and that there could be no pretence at present for any violent proceeding on the part of France. But from a little conversation I have had on the subject with Brunnow, I am inclined to think that Russia would not be disposed to accept our good offices if they were tendered. The Turkish Government, Canning says, seems rather to lean to the side of France. But really and truly this is a quarrel fitter for times long gone by than for the days in which we live.”

\* To Lord Normanby, November 28.

Although after the *coup d'état* at Paris the French pressure was violently renewed, in the meanwhile, on the eve of the blow and in the uncertainty of its result, the Turk was left free to act for himself by the temporary removal of the instrument of coercion.

“ C. G., December 1, 1851.

“ MY DEAR CANNING,

“ Lavallette may represent his going away on leave of absence as a mark of the displeasure of the French Government at the conduct of the Porte on the question about the holy buildings, but I happen to know that he has had leave of absence sent him because the French Government thought he had gone too far, and they considered his temporary absence on leave as likely to be the best way of letting the question drop down into its proper proportions. Say nothing about this unless you find Reshid frightened, and then you may whisper it gently and secretly into his ear.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.

“ You were quite right in advising Lavallette to accept the horses for the President, first, for reasons peculiar to the particular case, and next on the general diplomatic maxim—

“ ‘ Toujours prendre,  
Jamais rendre,  
Et encore pretendre.’

“ P.”

## CHAPTER VII.

Removal from the Government—Explanations in the House of Commons.

“Cassio, I love thee,  
But never more be officer of mine.”

*Othello*, Act II. Sc. 3.

WE now arrive at a critical period in the lives of two of the most eminent statesmen of their day. Lord John Russell, from the traditional recollections of his family, from the course of his own studies, and from the tendency of his own opinions, was the statesman whom the Liberal party of his own time most trusted in domestic affairs. Lord Palmerston, on the other hand, from long experience, decided character, and enlarged views, enjoyed the confidence of the same party in foreign affairs.

Both statesmen were said to have their faults; and now and then a portion of their general followers broke off from one or from the other. But, on the whole, taking each in his own specialty, there were no men in the country to match them; and they had hitherto, though not always agreeing, stood firmly together. But circumstances had of late



tended to dissolve this union. Lord John Russell, not only as Prime Minister, but as leader of the Liberal party, felt himself to be invested not only with great authority, but great responsibility, and was not unfrequently reproached by some of his colleagues, who, without considering our foreign policy in its general aspect, were prone to criticise its details, for allowing the Foreign Office too much independence. On the other hand, Lord Palmerston, who had acquired a complete mastery over the business of his department, who always acted on a thorough conviction that his views were undeniably right, and who refrained from any interference in the internal policy of the country, was disposed to think that very great latitude within the sphere of his own attributes should be allowed to him. His notion was that a Foreign Minister ought to be strictly bound to pursue the policy of the Cabinet he belonged to, but that he ought to be left free to follow out that policy in the ordinary details of his office, without having every despatch he wrote submitted to criticism and comment. There is this, moreover, to be said, that whereas in home affairs nothing important is done without the decision of a Cabinet, and the leader in Parliament has only to explain the resolutions of the Cabinet, in foreign affairs a minister is called upon every day of the week and at any time to write and speak to foreign governments, or their representatives, on current business. If he could not do this with a certain degree of prompti-

tude and freedom, he would lose all weight and influence with his own agents and with the agents of other Powers.

If, then, there is to be a minister of foreign affairs fit for his post, he must have the thorough confidence of the Premier, and act as if he had it.

Lord Palmerston especially required this; first, because he held an important post in a Whig Cabinet, not being a Whig; and, second, because his policy—that of constantly maintaining the dignity, power, and prestige of England unimpaired—was not only one of constant attention, but, necessarily, of constant action.

Nor was this all: Lord Palmerston had not merely to satisfy Lord John Russell, he had also to satisfy the sovereign under whom Lord John held his appointment. Foreign policy is that policy in which sovereigns, who are thus brought into competition with their equals, take the most interest. The Prince Consort, with whom Her Majesty lived on such terms of confidence as rendered her application to him on questions of importance a matter of course, was not only a Prince of considerable ability, but one who gave a minute and scrupulous attention to any business on which he was consulted. He was naturally slow and cautious of judgment; and although his opinions were conscientiously and entirely directed towards English objects, he had not entirely an English mind; and in a German gentleman (Baron Stockmar) much in his confidence, and who

deserved, from his great knowledge and abilities, to be so, he had for adviser a man well qualified to have taken a place amongst the first statesmen in Europe.

Sufficient has thus been said to show that the royal authority was likely to be exercised in foreign affairs, and that the decided views which Lord Palmerston was accustomed to form or be disposed at once to carry out jarred at times with the disposition towards more consideration and deliberation at Windsor. More caution, more deliberation was required of him ; and, in fact, Lord John Russell, with a double view, I am quite ready to suppose, of paying due deference to the Crown and of serving his colleague, made Lord Palmerston a communication in 1850 to this effect. Such restrictions could not be agreeable to the person on whom they were imposed, and, though conformable with the spirit of our Constitution, were hardly compatible with the prompt and practical despatch of business which every day was complicating and increasing, and which frequently required for a successful issue the transmitting of an immediate reply. During the discussions about the Spanish marriages Lord Palmerston lost three weeks in answering a communication from Guizot, by having to send drafts backwards and forwards while the Court was obliged to be moving about in a cruize on the Western coast. Guizot, in his subsequent notes and despatches, was always throwing this delay in his face ; but his

tongue was tied, and he was obliged to accept the rebuke in silence.

To these circumstances we have to add a new and important phase in the neighbouring kingdom. Prince Louis Napoleon, who had been elected President of the French Republic, was in a position that threatened new and serious complications in that country, remarkable, during the last hundred years, for its vicissitudes. This Prince, at the time of his election, did not pass in England, where he then resided, for having any superior ability, nor, as it has been said, had he acquired such a reputation with leading men in France. None had been willing to connect their fates with his. M. Odillon Barrot and M. de Tocqueville were the only two men of any reputation who had served under him, and both of these told their friends that it would be impossible to serve him long, because they knew they could not satisfy his ambition. M. de Tocqueville had been willing to make a compromise, and would have conceded the presidency for life, and a revenue, say, for that position, though inferior, doubtless, to the civil list of an emperor.

The Prince himself had, possibly, at first no fixed idea but that of governing France with as much power as it would accord him. That which, according to report, was said of him by his cousin at the time of his greatest prestige is probably near the truth. "For a time the world thought my cousin an idiot; now they think him a genius. He was

not an idiot, and is not a genius." He was not a great man, but he had a fair idea of what a great man should be; and he could in certain situations play the part of one. But, at all events, his talents, whatever they were, had no clear development in any visible direction. His conversation, simple and natural, was in no wise striking. He could not sustain an argument; and his written composition, which was certainly remarkable, appeared so much above the capacity he had otherwise evinced that he did not get credit for it. His unsuccessful attempts to make insurrection during the reign of Louis Philippe had created too high an opinion of his spirit of enterprise, and too low a one of his intellect.

None or few of the thinking classes then either in France or England considered his reign otherwise than ephemeral; and the longer his power continued, the more impatient those who thought they could cut it short when they pleased became of it. This impatience had of late visibly increased. The Assembly had boldly set itself up as his rival, and he had at last found it impossible to name a Parliamentary ministry.

Lord Palmerston, as far back as the 24th of January, in a letter to Lord Normanby, had given his views of what Louis Napoleon's course should be in such a contingency. He wrote: "If I was the President, I should not trouble myself as to whether the Assembly supported my ministers or not; whether

they censured or approved them. I should say to the Assembly, I cannot get rid of you and you cannot get rid of me, and your censures do not change my opinions of my own conduct. For that conduct I am not answerable to you (as long as I keep within the law), but to France. My ministers are acting by my instructions, and they are responsible to me, and not to you. If you reject good laws which I propose to you, yours be the blame. If you will not vote money to keep up an army, navy, and civil government, let the nation call you to account for thus betraying your country; but that which I will not do is to appoint ministers who shall be your instruments and not mine.

“The analogy of our Constitution in regard to the relation of ministers to Parliament and to the Crown does not hold good as to the position of the French ministers. The Constitutions of the two countries are wholly different.”

The Assembly met after the recess in November of 1851. The crisis arrived on the 2nd of December, when the leading members of the Opposition were arrested in their beds, and a purely military rule was established pending an appeal to universal suffrage as to the future government of France.

On the 3rd of December Count Walewsky, the French ambassador, called upon Lord Palmerston to inform him of what had taken place, and in the course of conversation Lord Palmerston expressed the view which he held as to the necessity and advantage for

France and Europe of the bold and decisive step taken by the President.

The following memorandum, written several years later, shows that he was well aware what was going on at this moment in England as well as in France among those who were seeking to cut short Napoleon's term of power :—

*Memorandum of certain Circumstances connected with the Coup d'état.*

“The *coup d'état* took place on Tuesday, December 2nd, 1851, and was known in London by the next day. On Wednesday, the 3rd, Mr. and Mrs. ——— dined with us in Carlton Gardens, and told me that they had been down to Claremont on the preceding Friday to visit the Queen Amelie; that they found the ladies of the French Court in a great bustle; and that they told Mrs. ——— as a great secret that they were making up their paquets, as they expected to have to go to Paris at the end of the then next week, that is to say, at the end of the week in which the *coup d'état* took place.

“On the Sunday following, that is to say, on the 7th December, Mr. Borthwick, editor of the *Morning Post*, came to me. He said he had a communication to make to me which it might be important for me to receive, and which he considered himself at liberty to make. He said that the day before, that is, on Saturday the 6th, General de Rumigny, attached to the French Court, had come to him and said that as he, Mr. Borthwick, had been civil and attentive to the ex-Royal Family, he (General Rumigny) had been desired to say to him that, if it would be useful to his paper, he should have daily accounts of the military operations that were about to commence in the north of France; that the Prince de Joinville and the Duc d'Aumale were gone to Lille to take the command of troops to act against the President; that the Royal Family had endeavoured to dissuade the Prince de Joinville from this step, but in vain; and that,

finding him determined on doing so, the Duc d'Aumale had said, 'My brother is a sailor, he knows nothing of military operations; I am a soldier, I will go with him and share his fate and fortune.' Mr. Borthwick said he had declined the offered communications, as he did not wish his paper to be considered the organ of the Orleans Family; and as the communication had not been made to him under the condition of secrecy, he came at once to tell me of it.

"I immediately wrote to Sir George Grey, then Home Secretary, to ask him to make inquiry through the detachment of police stationed at Claremont for the protection of the ex-Royal Family, to know whether all the French Princes were there, that is to say, those who were in England. I said that General de Rumigny or Borthwick must have made a mistake in naming D'Aumale, because he was then at Naples, and it must be the Duc de Nemours who had gone with Joinville.

"In the course of the afternoon I received from Sir G. Grey a report that both Nemours and Joinville were still at Claremont. That Joinville had been several times in London in the course of this week, and was that day at Claremont. That Joinville had been very ill for several days, and had been confined to his room, and nobody had seen him but his medical attendant, who visited him twice a day. This report at once showed that Joinville was off, as I afterwards heard was the case. He went as far as Ostend, but found that the attempt would not succeed, and he came back again. I believe the garrison of Lille had been changed. This confirmed the story as to Joinville, but left unexplained the statement as to D'Aumale. But some days afterwards I received a letter from my brother, minister at Naples, written before the news of the *coup d'état* had reached Naples, saying that the Duc and Duchesse d'Aumale had received alarming accounts of the health of the ex-Queen of France, and that in consequence thereof the Duke had suddenly set off for England. That two days afterwards the



Duchesse d'Aumale had received better accounts, and she regretted that her husband had not waited a day or two longer, as he would then have been spared a fatiguing journey in the depth of winter.

"This statement confirmed the whole of General de Rumigny's story, for D'Aumale had evidently, by preconcerted arrangement, left Naples to meet Joinville on a given day at a given place; and this proved that there had been a plot long proposed for an attack upon the President.

"About a fortnight or three weeks afterwards Count Lavradio, the Portuguese minister in London, went to Claremont to visit the Princesse de Joinville, who is a Brazilian, and he said he found her *toute explorée* at the turn of affairs in France, and that she said it was most afflicting: *et pour moi qui devoit être à Paris le 20!*

"All this clearly proves that if the President had not struck when he did, he would himself have been knocked over."

"P., 29/9, 1858."

On the same day as his conversation with Count Walewski Lord Palmerston wrote privately to Lord Normanby as follows:—

"C. G., 3rd Dec., 1851.

"MY DEAR NORMANBY,

"Even we here, who cannot be supposed to know as much as people at Paris did about what was going on among the Bourbonists, cannot be surprised that Louis Napoleon struck the blow at the time which he chose for it; for it is now well known here that the Duchess of Orleans was preparing to be called to Paris this week with her younger son to commence a new period of Orleans dynasty. Of course the President got an inkling of what was

passing, and, if it is true, as stated in our newspapers, that Changarnier was arrested at four o'clock in the morning in council with Thiers and others, there seems good reason to believe, what is also asserted, that the Burgraves\* had a stroke prepared which was to be struck against the President that very day, and that, consequently, he acted on the principle that a good thrust is often the best parry. Your despatch of Monday might have suited the success of the Burgraves as well as that of Louis Napoleon, as in the earlier part of it you contemplated the chances of power passing out of his hands to those of other powers. I have reason to think, because I have heard it from several quarters, that the President has been sometimes led to infer, from your social intimacy with the Burgrave party, that your political sympathies were more directed towards them than towards him. Of course a minister or ambassador cannot be expected to adapt his social relations to the party jealousies of the Government to which he is accredited, but if it so happens that personal friendships and private and social intimacies lead him into frequent communication with persons who are hostile to the Government, it is the more necessary for him to take care to destroy in the mind of the Government any misapprehension which this circumstance might give rise to; and

\* The majority, comprising Thiers, Tocqueville, Odillon Barrot and others, in the Assembly. It was a nickname, taken from the title of a play by Victor Hugo, in which a similar party was represented.

I have no doubt that you have been careful to do so. As to respect for the law and Constitution, which you say in your despatch of yesterday is habitual to Englishmen, that respect belongs to just and equitable laws framed under a Constitution founded upon reason, and consecrated by its antiquity and by the memory of the long years of happiness which the nation has enjoyed under it, but it is scarcely a proper application of those feelings to require them to be directed to the day-before-yesterday tomfoolery which the scatter-brained heads of Marrast and Tocqueville invented for the torment and perplexity of the French nation; and I must say that that Constitution was more honoured by the breach than the observance.

“It was high time to get rid of such childish nonsense; and as the Assembly seemed to be resolved that it should not be got rid of quietly and by deliberate alteration and amendment, I do not wonder that the President determined to get rid of them as obstacles to all rational arrangement.

“If, indeed, as we suppose, they meant to strike a sudden blow at him, he was quite right on that ground also to knock them down first.

“I find I have written on two sheets by mistake; the blank leaf is an appropriate emblem of the present state of the French Constitution. It is curious that such a nation as the French, after more than sixty years of political struggle and five revolutions—counting the assumption of power by Napo-

leon as one—should at last have arrived at a point where all Constitution is swept away, and where they are going to give a practical example of that original compact between the people and the ruler which is generally considered as an imaginary illustration of a fanciful theory.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

One of Lord Palmerston's difficulties was the ill-disguised hostility of the British ambassador to the French President. The Government, indeed, at the request of the President, were obliged to recall him shortly after the dismissal of Lord Palmerston, who had previously remonstrated as follows:—

“ C. G., 6th Dec., 1851.

“ MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“ In times of crisis and on affairs of deep importance, frankness between persons officially acting together becomes a duty, and I feel compelled therefore to say that the tone and substance of your despatches create serious apprehensions in my mind. Events are passing at Paris which must have a most important influence upon the affairs of Europe generally, and upon the interests of this country in particular, and the character of our relations with the French Government may be much influenced by the course pursued during the present crisis by the British representative at Paris. The great probability seems still to be, as it has, I think, all along

been, that, in the conflict of opposing parties, Louis Napoleon would remain master of the field, and it would very much weaken our position at Paris, and be detrimental to British interests if Louis Napoleon, when he had achieved a triumph, should have reason to think that, during the struggle the British representative took part (I mean by a manifestation of opinion) with his opponents. Now we are entitled to judge of that matter only by your despatches, and I am sure you will forgive me for making some observations on those which we have received this week. Your long despatch of Monday appeared to be a funeral oration over the President, with a passage thrown in as to his intentions to strike a *coup d'état* on a favourable opportunity, as if it were meant to justify the doom which was about to be pronounced upon him by the Burgrave majority. Your despatches since the event of Tuesday have been all hostile to Louis Napoleon, with very little information as to events. One of them consisted chiefly of a dissertation about Kossuth, which would have made a good article in the *Times* a fortnight ago; and another dwells chiefly upon a looking-glass broken in a club-house, and a piece of plaster brought down from a ceiling by musket shots during the street fights.

“Now we know that the diplomatic agents of Austria and Russia called upon the President immediately after his measures of Tuesday morning, and have been profuse in their expressions of ap-

proval of his conduct; of course what they admire and applaud is the shutting up of a parliament house by military force; and, probably, when Louis Napoleon publishes his new Constitution, with an elective popular assembly and senate, &c., they may not think the conclusion as good as the beginning; but still they are making great advances to him, and though we should not wish you to go out of your way to court him, nor to identify us with his measures, it would be very undesirable that he should have any grounds for supposing your sympathies identified with the schemes which were planned for his overthrow, and of the existence of which I apprehend no reasonable doubt can be entertained, though you have not particularly mentioned them of late.

“The greater part of the French refugees are gone back from hence to France. Ledru Rollin, Caussidière, and Louis Blanc remain here for the present.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

Count Walewski very naturally communicated at once to the French Foreign Office the tenor of what Lord Palmerston had said to him. Meanwhile Lord Normanby had applied for instructions as to his future conduct, and received the following official reply:—

“Foreign Office, Dec. 5, 1851.

“MY LORD,

“I have received and laid before the Queen your Excellency’s despatch of the 3rd instant, re-

questing to be furnished with instructions for your guidance in the present state of affairs in France.

“I am commanded by Her Majesty to instruct your Excellency to make no change in your relations with the French Government.

“It is Her Majesty’s desire that nothing should be done by her ambassador at Paris which could wear the appearance of an interference of any kind in the internal affairs of France.

“I am, &c.,

“PALMERSTON.”

Lord Normanby hastened to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in order to communicate to him the tenor of this despatch. M. Turgot, who had been piqued, as Louis Napoleon himself had been, at the hostile language held by the English representative, replied tartly that such a communication was unnecessary, as M. Walewski had already informed him that Lord Palmerston entirely approved of what the President had done. This statement Lord Normanby reported home in the following despatches, to which I append two side notes which appear in Lord Palmerston’s handwriting, and his despatch of the 16th December, pointing out the unreasonable character of Lord Normanby’s complaints:—

“Paris, Dec. 6, 1851.

“MY LORD,

“I this morning received your Lordship’s despatch of yesterday’s date, and I afterwards called on M. Turgot, and informed him that I had received Her Majesty’s commands

Not so.

to say that I need make no change in my relations with the French Government in consequence of what had passed. I added that if there had been some little delay in making this communication, it arose from some material circumstances not connected with any doubt on the subject.

“M. Turgot said that delay had been of less importance, as he had two days since heard from M. Walewski that your lordship had expressed to him your entire approbation of the act of the President, and your conviction that he could not have acted otherwise than he had done. I said I had no knowledge of any such communication, and no instructions beyond our invariable rule to do nothing which should have the appearance of interfering in any way in the internal affairs of France, but that I had often had an opportunity of showing under very varied circumstances, that whatever might be the Government here, I attached the utmost importance to maintaining the most amicable relations between the two countries. I added that I was sure, had the Government known of the suppression of the insurrection of the Rouges at the time I had heard from them, I should have been commissioned to add their congratulations to mine.

“I have thought it necessary to mention what was stated about M. Walewski’s despatch because two of my colleagues here mentioned to me that the despatch containing expressions precisely to that effect had been read to them in order to show the decided opinion which England had pronounced.

“I have, &c.,

“NORMANBY.”

“Paris, Dec. 15, 1851.

“MY LORD,

“In my despatch of the 6th instant, notifying my communication of my instructions to M. Turgot, I reported that his Excellency had mentioned that M. Walewski had written a despatch in which he stated that your lordship had expressed your complete approbation of the course taken



by the President in the recent *coup d'état*. *I also reported* No such statement in his despatch. that I had conveyed to M. Turgot my belief *that there must be some mistake in this statement, and my reasons for that belief.*

“But as a week has now elapsed without any explanation from your lordship on this point, I must conclude M. Walewski’s report to have been substantially correct.

“That being the case, I am perfectly aware that it is beyond the sphere of my present duties to make any remark upon the acts of your lordship, except inasmuch as they affect my own position. But within these limits I must, with due deference, be permitted to observe, that if your lordship, as Foreign Minister, holds one language on such a delicate point in Downing Street, without giving me any intimation you had done so—prescribing afterwards a different course to me, namely, the avoidance of any appearance of interference of any kind in the internal affairs of France—I am placed thereby in a very awkward position.

“If the language held in Downing Street is more favourable to the existing order of things in France than the instructions on which I am directed to guide myself upon the spot, it must be obvious that by that act of your lordship’s I become subject to misrepresentation and suspicion in merely doing my duty according to the official orders received through your lordship from Her Majesty.

“All this is of more importance to me, because, as I stated before, several of my diplomatic colleagues had had the despatch read to them, and had derived from it the conviction that, if accurately reported, your expressions had been those of unqualified satisfaction.

“I have, &c.,

“NORMANBY.”

“Foreign Office, Dec. 16, 1851.

“MY LORD,

“I have received your Excellency’s despatch of the 15th instant, referring to the statement made

to you by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on the occasion of your communicating to his Excellency the instructions with which you have been furnished by Her Majesty's Government for your guidance in the present state of affairs in France, and I have to state to your Excellency that there has been nothing in the language which I have held, nor in the opinions which I have at any time expressed on the recent events in France, which has been in any way inconsistent with the instructions addressed to your Excellency, to abstain from anything which could bear the appearance of any interference in the internal affairs of France. The instructions contained in my despatch of the 5th instant, to which your Excellency refers, were sent to you, not in reply to a question as to what opinions your Excellency should express, but in reply to a question which I understood to be, whether your Excellency should continue your usual diplomatic relations with the President during the interval which was to elapse between the date of your Excellency's despatch of the 3rd instant and the voting by the French nation on the question to be proposed to them by the President.

“As to approving or condemning the step taken by the President in dissolving the Assembly, I conceive that it is for the French nation, and not for the British Secretary of State or for the British ambassador, to pronounce judgment upon that event; but if your Excellency wishes to know my own

opinion on the change which has taken place in France, it is that such a state of antagonism had arisen between the President and the Assembly that it was becoming every day more clear that their co-existence could not be of long duration; and it seemed to me better for the interests of France, and, through them, for the interests of the rest of Europe, that the power of the President should prevail, inasmuch as the continuance of his authority might afford a prospect of the maintenance of social order in France, whereas the divisions of opinions and parties in the Assembly appeared to betoken that their victory over the President would only be the starting-point for disastrous civil strife.

“Whether my opinion was right or wrong, it seems to be shared by persons interested in property in France, as far at least as the great and sudden rise in the Funds and in other investments may be assumed to be indications of increasing confidence in the improved prospect of internal tranquillity in France.

“I am, &c.,

“PALMERSTON.”

These despatches, however, of the English ambassador came in due course before the Queen and the Premier; and Lord John Russell, on the 14th, called the Foreign Secretary to account for what he appeared to have said in the matter. Lord Palmerston answered by a detailed exposition of his view

of the whole affair, and gave the grounds on which he had formed his opinion.

“Carlton Gardens, 16th Dec. 1851.

“MY DEAR JOHN RUSSELL,

“I return you the Queen’s memorandum and the despatch from Normanby to which it relates. To say that I expressed entire approbation of what the President had done, and that I stated my conviction that he could not have acted otherwise than he had done, is giving a high colouring to anything that I may have said to Count Walewski on the 3rd instant, the date, apparently, of his despatch to Mons. Turgot; but it must be borne in mind that Normanby writes his recollections of what Mons. Turgot said to him. That Mons. Turgot spoke to him, apparently somewhat piqued at the delay of his communication, and also from recollection, and that it was natural that Count Walewski in writing his despatch should colour highly what anybody about whom he wrote had said to him on the events of the preceding day. But the opinion which I entertain of this grave and important matter, and which, no doubt, I expressed is, that so decided an antagonism had grown up between the President and the Assembly that it was to be foreseen that they could not long coexist, and that each was planning the overthrow of the other—either meaning aggression or believing that their course was only self-defence: there are circumstances which seem to countenance the supposition that the Assembly intended in the course of that very week to have struck

a blow at the President, and to have deprived him of his position. Now, as between the President and the Assembly it seems to me that the interests of France, and, through them, the interests of the rest of Europe, were better consulted by the prevalence of the President than they would have been by the prevalence of the Assembly; and the great rise which had taken place in the French Funds from 91 to 102, together with the sudden spring which has been made by commerce in general, seem to show that the French people in general are of the same opinion, and that what has happened has inspired the nation with a feeling of confidence which they had not before.

“Indeed, to account for this we have only to look at what each of the two parties offered to France as the result of their victory over the other party. The President had to offer unity of authority and of purpose and the support of the whole army against the anarchists for the maintenance of order. The Assembly had to offer immediate division among themselves, a division in the army, and, in all probability, civil war, during which the anarchists would have had immense opportunities and facilities for carrying their desolating schemes into execution. If the Assembly had had any acceptable ruler to propose to the nation instead of Louis Napoleon they might, with their opinions and preferences, have been acting as true patriots by overthrowing the President. But there were scarcely more than three

alternatives which they could have proposed. First, Henry V., who represents the principle of Legitimacy, and who has a devoted and a considerable party in France; but that party is still a minority of the nation, and a minority cannot govern the majority. Secondly, they might have proposed the Comte de Paris, but he is only about twelve years old; and a six years' minority with a regency, and with Thiers as the Prime Minister, was not a proposition which a nation in the state in which the French are was at all likely to accept. Thirdly, they might have offered the Prince de Joinville as a President, or three of the generals as a commission of government, but neither of these arrangements would have been acceptable to the whole nation. The success then of the Assembly would, in all human probability, have been civil war, while the success of the President promised the re-establishment of order.

“This bitter antagonism between the President and the Assembly was partly the consequence of the arrangements of 1848, and partly the result of faults on both sides, but chiefly on the side of the Assembly.

“It may safely be affirmed that a long duration of a centralised, as contradistinguished from a federal Republic, in a great country like France, with a large standing army, and the seat of government not in an important place like Washington, but in a great capital which exercises almost paramount influence

over the whole country, is a political impossibility, let the arrangement of such a Republic be ever so well or so wisely constructed.

“ But the arrangements of 1848 greatly increased that general impossibility, and, indeed, the work of Messrs. Marrast and Tocqueville would more properly be called a dissolution than a Constitution, for they brought the political organisation of France to the very brink of anarchy.

“ Not to more than mention, among other defects, that there were two great powers, each deriving its existence from the same source, almost sure to disagree, but with no umpire to decide between them, and neither able by any legal means to get rid of the other — not to dwell upon that, the question in regard to which the rupture took place was sure to bring about sooner or later collision, and probably violence.

“ The Constitution contained a regulation that the same person should not be twice running elected as President; that is to say, that at the end of the first and of each successive term of Presidentship the French nation should not be allowed to choose the person whom they might prefer and think fittest to be at the head of their Government. Now, there seemed every reason to expect that the vast majority of the nation would re-elect Louis Napoleon, and the great majority of the *Conseils-Généraux* petitioned that the Constitution might be altered, meaning specifically in this respect. But another

regulation of 1848 interfered. A certain proportion of the Assembly was required to give validity to a resolution that the Constitution should be revised, and this majority the Assembly did not give. It had been generally expected that the actual conflict would be put off till May of next year, but the measures of both parties brought it on sooner.

“The proposal of the President to restore universal suffrage was evidently intended for the purpose of securing for him such an overwhelming number of votes, that the Assembly would not have set his election aside. The Assembly tried to parry this by various schemes, either projected or actually put forward. One plan was a law attaching punishment to any elector who might vote for an ineligible candidate; but this, I believe, was not actually brought forward. Another was what was called the *Questeur* proposal, which went to place a portion of the army under the orders of the Assembly. This, indeed, was negatived, but it showed what its proposers intended. Then came the proposal to declare it high treason in an existing President to take any steps to procure his re-election—a law which, if it had passed, would obviously have placed the President at the mercy of the Assembly, unless he could rely upon a sufficient portion of the army to fight against that part of it which might go over to the Assembly. It is said, with what truth I cannot tell, that it was the intention of the leaders of the majority of the Assembly, if that law had been carried, immediately to have arrested within



the walls and on the spot such of the ministers as were members, among whom was the Minister of War, and to have also endeavoured to send the President to Vincennes, so far I know; at least it was told to me on the Tuesday or Wednesday that those who were about the Royal Family at Claremont expected something which they considered favourable to their interests to happen at Paris before the end of that week. I mean that this expectation had been expressed in the course of the week preceding the 2nd of this month.

“It seems to me, then, it is fair to suppose that Louis Napoleon may have acted from mixed motives. There is no doubt that he was impelled by ambition, and by a rooted belief which he is well known to have entertained from a very early age, that he was destined to govern France. But he may also have felt that, in the present deplorable state of society in France, he was much more capable of promoting the interests of the country than his antagonists were; and a man even with less personal ambition might, in his situation, have thought *salus Reipublicæ suprema lex*.

“His justification will, no doubt, very much depend upon the degree of proof which he may be able to adduce that he was acting at the moment in self-defence, and was only anticipating an impending blow, and also upon the use which he may make of the ascendancy which he has acquired.

“I do not agree with the opinion which I under-

stand Macaulay has expressed in a letter to Lord Mahon, that the French nation are only fit for military despotism; nor can I believe that any government which is not what we mean by the term Constitutional, can have a long duration in France.

“Yours sincerely,  
“PALMERSTON.”

“I have said nothing of the events of Thursday and Friday, but there can be but one feeling as to the wanton destruction of life which the soldiers appeared to have inflicted on the people of Paris.”

To this came a reply that the question at issue was not the grounds for the judgment he had formed, but whether he ought to have given any opinion without previously consulting the Cabinet and taking the orders of the Sovereign. Lord Palmerston rejoined that the opinion given by him was given as his own and in an unofficial conversation, and that it in no way fettered the action of the Government; that if it were laid down that a Secretary of State was to express no opinion on passing events in conversing with foreign ministers, except as the organ of a previously-consulted Cabinet, there would be an end of that easy and familiar personal intercourse which is so useful for the maintenance of friendly relations with foreign governments. This did not

satisfy the Premier, who, in the following letter, ended the debate by a very summary decision :—

“Woburn Abbey, Dec. 19, 1851.

“MY DEAR PALMERSTON,

“I have just received your letter of yesterday. No other course is left to me than to submit the correspondence to the Queen, and to ask Her Majesty to appoint a successor to you in the Foreign Office.

“Although I have often had the misfortune to differ from you in minor questions, I am deeply convinced that the policy which has been pursued has maintained the interests and the honour of the country.

“I remain yours truly,

“J. RUSSELL.”

To soften the blow, however, he immediately afterwards made a proposal almost comical in its character, and offered to Lord Palmerston the viceregal dignity at the Court across the Irish Channel. This was of course civilly declined, but the retort which such a communication afforded to one who had been charged with conduct both imprudent and indecorous was too good to be neglected.

“Broadlands, 23rd Dec. 1851.

“MY DEAR JOHN RUSSELL,

“I have received your letter of yesterday; I cannot, however, allow our correspondence on this matter to close without saying that I do not admit your charge of violations of prudence and decorum, and I have to observe that that charge is refuted by the offer which you made me of the Lord Lieutenancy

of Ireland, because I apprehend that to be an office for the due performance of the duties of which prudence and decorum are qualities which cannot well be dispensed with.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

The Cabinet was summoned on the 22nd to receive the news of Lord Palmerston's dismissal and the appointment of Lord Granville in his stead. Lord Palmerston, meanwhile, was silent except to his most intimate friends, for, as he said to Lord Broughton, “When a man resigns, he is expected to say why; when he is removed, it is for others to assign reasons.”

There can be no doubt whatever that the true reason could not be publicly assigned. The long-cherished hostility of certain foreign courts and governments acting upon our own was the motive power, and this occasion was seized upon merely as a pretext. All over Europe the result was regarded as a triumph for the Absolute and a blow for the Liberal cause.

From the British embassy at Vienna, Mr. Murray wrote to a friend:

“Lord Palmerston's retirement is received with the most profound regret by the Liberal party in Austria, who look upon it as the utter annihilation of their hopes. It will hardly be believed that these arrogant fools here actually think that *they* have overthrown Lord Palmerston; and the

vulgar triumph of Schwarzenberg knows no bounds. Not content with placarding the news with lying comments of all sorts, and despatching couriers into the provinces to circulate the most monstrous fictions about the 'Victory of Austrian Policy,' his bad taste has actually gone far enough to make him give a ball in consequence. I believe if an earthquake had swallowed up England, Queen, Lords, and Commons, Constitution, Free Press and all, it would not have created more sensation than this sudden and strange change in the English Cabinet."

We must recall the German doggrel, in vogue at the time, if we wish to understand the excited feelings of the moment :—

"Hat der Teufel einen Sohn,  
So ist er sicher Palmerston."

Some mad enthusiasm might be forgiven at the prospect of getting rid of the devil's son !

From Madrid Lord Howden at once sent in his resignation to Lord Granville, alleging that he could no longer be of any use there, as "the retirement of Lord Palmerston either actually is, or most certainly will be, believed to be a direct concession to the reactionary spirit which is riding rough shod over the world, and which is nowhere more to be apprehended than in Spain."

It was the same everywhere abroad.

At home the feeling of astonishment overcame for the moment every other feeling; an astonishment not confined to the general public, but extending even to some of his colleagues. Lord Palmerston received letters from all sides expressing regret and

asking for explanation. He contented himself with acknowledging their sympathetic communications. I shall only quote one letter addressed to him on the subject, and that is one from Lord Lansdowne :—

“ Bowood, December 24.

“ MY DEAR PALMERSTON,

“ I cannot resist the desire I feel to write to you, and give some expression to the deep concern I feel at the event which has just occurred, of the probability of which I was only made aware the day before the last Cabinet, by two letters from J. Russell, which, owing to the accident of my being absent from home, reached me at the same time, when there appeared to be no reason left for further and more satisfactory explanation.

“ I have felt this concern the more deeply because I am perfectly convinced there was and is no difference in the Cabinet with respect to the neutral position to be maintained in French affairs, and because I have felt inclined from the first to the same individual opinion, the grounds of which you stated in your letter to J. Russell as to the necessity of a *coup d'état* by one person to give France any chance of a peaceable future, though I wish such opinions had not been expressed to an ambassador, apparently not very well disposed to receive them, without having been previously communicated to J. Russell and to the Queen, knowing as I long have known the extent of susceptibility which prevailed in that quarter on these matters, and greatly lamented, and which I have unsuccessfully laboured to combat.

“ What I chiefly wish, however, to say to you on this occasion is, that not only have I approved of every essential act during your administration of foreign affairs at the time, but that there is not one with respect to which upon subsequent reflection I could wish to recall my approbation. Your policy will never, while you live, want the ablest of all

defenders, but whether in or out of office (and J. Russell is well apprised upon what a slender thread my own tenure of office now hangs), I can never hear it impugned in public or in private without expressing my conviction and admiration of its great ability, and real consistency with the interests, and, above all, the honour of the country.

“Yours sincerely,  
“LANSDOWNE.”

The following letter to his brother gives, in Lord Palmerston's own words, a full story of the whole matter, and explains what was much commented upon at the time, namely, his apparent want of respect in not attending in person at Windsor to deliver up the seals of office :—

“Broadlands, 22nd Jan., 1852.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“I have not been able to write to you sooner except by the common post, and I did not like to send you details by that conveyance. The history of my dismissal is short and simple. I had, like all the rest of the world, long considered the French Constitution of 1848 as one that would not long work, and as an arrangement which approached to the very verge of anarchy. The course pursued by the Assembly—and more especially after its meeting in the beginning of November—showed that a conflict between that body and the President was inevitable; that there was no way out of the difficulty in which France was placed except by some act of violence against the law and Constitution; and it seemed to me better that in such a conflict the President should

prevail over the Assembly, than that the Assembly should prevail over the President. Therefore when the *coup d'état* took place, and Walewsky came to me on the Tuesday (the 3rd of December) to tell me of it, I expressed to him these opinions. The President could offer to France settled government, with order and internal tranquillity; the Assembly had no eligible candidate to offer in the room of the President. Henry V. had only a minority with him, and could not with that govern the majority of the nation. The Comte de Paris is only about twelve years old, and France could not now accept a regency of six or eight years' duration, with a foreign and Protestant princess as Regent, and Thiers as Prime Minister. The Triumvirate of the Generals Cavaignac, Changarnier, and Lamoricière would be military despotism; and Joinville as President would be a political solecism. Any one of these arrangements would have been civil war and local and temporary anarchy; and the Assembly had nothing else to offer. Walewsky wrote on the 3rd a private letter to Turgot, giving him an account of what I had said, the sum and substance of which was, that I thought that what the President had done the day before was the best thing for France, and, through France, for the rest of Europe. On the 3rd, Normanby, who had for some time been on very bad personal terms with the President, wrote a despatch to ask whether, in consequence of what had happened, he should alter in any way his relations with the French Government. On the 5th



I sent him a despatch, saying that he was to make no change in his relations with the French Government, nor to do anything which would wear the appearance of any interference in the internal affairs of France. He received this despatch on the 6th, and went immediately to Turgot to tell him of it—a step wholly unnecessary, because all he was told to do was to make no change in his relations with the French Government. Turgot, who was nettled at the existence of any doubt on the subject, said that the communication was unnecessary, as he had two days before received an account from Walewsky, saying that I had entirely approved what the President had done, and thought he could not have acted otherwise. This despatch having been read by the Queen and John Russell, the latter wrote to me to say that he hoped I should be able to contradict that report of what I had said. To this I replied that the particular expressions ascribed to me were rather a highly-coloured version of what I had said, but that it must be remembered that Normanby reported what Turgot had said to him verbally; that Turgot stated from memory what Walewsky had written in a despatch or letter received two days before; and that Walewsky gave the impression which he had derived from our conversation, but not the particular words which I had used. But I stated to John Russell, at considerable length, my reasons for thinking that what had been done was the best thing for France and for Europe.

“To this John Russell replied that I mistook the point at issue between us. That the question was not whether the President was or was not justified in doing what he has done, but whether I was justified in expressing any opinion thereupon to Walewsky without having first taken the opinion of the Cabinet on the matter. To this I answered that his doctrine so laid down was new, and not practical. That there is a well-known and perfectly understood distinction in diplomatic intercourse between conversations which are official and which bind governments and conversations which are unofficial and which do not bind governments. That my conversation with Walewsky was of the latter description, and that I said nothing to him which would in any degree or way fetter the action of the Government; and that if it was to be held that a Secretary of State could never express any opinion to a foreign minister on passing events, except as the organ of a previously-consulted Cabinet, there would be an end of that easy and familiar intercourse which tends essentially to promote good understanding between ministers and governments.

“John Russell replied to this that my letter left him no alternative but to advise the Queen to place the Foreign Office in other hands; but he offered me the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland, or any other arrangement which I might prefer. Of course, having been so cavalierly sent to the right-about, I told him there were obvious reasons which

prevented me from availing myself of his offers, and that I only waited to learn the name of my successor to give up the seals. There was a misunderstanding about the giving them up. I had come down here before the day appointed for that purpose, and John Russell sent me a message by Lord Stanley of Alderley to say that if it would be inconvenient to me to come to town, the seals might be sent down to Windsor, where the Queen was, and where the Council was to be held for swearing in Lord Granville. I understood this message to mean that my presence was not required, and that I might send the seals to John Russell to deliver up for me. Accordingly I sent them up from hence by a messenger, who was ordered to go down with them to Windsor in the special train from London which was to convey the ministers, and he was to deliver them to John Russell at Windsor. But it turned out that what John Russell meant was that I need not come round by London to go to Windsor from hence, but might go across from Basingstoke to Reading, and that the seals might be sent down to me from London.

“It certainly did not require the wisdom of a Prime Minister to tell me this. The result was that the Queen waited an hour in expectation of my arrival, and then John Russell discovered the messenger and the box with the seals, and he delivered them to the Queen. On hearing this, I wrote a letter of explanation, which John Russell sent to

the Queen, and she was satisfied. I mention all this merely because you may have heard that I behaved rudely, and did not apologize. But as to the main point, John Russell distinctly narrowed down the ground of my dismissal to the fact of my having expressed *an* opinion on the *coup d'état* without reference to the nature of that opinion, Johnny saying that that was not the question. Now, that opinion of mine was expressed in conversation on Tuesday, the 3rd; but on Wednesday, the 4th, we had a small evening party at our house. At that party John Russell and Walewsky were, and they had a conversation on the *coup d'état*, in which Johnny expressed his opinion, which Walewsky tells me was in substance and result pretty nearly the same as what I had said the day before, though, as he observed, John Russell is not so 'expansif' as I am; but, further, on Friday, the 6th, Walewsky dined at John Russell's, and there met Lansdowne and Charles Wood; and in the course of that evening John Russell, Lansdowne, and Charles Wood all expressed their opinions on the *coup d'état*, and those opinions were, if anything, rather more strongly favourable than mine had been. Moreover, Walewsky met Lord Grey riding in the Park, and Grey's opinion was likewise expressed, and was to the same effect. It is obvious that the reason assigned for my dismissal was a mere pretext, eagerly caught at for want of any good reason. The real ground was a weak truckling to the hostile

intrigues of the Orleans Family, Austria, Russia, Saxony, and Bavaria, and in some degree also of the present Prussian Government. All these parties found their respective views and systems of policy thwarted by the course pursued by the British Government, and they thought that if they could remove the minister they would change the policy. They had for a long time past effectually poisoned the mind of the Queen and the Prince against me, and John Russell giving way, rather encouraged than discountenanced the desire of the Queen to remove me from the Foreign Office.

“In the meanwhile the papers, having but little to discuss, have all over the country—both London and provincial papers—been full of my removal; and the general tone has been highly complimentary to me, and far from agreeable to John Russell. This, of course, has much annoyed him; and I think, if known by the Court, must afford them matter for reflection.

“The general opinion is that the ministry will not stand long after the meeting of Parliament. Indeed, it is likely that they will be wrecked upon the Reform Bill. At all events, it is scarcely probable that they should get through the session without some defeat which would lead to their resignation. In that case the Queen would send for Lord Derby, who would probably be able to form a Government even without the Peelites; but they would most likely join him. However, all these things are matters of speculation.

“We are going to town next week to be ready for the meeting of Parliament.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

Parliament met on the 3rd of February. Immediately after the speeches of the mover and seconder of the address were concluded, the Prime Minister was asked to explain the reason for Lord Palmerston's removal from office. Lord John Russell began by saying:—

“It will be right that I should first state to the House what I conceive to be the position which a Secretary of State holds as regards the Crown in the administration of foreign affairs, and as regards the Prime Minister of this country. With respect to the first, I should state that when the Crown, in consequence of a vote of the House of Commons places its constitutional confidence in a minister, that minister is, on the other hand, bound to afford to the Crown the most frank and full detail of every measure that is taken, or to leave to the Crown its full liberty, a liberty which the Crown must possess, of saying that the minister no longer possesses its confidence. Such I hold to be the general doctrine. But as regards the noble lord, it did so happen that in August, 1850, the precise terms were laid down in a communication on the part of Her Majesty with respect to the transaction of business between the Crown and the Secretary of State. I became the organ of making that communication to my noble friend, and thus became responsible for the document I am about to read from.

“I shall refer only to that part of the document which has reference to the immediate subject:—

““The Queen requires, first, that Lord Palmerston will distinctly state what he proposes in a given case, in order

that the Queen may know as distinctly to what she is giving her royal sanction.

“‘Secondly, having once given her sanction to a measure, that it be not arbitrarily altered or modified by the minister. Such an act she must consider as failing in sincerity towards the Crown, and justly to be visited by the exercise of her constitutional right of dismissing that minister. She expects to be kept informed of what passes between him and the foreign ministers before important decisions are taken based upon that intercourse; to receive the foreign despatches in good time, and to have the drafts for her approval sent to her in sufficient time to make herself acquainted with their contents before they must be sent off. The Queen thinks it best that Lord John Russell should show this letter to Lord Palmerston.’

“I sent that accordingly, and received a letter in which the noble lord said:—

“‘I have taken a copy of this memorandum of the Queen, and will not fail to attend to the directions which it contains.’”

Lord John Russell then proceeded to remark that—

“The first important transaction in which Lord Palmerston had taken part since the end of the last session of Parliament was the reception of a deputation of delegates from certain metropolitan parishes respecting the treatment of the Hungarian refugees by the Turkish Government. On this occasion he (Lord John Russell) thought that his noble friend had exhibited some want of due caution; but he gave him the credit of supposing that this was through an oversight.

“The next occasion to which he thought it necessary to refer related to the events which had taken place on the 2nd of December, in France.

“The instructions conveyed to our ambassador from the Queen’s Government were to abstain from all interference in the internal affairs of that country. Being informed of an

alleged conversation between Lord Palmerston and the French ambassador repugnant to these instructions, he (Lord John) had written to that noble lord; but his inquiries had for some days met with a disdainful silence, Lord Palmerston having meanwhile, without the knowledge of his colleagues, written a despatch to Lord Normanby, in which he, however, evaded the question whether he had approved the act of the President. The noble lord's course of proceeding in this matter he considered to be putting himself in the place of the Crown, and passing by the Crown, while he gave the moral approbation of England to the acts of the President of the Republic of France, in direct opposition to the policy which the Government had hitherto pursued.

“Under these circumstances, he (Lord John Russell) had no alternative but to declare that, while he was Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston could not hold the seals of office; and he had assumed the sole and entire responsibility of advising the Crown to require the resignation of his noble friend, who, though he had forgotten and neglected what was due to the Crown and his colleagues, had not, he was convinced, intended any personal disrespect.”

Lord Palmerston then rose, and the following is a report of what he said :—

“He should be sorry if the House and the country should run away with the notion which Lord John Russell seemed to entertain, that he had abandoned principles. He concurred in Lord John's definition of the relations between the Foreign Minister and the Crown, and he contended that he had done nothing inconsistent with these relations. With reference to the deputation on the subject of the release of the Hungarian refugees, he had thought it to be his duty to receive it. He had repudiated certain expressions contained in the address, and he had said nothing upon that occasion which he had not uttered in that House and elsewhere. He then entered into a lengthened statement of the transactions in



reference to the *coup d'état* in France, which had been represented by Lord John Russell as forming the groundwork of his removal from office. After recounting the interview with Count Walewski on the 3rd of December, he said that on that same day Her Majesty's ambassador at Paris wrote a despatch to ask what instructions he should receive for his guidance in France during the interval before the vote of the French people on the question that was to be proposed to them, and whether in that interval he should infuse into the relations with the French Government any greater degree of reserve than usual.

"I took," Lord Palmerston proceeded to say, "the opinion of the Cabinet on that question, and a draft of that opinion was prepared and sent for Her Majesty's approbation. The answer could only be one in consistence with the course we had pursued since the beginning of the events alluded to, and was such as the noble lord has read. Her Majesty's ambassador was instructed to make no change in his relations with the French Government, and to do nothing that should wear the appearance of any interference with the internal affairs of France. There was no instruction to communicate that document to the French Government; it simply contained instructions, not in fact what the English ambassador was to do, but what he was to abstain from doing. The noble lord, however (the Marquis of Normanby), thought it right to communicate to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs the substance of that document, accompanying his communication with certain excuses for the delay, which, however, did not rest with that noble marquis, as his despatch to the English Government was dated the 3rd of December. The French minister stated that he had nothing to complain of with respect to the delay, and the less, indeed, because two days before he had received from the French ambassador in London a statement which the noble lord (Lord John Russell) has read, viz., that I entirely approved of what had been done, and thought the President of the French fully justified.

That was a somewhat highly-coloured explanation of the result of the long conversation we held together. Those particular words I never used, and probably the French ambassador never would have conceived it consistent with the dignity due to his country to ask the approval of a Foreign Secretary of State. Consequently the approval was not given, and was not asked. When the Marquis of Normanby's despatch reached my noble friend (Lord John Russell), he wrote to say he trusted that I could contradict that report. There was, as he has stated, an interval between the receipt of the noble lord's letter and my answer. The noble lord's letter was dated the 14th, and my answer the 16th. I was at the time labouring under a heavy pressure of business, and wishing fully to explain the opinion I expressed, it was not until the evening of the 16th that I was able to write my answer. The noble lord got it early next morning, on the 17th."

This letter has already been given above as well as the history of the correspondence which ensued, and Lord Palmerston's claim for the unfettered action of a foreign secretary. He then continued :—

"Now, I expressed this opinion to which the noble lord has referred to the French ambassador on the 3rd of December; but was I the only member of the Cabinet who did thus express an opinion on passing events? I am informed that on the evening of that very day, and under the same roof as I expressed my opinion, the noble lord at the head of the Government, in conversation with the same ambassador, expressed his opinion. (Hear, hear, and laughter.) I cannot tell what that opinion was, but from what has fallen from the noble lord this evening, it may be assumed that that opinion was not very different even from the reported opinion which I am supposed to have expressed. Was that all? On the 5th, and in the noble lord's own house, I have been informed

that the French ambassador met the noble lord, the President of the Council, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The noble lord again expressed an opinion, and the President of the Council and the Chancellor of the Exchequer also expressed an opinion. (Cheers and laughter.) And be it remembered that the charge is not the nature of the opinion, for the noble lord distinctly told me, 'You mistake the question between us. It was not whether the President was justified or not, but whether you were justified in expressing an opinion on the matter at all.' I believe that the noble lord the Secretary of State for the Colonies did also, in those few days, express an opinion on those events; and I have been informed also that the then Vice-President of the Board of Trade, and now the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, also expressed his opinion. Then it follows that every member of the Cabinet, whatever his political avocations may have been, however much his attention may have been devoted to other matters, is at liberty to express an opinion of passing events abroad; but the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whose peculiar duty it is to watch those events, who is unfit for his office if he has not an opinion on them, is the only man not permitted to express an opinion; and when a foreign minister comes and tells him that he has news, he is to remain silent like a speechless dolt or the mute of some Eastern Pacha. (Cheers and laughter.) Now I am told, 'It is not your conversation with M. Walewski that is complained of, but your despatch to the Marquis of Normanby.' What had I stated in that despatch in reference to which a great parade has been made, as if I had been guilty of breach of duty to the Crown and of my obligations to the Prime Minister, in sending it without previously communicating with the noble lord? No man can lay down the matter more strongly than I have in reference to the obligations of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I have always admitted, that if the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sends a despatch of importance to an ambassador

abroad without ascertaining the opinion of the Prime Minister of the Crown, he is guilty of a breach of duty. But there are many cases in which it is perfectly well known that he is only expressing the opinion of the Government, and inconvenience might arise from delay.

“Lord Palmerston then concluded his statement by maintaining that it was a misrepresentation of the fact to say that he had given instructions to Lord Normanby inconsistent with the relations of general intercourse between England and France. It was no instruction at all. He did not profess to give the opinion of the Government or that of England. It was his own opinion, and whether right or wrong, it was shared by numbers in France. Therefore the charge made against him by Lord John Russell, founded on this despatch, had no foundation either in justice or in facts. Lord Palmerston next observed upon the complaints made against him of having delayed so long in replying to the inquiry of the Prime Minister, an accident which was occasioned by the pressure of business. When he could reply, he had stated to the noble lord that he had merely expressed an opinion to the French ambassador that there had been for some time such an antagonism between the President and the Assembly, that their co-existence had become an impossibility, and if one or the other were to prevail, it would be better that it should be the President. He concluded with an animated defence of his foreign policy in all its aspects, during periods of difficulty, whilst he had held the seals of office, which had contributed to the maintenance of general peace without sullyng the honour or dignity of England.”

He resumed his seat with the House only partially with him. The attack had been very vigorous. His defence had been incomplete. The motives that actuated him in his comparative reserve may be

gathered from the following details as to these events, which he gave in a letter to Lord Lansdowne,\* relating a conversation with the Duke of Bedford in October, 1852.

“The reason assigned by John Russell, in his letters to me, for his abrupt dismissal of me, was an opinion which I had expressed to Walewsky about the President’s *coup d’état*, in a morning conversation at my house, the day after that event had happened—that opinion being to the effect that the President had acted in self-defence, and that what he had done was, in the circumstances of the case, the best thing for France. Now, I said to the Duke, in regard to the validity of that ground, I have only to repeat to you what Count Walewsky told me, either the day (or two days) before the matter was discussed in the House of Commons.

“Count Walewsky then said to me that he had the day before had with John Russell a conversation which concerned me, and which he thought it right to report to me. He said that Lord John had sent for him, and had said he wished to ask him a question. He had been told that Count Walewsky had said that he, Lord John, had expressed to him, Count Walewsky, in regard to the *coup d’état*, opinions similar in substance and effect to those which had been expressed to him by me, and he wished to know if that report was true. Count Walewsky said that

\* Dated Broadlands, October, 1852.

his reply to Lord John was, that that report was perfectly true; that it was true that he had said so, and that what he had said was true. He told Lord John that he, Lord John, had upon two occasions expressed such opinions. The first occasion was on the evening of Wednesday, the 3rd of December, the same day in the morning of which I had expressed to him, Count Walewsky, the opinion which he, Lord John, had found fault with. That he, Count Walewsky, had that evening met Lord John at a party at Lady Palmerston's, and that then and there Lord John had spoken of the event of the day before in terms similar to those used by me in the morning. The second occasion was the Friday following, when he, Count Walewsky, dined with Lord John, and met there some other members of the Cabinet, and that evening, said Count Walewsky to Lord John, 'upon that very sofa' (pointing to one in the room), 'you expressed opinions if anything stronger than what Lord Palmerston had said to me on the Wednesday; and whereas I had contented myself with reporting what Lord Palmerston had said in a private letter to Monsieur Thurgot, I made what you had said the subject of an official despatch.' Count Walewsky said to me that after this Lord John asked him whether he had told all this to me; and Count Walewsky said that, having recently passed a day at Broadlands, he had talked over with me the circumstances connected with my dismissal from office, and that he had stated to me all that he had then repeated to Lord John.

‘But,’ said Lord John, ‘does Lord Palmerston mean to say all this in the House of Commons?’ ‘Of that,’ said Count Walewsky, ‘I know nothing.’

“I may here observe that I stated in my speech in the House of Commons the general result of this communication made to me by Walewsky; but I did not like to be too precise, or to go into details, out of delicacy to Count Walewsky, though he would have had no objection to my making the assertion on his authority.

“I then observed to the Duke of Bedford that the ground on which Lord John Russell had, in his letters to me, placed my dismissal, even if it had had any intrinsic validity, which it had not, was destroyed by this statement, which showed that I had done and said no more than John Russell himself had said and done. But I went on to say to the Duke that I had still further to complain of the manner in which John Russell had made his statement in the House of Commons; for that, finding his original ground, as put forward in his letters to me, thus rendered untenable, he had, in his speech, adopted another ground, and had put my dismissal partly on the ground—first, that I had taken two days more than I ought to have taken to answer a demand for explanation made to him by the Queen, and sent on to me; and, secondly, on the ground that, by sending a despatch to Normanby without previously sending the draft to the Queen, I had incurred the penalty of dismissal, intimated by the Queen’s memorandum of August 1850,

as likely to be the result of such an omission. I said to the Duke that the Queen's demand for explanation as to what I had said to Count Walewsky came to me from John Russell at a moment when I was overwhelmed with pressing office business, thrown into arrear by my time having been occupied by a succession of Cabinet meetings; that the explanation to be given by me was necessarily a long one; that, in order to write it, I had to sit up one night till half-past four in the morning, having put a messenger under orders to take it down to Woburn in an office-box by the first train of the next day; and that in the box which contained my explanation I put a short note, saying that it was then half-past four in the morning, that I could not sit up any longer to take a copy of my paper, and that I begged that John Russell would at his leisure either send me a copy of it or let me have it again, that I might copy it. Well, said I to the Duke, 'If John Russell thought that the Queen would consider the two or three days' delay in the transmission of my reply to her inquiry as disrespectful to her, what was it his duty to do when my explanation reached him? Why, of course, to send it off immediately to Osborne, where the Queen then was. But what did he do? Why, that very afternoon he quietly sent my paper back to me, that I might take a copy of it; and he added that when I returned it to him he would transmit it to the Queen, with a copy of the answer which he intended to write to it. Thus interposing a further



delay of at least three days, in addition to the previous delay which he made the subject of complaint against me.'

"Then I said to the Duke that I thought it was unhandsome by me, and very wrong by the Queen, for him, John Russell, to have read in the House of Commons the Queen's angry memorandum of August 1850, hinting at dismissal. In regard to the Queen, he was thus dragging her into the discussion, and making her a party to a question which constitutionally ought to be, and before Parliament could only be, a question between me and the responsible adviser of the Crown; and I said that this mention of the Queen as a party to the transaction had given rise to newspaper remarks much to be regretted, and which the Prime Minister ought not to have given an occasion for.

"I said that, as regards myself, the impression created by his reading that memorandum was, that I had submitted to an affront which I ought not to have borne; and several of my friends told me, after the discussion, that they wondered I had not sent in my resignation on receiving that paper from the Queen through John Russell. My answer to those friends, I said, had been, that the paper was written in anger by a lady as well as by a Sovereign, and that the difference between a lady and a man could not be forgotten even in the case of the occupant of a throne; but I said that, in the first place, I had no reason to suppose that this memorandum would ever

be seen by, or be known to, anybody but the Queen, John Russell, and myself; that, secondly, my position at that moment, namely, in August 1850, was peculiar. I had lately been the object of violent political attack, and had gained a great and signal victory in the House of Commons and in public opinion: to have resigned then would have been to have given the fruits of victory to adversaries whom I had defeated, and to have abandoned my political supporters at the very moment when by their means I had triumphed. But, beyond all that, I had represented to my friends, by pursuing the course which they thought I ought to have followed, I should have been bringing for decision at the bar of public opinion a personal quarrel between myself and my Sovereign—a step which no subject ought to take, if he can possibly avoid it; for the result of such a course must be either fatal to him or injurious to the country. If he should prove to be in the wrong, he would be irretrievably condemned; if the Sovereign should be proved to be in the wrong, the monarchy would suffer.”

This resort to the memorandum of August, 1850, for the purposes of debate in the House of Commons gave Lord John Russell an unexpected success in the discussion. It was an unfair advantage, because it was a surprise, and because, as we see from the foregoing letter, Lord Palmerston considered his tongue to be tied in the matter. In consequence the general

impression on the House was, no doubt, for the moment, unfavourable to Lord Palmerston. In a reminiscence of this debate which Lord Dalling left behind him, the scene is described as follows:—

“I happened to be under the gallery on the night in which Lord Russell made his explanations.

“His speech certainly was one of the most powerful I ever heard delivered. It was evidently intended to crush an expected antagonist, and, by the details into which it went, took Lord Palmerston completely by surprise. I listened to his reply with the more affectionate interest, since he was kind enough to mention my own name with praise; but I felt, and all his friends felt, that it was feeble as a retort to the tremendous assault that had been made on him.

“I remember Mr. Bernal Osborne coming to the bench where I was sitting, and expressing to me a regret similar to that which I felt myself; and I think it was the night after, in debate, that, meeting Mr. Disraeli on the staircase of Ashburnham House, which was then the Russian embassy, he said in his peculiar manner, ‘*There was a Palmerston!*’

“‘Palmerston is smashed,’ was, indeed, the expression generally used at the clubs; but it did not in the least convey the idea that Lord Palmerston had formed of his own position.


“I must say, in truth, that I never admired him so much as at this crisis. He evidently thought he had been ill-treated; but I never heard him make an unfair or irritable remark, nor did he seem in anywise stunned by the blow he had received, or dismayed by the isolated position in which he stood.

“I should say that he seemed to consider that he had had a quarrel put upon him, which it was his wisest course to close by receiving the fire of his adversary and not returning it.

“He could not, in fact, have gained a victory against the

Premier on the ground which Lord John Russell had chosen for the combat which would not have been more permanently disadvantageous to him than a defeat. The faults of which he had been accused did not touch his own honour nor that of his country. Let them be admitted, and there was an end of the matter. By-and-by an occasion would probably arise in which he might choose an advantageous occasion for giving battle, and he was willing to wait calmly for that occasion."

It came soon enough.



## CHAPTER VIII.

Fall of the Russell Administration—Lord Derby's Government—  
Dissolution—Speeches at Tiverton and Lewes—Letters—Defeat  
of the Derby Cabinet.

“Your power and your command are taken off,  
And Cassio rules in Cyprus.”

*Othello*, Act V. Sc. 1.

IN February Lord J. Russell brought in a Militia Bill which was intended to develop a local militia for the defence of the country. Lord Palmerston at once expressed his dissatisfaction at the form of the measure, and in committee on the Bill moved as an amendment to omit the word “local,” so as to constitute a regular militia, which should be legally transportable all over the kingdom, and so be always ready for any emergency. This he carried against the Government by a majority of eleven, and the Russell administration came to an end. The event created little wonder, as the progressive feebleness of the Cabinet, since one of its strongest members left it, had for some time prepared the public mind for a change. We have, however, Sir George Lewis's testimony\* that the division on the amend-

\* Sir G. Lewis to Sir E. Head. Letters, p. 251.

ment was a surprise, and that Lord Palmerston himself did not wish to turn out the Government; but the cup being full, a little movement was sufficient to make it run over. Lord Derby formed a Government, after having invited the co-operation of Lord Palmerston, who thus writes to his brother:—

“C. G., February 24, 1852.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“I have had my tit-for-tat with John Russell, and I turned him out on Friday last. I certainly, however, did not expect to do so, nor did I intend to do anything more than to persuade the House to reject his foolish plan and to adopt a more sensible one. I have no doubt that two things induced him to resign. First, the almost insulting manner towards him in which the House, by its cheers, went with me in the debate; and, secondly, the fear of being defeated on the vote of censure about the Cape\* affairs which was to have been moved to-day; as it is, the late Government have gone out on a question which they have treated as a motion merely asserting that they had lost the confidence of the House, whereas if they had gone out on a defeat upon the motion about the Cape, they would have carried with them the direct censure of the House of Commons. Lord Derby has formed his Government solely out of his Protectionist party—none of any other party would join him. He made me on

\* The Caffre War of 1851.

Sunday, immediately after he had seen the Queen, a very civil and courteous offer to join him, but of course it was impossible for me to do so on account of my entire difference with him on the question of imposing a duty on the importation of corn even if there had been no other reasons, but there are many other reasons against it. The House is adjourned till Friday, and then it will probably adjourn again for ten days to allow time for the new ministers to be re-elected. They are not going to dissolve immediately, but will do so as soon as the Estimates are voted and the Mutiny Bill passed. I cannot conceive that such a Government can stand long, or can even get a majority by a fresh general election.

“ Yours affectionately,

“ PALMERSTON.”

And to his brother-in-law, Mr. Laurence Sullivan, he writes the same day :—

“ Lord Derby invited me to join him, but as he said that his adherence to or abandonment of protective duties on corn was to depend on the result of the next general election, that announcement created a preliminary obstacle which rendered all further discussion as to any other points needless. I could not, however, have joined him even if that objection had been removed, because his Government was not to be formed upon any broad principle of a general union of parties, but he meant me to come in singly ; and the office of all others which he had intended

to propose to me was that of Chancellor of the Exchequer, which is, of course, departmentally subordinate to the First Lord of the Treasury. I do not mean to say that, irrespective of the question of Protection, I should have been much disposed to join him in any case; but if his Government had been framed on a comprehensive principle, and Protection had been thrown overboard, the matter would have required consideration."

Ministers brought in and carried their own Militia Bill, which Lord John Russell opposed, but which was strongly supported by Lord Palmerston on the second reading. In the following letters he describes with an accurate forecast the position of affairs; but it is curious to notice that Lord Aberdeen, who was to be Prime Minister within eight months, is not even mentioned as a possible choice:—

"Carlton Gardens, April 30, 1852.

"MY DEAR WILLIAM,

"It is a long time since I wrote to you, but one finds one's time nearly as much occupied out of office as in, there are so many things one has been obliged to leave undone during a five years' incessant Downing Street toil. But I am gradually getting through a mass of accumulated confusion. I am, however, a member of a committee on ventilation, which takes up much of my mornings, in addition to House of Commons attendance in evenings.

"Our new Government gets on pretty well;



Disraeli has this evening made a good financial statement. His speech of two hours was excellent, well arranged, clear, and well delivered, but it made out the complete success of the financial and commercial measures of the last ten years, of the Peel and of the Whig administrations, which, while they were in progress and under discussion, he and Derby were the loudest to condemn. He was vociferously cheered by Liberals and Peelites, but listened to in sullen silence by the supporters of the Government. His only proposal is that the income tax, which expired on the 5th of this month, shall be continued for one year longer, to give the Government time to consider what permanent system they will propose; but he has entirely thrown over the idea of import duty on corn, or, in other words, the principle of Protection. Opinions differ as to the probable duration of the session, but the chances are that the dissolution will not be till the end of June. I do not see that we need care much when it may be, now that, by general consent, it is agreed that the new Parliament is not to meet till November. The only inconvenience of delay is, that people are put to trouble and expense by the measures necessary to guard against contests. In the meantime it is a real public advantage that the Tory party has come into office, and has had an opportunity of seeing, and learning, and judging, as responsible ministers, many things of which in Opposition they had very imperfect knowledge and conceptions. They do better

than was expected of them, but, nevertheless, it is scarcely possible that they should stand as they are ; and if they do not get some material reinforcement they will probably not live over next Christmas, notwithstanding any addition to the number of their supporters (and that will not be great) which a general election may bring them. The most natural reinforcement for them to look to would be the Peel party ; not very numerous, counting about fifty or sixty, but containing a good many men of capacity. But as yet it seems to me that the Peelite leaders have not softened the bitter animosity they have hitherto felt for the Derby Protectionists. There is no knowing, however, how far a liberal offer of places in the Government might alter those feelings, still I think it unlikely. I believe the Derby Government rather calculate upon inducing me to join them when Protection has had its public funeral ; on this point of course I am studiously silent, but I have no intention or inclination to enlist under Derby's banners. I do not think highly of him as a statesman, and I suspect that there are many matters on which he and I should not agree. Besides, after having acted for twenty-two years with the Whigs, and after having gained by, and while acting with them, any little political reputation I may have acquired, it would not answer nor be at all agreeable to me to go slap over to the opposite camp, and this merely on account of a freak of John Russell's which the whole Whig party regretted and con-

demned ; moreover, I am in no great hurry to return to hard work, and should not dislike a little more holiday. On the other hand, I own that it would be a very pressing public emergency which would induce me to place myself again under John Russell, not on account of personal resentment, which I have ceased to feel, and he and I meet in private as good friends as ever ; but he has shown on so many occasions such a want of sound judgment and discretion, that I have lost all political confidence in him. This last frolic of his in opposing the organisation of a militia by the present Government after having two months ago resigned the Government because, as he said, he was prevented (though he was not) from bringing in a Bill for the same purpose, and after having stated in Parliament that his reason for resigning, instead of dissolving, was that he did not think it right to deprive the country, during the time necessary for a general election, of the means of passing a law for the national defences—this frolic has astounded and disgusted the whole Whig party, and all other parties into the bargain. The truth is that the Whigs would be glad to get rid of John Russell and to have me in his stead if this change could well be accomplished. But such a substitution is not an easy thing. It is difficult to reduce to the second place a public man who, for many years, has occupied the first place both as leader of Opposition and as head of a Government ; and such an active man as John Russell cannot be put upon the shelf.

The fact is, he has great talents, brilliant abilities, extensive knowledge, but he wants judgment, and acts perpetually from sudden and ill-considered impulse.

“ If the present Government should be overthrown the decision the Queen would make as to the person she would send for to make a new administration would of course much depend upon the circumstances attending the defeat of the present Government. But John Russell, if she sent for him, would have much difficulty in forming a Government. He would try to get Graham and the Peelites; with Graham alone he could not do. If the other Peelites were to join him he might make a strong Government, though he himself would be an element of weakness in it. If I was sent for, which, from the feeling towards me at Court, is highly unlikely, I should have some difficulty in forming a Government, but I think I could do it; and though I should be conscious that I am wanting in many of the requisite qualifications for the post of Prime Minister, yet I think, on the whole, my deficiencies are not greater than those of Derby and John Russell, or of any other person who at present could be chosen for such a duty. If our session is not of long duration, and the general election is over by the middle of July, I think that Emily and I shall probably go over to Ireland for a month, that we shall then pass the end of August and the month of September at Broadlands, and run over to Paris for a fortnight or three

weeks in October, before the meeting of Parliament in November. It will not be unuseful to have some communication with the President, or, as he will by that time perhaps be, the Emperor. My Tiverton friends are staunch, and I am not likely to have any contest there. I have received many overtures from other places, but had the offers been ever so plainly demonstrative of success I should still have preferred keeping a good and safe seat when I have been lucky enough to get it.

“ Yours affectionately,

“ PALMERSTON.”

There was to be a dissolution at the end of the session, and speculation as to its result was afloat.

“ C. G., May 23, 1852.

“ MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“ Those who have looked into the chances of the general election, like Tufnell,\* for instance, think that the next Parliament will, in its subdivisions, not differ very much from the present one, and that the Government will not have a majority. If that should so be, and it seems probable, this Government can scarcely long survive the meeting of the new Parliament unless it is kept alive by the difficulty of forming another administration; but difficulties of that kind seldom prevent the overthrow of what is, though they may embarrass those who have to build up something else to succeed what they have

\* Had been “ whip.”

thrown down. John Russell would naturally be the person to be sent for to form a new Government, but he has gone down woefully in public opinion of late, and especially in the opinion of his own party. His talents are beyond dispute, but the infirmity of his judgment seems equally undeniable. At the same time there he is, at all events leader *par droit de naissance*, even though his title by *conquête* has been somewhat shaken; and he is so circumstanced that while he cannot be dealt with as if he were not, and while he must always be an important man while his health and strength lasts, yet he does not inspire that confidence which a Prime Minister ought to enjoy in order that he may be useful, and if he were again called upon to form a Government he might find it difficult to rally round him such colleagues as he would like to have. However, all speculations as to the future are at present idle. Much will depend upon the result of the general election, and the present Government are safe till the end of the year at all events.

“Young Stanley (Derby’s son) is just come back; he is a promising young man, and if he trains on, he may be of much service to his father’s administration. My position in the meanwhile is a very agreeable one. As I have no office which other people want, nobody abuses me in order to knock me down; while both the Government and the Liberals, wishing to get me on their side, are vying with each other in civilities. This is all very well as long as it lasts,

and after five years and a half of galley-slave labour I find it not disagreeable to have some command of my time.

“ While Aquila\* was here I called upon him, and took that opportunity of telling him what I thought about the system of government in Naples. He asked me to put in writing what I had said to him, and I did so. But he sent me back my paper through Carini, saying that it would be of no use to him at Naples, as it repeated assertions which he had denied to me in our conversation. Carini suggested that I should write him another letter, which I declined doing. I said that the Prince had asked me of his own accord to put in writing that which I had said to him, and I had done so; but, having done so, I could not put on paper statements and opinions different from what I had said in conversation. Carini said that he would explain this in a letter from himself to the Prince. I begged he would let me see his letter before he sent it, as I should not like any other person to expound my opinions without giving me an opportunity of seeing that he did so correctly, but he has not yet sent me his letter. I send you a copy of the paper which I sent to Aquila, and which was returned to me: you will thus be able to know whether Aquila truly reports what passed between us in conversation.

“ Yours affectionately,

“ PALMERSTON.”

\* One of the royal princes of Naples.

“Carlton Gardens, Londra, 10 Maio 1852.

“Osservazioni rispettosamente sottomesse a Sua Altezza Reale il Conte di Aquila:—

“1° Alleanza trà l’Inghilterra ed il Regno delle Due Sicilie.

“Questa alleanza che ha esistito per tanti anni, e con sì grande e reciproco vantaggio, è fondata sugli interessi veri ed importanti di ambedue i paesi.

“Il Governo Napolitano ha dovuto in tempi passati ricorrere all’ aiuto ed al sostegno dell’ Inghilterra. Le forze di terra e di mare Inglesi furono quelle che salvarono e guardarono per la dinastia Napolitana l’ isola di Sicilia, e l’ Inghilterra non fu la meno influente di quelle Potenze, che nel 1814 e nel 1815 ristabilirono la famiglia reale di Napoli nella possessione di tutti i loro dominii.

“Il Governo Inglese fu mosso a tale condotta da motivi della più sana politica. E giacchè questa politica ha per base gli interessi nazionali dell’ Inghilterra, no è da dubitarsi che ogni governo Inglese sarebbe, in ogni tempo, guidato in riguardo a questi affari dagli stessi e medesimi principii. Quindi si può affermare che se mai nell’ avvenire il regno delle Due Sicilie si trovasse minacciato da pericoli esterni, il Governo Napolitano troverebbe nel Governo Inglese un’ amico disposto a dargli pronto ed efficace aiuto.

“Ma il Governo Inglese non può agire in tali affari senza il consenso ed il sostègno del Parlamento; e l’ influenza dell’ opinione pubblica è grande e decisiva sulle determinazioni del Parlamento.



“Ora per ben capire le probabilità del futuro, bisogna aprir gli occhi sul fatto che l’opinione pubblica in Inghilterra si pronuncia oggidì fortemente contro il Governo di Napoli. E se per sventura accedesse che il Governo Napolitano fosse costretto a domandar soccorso dall’Inghilterra, il Governo Inglese non potrebbe ottenere dal Parlamento i mezzi necessarii per recarsi all’ aiuto del Re delle Due Sicilie.

“Le cagioni della cattiva opinione che prevale in Inghilterra, in riguardo al Governo Napolitano, sono le persecuzioni e gli esilii dei Siciliani, e le ingiustizie e le crudeltà praticate verso i Napolitani.

“Malgrado l’annistia Siciliana, pubblicata secondo la promessa fatta al amiraglio ed al ministro Inglese, moltissimi Siciliani sono stati incarcerati od esiliati per causa d’avvenimenti anteriori a quella amnistia.

“Nel Regno di Napoli, poi, le carceri sono piene di prigionieri, dei quali non pochi sono tenuti rinchiusi senza processo; mentre che molti altri, dopo essere stati illegalmente condannati, sono assoggettati a pene che non si usano, in questi tempi, in paesi civiliti; e le quali sarebbero considerate altro modo dure, quando anche codesti condannati fossero veramente rei dei delitti dei quali sono stati accusati.

“Le persone in Inghilterra che conoscono il buon cuore e la generosità inerente di Sua Maestà, il Re delle Due Sicilie, sanno bene che questi abusi di potere vengono fatti da agenti inferiori; che questi agenti subalterni nascondono al Re il vero stato di queste cose; e che la verità è forse meglio conosciuta

nelle strade di Londra che nel Palazzo Reale di Napoli.

“Ma la persona che potrebbe riuscire a persuadere al Re di accordare senza indugio e senza eccezione un’ amnistia generale per tutti i suoi sudditi; di rilasciare tutti i prigionieri politici; e di far cessare immantinentemente tutti i processi per accuse politiche, renderebbe a Sua Maestà Siciliana un servizio di sommo valore, in riguardo all’ alleanza trà il Regno delle Due Sicilie e la Gran Bretagna; ed un tale atto di clemenza e di magnanimità dalla parte del Re cambierebbe in un tratto l’ opinione pubblica in Inghilterra, e ristabilirebbe quella cordialità trà i due popoli, che dovrebbe sempre esistere, e renderebbe il Governo Inglese abile di dar soccorso al Governo Napolitano in caso di bisogno.”

It will be observed that Lord Palmerston availed himself of his comparative leisure out of office to pay Count Aquila the compliment of corresponding with him in his own language. Lord Palmerston spoke and wrote Italian clearly and fluently. When Victor Emmanuel was made a Knight of the Garter at Windsor Castle, the Queen wished that he should have some notion of the oath which he was about to take. Lord Palmerston accordingly wrote out a translation in Italian and handed it to the King. When Cavour heard of it, he was so interested in the incident that he asked for the paper, and, having ascertained that it was in Lord Palmerston’s own

handwriting, put it away, as an historical relic, among the archives under his control.

In the early part of June there was a debate in the House of Commons on the general conduct of our foreign affairs by the Tory Government. The immediate occasion was the question of compensation to a Mr. Mather, an Englishman, who had been cut down in the streets of Florence by an Austrian officer. Lord Palmerston found fault with the faltering action of the Foreign Office; and the next letter shows that he regarded the state of public affairs as merely provisional:—

“C. G., June 20, 1852.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“Poor Malmesbury has got into sad disgrace by his diplomatic mismanagement and his ungrammatical despatches; but every trade requires an apprenticeship, and a man cannot expect to start at once into being a good foreign secretary any more than into being a good performer on the violin. He is, however, naturally a clever man, and, with practice, may become a good minister; but it was a hard trial for a man who had never been in any office whatever to undertake at once the management of our foreign affairs.

“We are now on the eve of our dissolution, which is expected to happen about Tuesday or Wednesday week. The House of Commons will have finished all its business by Friday week, and the Lords will wind up theirs in two or three days afterwards. Those

who have studied the matter, and are able to judge, think that the general election will send us back a House of Commons divided into fractions, not very different in their relative proportions from those which exist in the present House. Some say the Derby party will gain from ten to twenty votes, some say it will lose from ten to twenty; but that gain, if they make it, will not give them a majority of their own; and it may fairly be assumed, therefore, that the Government, as it now is constituted, cannot long survive the meeting of the new Parliament, if, indeed, it shall continue to exist as it now is until then.

“The fact is, that this Government has only two real men in its ranks—one in the Lords, and one in the Commons—Derby and Disraeli. The rest are all cyphers as to debate, though many of them are, I fancy, inconvenient entities in council.

“There will, however, be great difficulty found in the improvement of this Government, or in the construction of a new one. The Peelites are the only party who could as a body join Derby, and they are at present very hostile to him, and seem to me to think more of forming a Government upon the ruins of his than of entering into a combination with him. Still, a liberal offer of places might alter their feelings; and they must be conscious that they are not numerous enough as a party to make a Government by themselves. John Russell, on the other hand,

still clings to the position of leader of the Whig and Liberal party; but a great number of the Whigs openly express their opinion that he has shown himself unfit to lead a large party or to be the head of a Government, and that he has in a great measure lost their confidence. He certainly has entirely lost mine. I feel no resentment towards him personally or privately; but it would require strong inducements to persuade me to become again a member of a Government of which he was the head. I could feel no confidence in his discretion or judgment as a political leader, and could place no trust in his steady fidelity as a colleague having my official position at his mercy. The best arrangement that could be made would probably be to place Lord Lansdowne as head of the Government, and under him John Russell and myself with other Whigs, who with the best of the Peelites might serve as colleagues on equal terms. But Lansdowne's friends and family say that he would not undertake such a task. We shall see. I am told that the Court does not like the present Government, and I can believe it. All royal persons like acquiescence and subserviency of demeanour and conduct. Peel and his Government, with Aberdeen as Foreign Secretary, spoilt them in this respect; but Derby has an off-hand and sarcastic way about him, which is not the manner of a courtier, and has, I know, fought stoutly and successfully on the Danish question.

“As to me, my position is as agreeable as it is

possible for any public man's position to be. The Court, indeed, are cold, though civil. Either they are conscious of having made a mistake in their passionate hostility to me, and do not like to acknowledge it, or else they still dislike me, and only are just civil enough to prevent remarks. But the public, the press, the Parliament, and political parties are all well disposed and civil. Being free to act individually, I can express my own opinions without caring for others, and those opinions have generally been lucky enough to meet with concurrence. The Government are civil to me, hoping I may join them. The Whigs are civil to me, hoping that I may not leave them.

“We have got a new gardener at Broadlands; our former one had dwindled down into a smoking sot. It is a trial to a man to be left as much alone and unlooked after as the gardener of a Secretary of State necessarily is.

“I hear that Aquila has been told at Naples to hold his tongue about anything he heard or saw in England, and not to obtrude the revolutionary doctrines of the northern barbarians upon the more civilised sages of the south of Europe.

“Good-bye.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

On the dissolution of Parliament Lord Palmerston in the first week in July went down to Tiverton,

and was re-elected without opposition. At the former general election the Chartists had brought down a well-known lecturer, Mr. Julian Harney, to oppose him; but on this occasion their hearts failed them at the last moment. The only opponent, therefore, that he had to encounter was his old friend Row-cliff, the Tiverton butcher, whom he disposed of in his happiest manner, as will be seen by the following characteristic extracts from his speech on the hustings. Much speculation was afloat as to whether or not he would join the Conservatives, now that he had broken from his former leader. Reporters flocked from all parts to gather any stray indications of his future conduct. These he dextrously baffled all through a humorous speech; and when the Radical elector, impatient of this evasion, boldly put the direct question, he was no less successfully parried. After thanking the electors for the honour which they had conferred on him for the fifth time, Lord Palmerston proceeded:—

“We were told when we came to this place that we should not only have hot weather and a warm reception, but also a hot contest. (Laughter and cheering.) We were told, in mysterious language, in handbills circulated throughout the town, than an unknown candidate would appear—a gentleman of ‘independent principles.’ I have heard, gentlemen, of an independent fortune; I have heard of independent conduct; I have heard of independent character; but the handbill does not condescend to explain what is meant by ‘independent principles.’ (Cheers.) I presume the allusion is to principles wholly independent of

common sense, of justice, and of liberality. (Laughter.) I am glad, gentlemen, for the sake of the constituency of Tiverton, that such a man has not been found. I will not do the gentlemen who circulated the handbill to which I refer—the gentlemen who went about canvassing the electors for ‘a dark horse’ for an unknown man whose name they had promised not to reveal until votes had been promised blindfold—I will not do them the injustice to suppose that this announced contest, and this mysterious candidate were, from beginning to end, nothing but a hoax. I will not suppose that those individuals were repeating the misplace<sup>d</sup>, and I may, perhaps, say vulgar joke, which has sometimes been made, with some malignity and envy, by the inhabitants of the eastern part of this island, who have said that the further westward they went the more convinced they were that the wise men came from the east. (Laughter.) I cannot believe that any men of Tiverton would have offered such an insult to their fellow-townsmen. I am, therefore, compelled to think that a small portion of the electors of this borough, anxious that a contest should take place for the sake of the fun (for they could not have anticipated success), having beat the land, and having searched the sea, having ransacked houses and dived into the holds of yachts, having even gone, as was hinted, to the very mast-head, have yet been unable to find any man who would kindly devote himself to the amusement of a small portion of the inhabitants. We have been told that the general election in which this country is now engaged is to determine finally and for ever one great question—I mean the question of Protection or no Protection. It is my humble opinion that that question has been long since settled. I took the liberty of telling you last autumn, when I had the pleasure of being here, that when you saw the River Exe running up from the sea to Tiverton, instead of running down from Tiverton to the sea, you might then, and not until then, consider certainly that the revival of Protection was near at



hand. (Laughter and cheers.) I see no change in the current of the Exe. I don't even see that in the construction of your bridges you have taken any precautions to secure them against a turn of the stream. What, gentlemen, after all, is this great question which is called Protection? Why, Protection is a single word which represents a not very complex idea. Protection is a term something like that of 'independent principles,' to which I before referred; but Protection, stripped of its generality, means practically taxing the food of the many for the sake of the interests of the few. (Loud cheers.) I have that notion of the good sense and the good feeling of the British nation, that I am convinced they never will consent to revert to a system which is founded upon injustice and mistake. (Cheers.) If you wished to know what has been accomplished by the Liberal commercial measures which have marked for some years past the course of legislation, I should give you an answer similar to that inscribed upon the tablet which records the burial-place of the great architect who built the magnificent cathedral of St. Paul's. You know very well that it is usual to adorn the place of sepulture of eminent persons with marble statues, or groups representing different ideas connected with them. The burial-place of the architect of St. Paul's has no such ornaments. You find a simple inscription of his name, and it is added, 'If you seek for his monument, look around you'—look around at that magnificent structure which bears witness to the skill he had attained in his profession. Well, gentlemen, if I am asked what is the merit of those commercial measures which have of late been formed into laws, I answer, 'Look around you.' Look around you, beginning with the prosperity of the princely merchant in his counting-house, and descending to the humble peasant reposing in his cottage. Ask the mother who carries her babe in her arms; ask the father whose children are clinging around him; ask them what has been the benefit of the commercial relaxations of late years. They

will tell you the benefit is felt both physically and morally, and they will entreat you not to revert to a system which would deprive them of the enjoyments with which they have been blessed. (Cheers.) We are, nevertheless, told that there is one class which, amid this general prosperity, has suffered in some degree—namely, the owners and occupiers of land. If I am asked what is the real protection for them, I say their protection lies mainly in the happiness and contentment of the rest of their fellow-countrymen. Is that a vain assertion? Why, look what happened only three or four years ago. In 1848, when all Europe was convulsed, when thrones were overturned, when constitutions, ancient and modern, were alike levelled in the dust, what was the example shown by this great country? There were a few men who, unjustly and unwisely dissatisfied with the condition of this country, wished for a violent change; but the moment that change was threatened you saw every man in the great city of London, from the highest peer down to the humblest labourer, mingling in honourable fellowship, and stepping forward to defend the laws and institutions of their country in an array so formidable that it prevented even the slightest manifestation of disorder. Now, I believe that could not have happened if the people of this country had not felt that the course of legislation had been directed towards the general good. I say, then, that Protection is gone, and I trust and hope that the result of this general election will be to give the final seal and sanction of the country to the doom of that mistaken and bygone principle. Now, gentlemen, those persons and those parties who wish to improve the institutions of a great country like this are bound to go slowly and deliberately, and they are sure to meet with great resistance at every step which they take. I, for one, do not complain of that resistance. It belongs to the character of the country, and it has this advantage, that it prevents sudden and ill-considered alterations, and that measures proposed as improvements receive that due consi-

deration and discussion which renders them ultimately better adapted to the condition of the people to whom they apply. A love and affection for ancient practices and institutions is an honourable and peculiar characteristic of the people of this country, and I am the last to wish that that honourable and useful sentiment should ever be discarded from their minds. There are some of the nations of the Continent who are more volatile and more apt to change, and national character is often evinced by circumstances apparently trifling in themselves. Now, in many parts of the Continent if an innkeeper wishes to recommend his inn, he hangs up a sign of 'The New White Horse,' or 'The New Golden Cross.' The last novelty is that which is considered the most attractive. Here, gentlemen, a contrary course is pursued, and, if the owner of a country alehouse wishes to draw custom, he hangs up the sign of 'The Old Plough New Revived.' (Laughter.) There is at a place called Hanwell, not far from London, an inn to which gentlemen who were fond of pigeon-shooting used to resort to practise their skill. Well, what is the sign of that inn? It is the 'Old Hats.' Not that anybody was thought to prefer an old hat to a new one, but it was expected that gentlemen would come to 'The Old Hats' in preference to 'The New Hats.' Now, a rival inn was set up, and what was its sign? Why, 'The Old Old Hats' (great laughter), and much it profited by that superlative designation. I was looking, as I came down here, at the railway time-table book, and I saw among the advertisements that a firm in the Poultry announce an inn as the 'Old King's Head;' and, in order that they may combine the attractions of national feeling with the attractions of good living, they add that it is the oldest turtle house in London. (Much laughter.) The people of this country, too, when they wish to express their attachment to the land they live in, call it, with affectionate endearment, 'Old England;' but that does not prevent them from repairing what may have got into decay, or from im-

proving, or ornamenting, or embellishing that which is still good, but may be made better."

Lord Palmerston then turned to the Militia Bill which the Government had just passed, and which he had supported, though many of his constituents disapproved of it.

"I suppose that no man in this country, except the few who think in agreement with the author of a pamphlet which I felt it my duty to mention in the House of Commons, and who, good man! recommended that we should quietly submit to be invaded and conquered, in the hope that the conqueror would be so astonished at our submission that he would grow ashamed of himself, and would go away after having taken some £50,000,000 of our money. I presume, with this exception, that there is no man who has an English heart in his bosom who does not feel that England is worth defending, and that he ought to make any sacrifice rather than allow his country to be conquered. Why, I may say, gentlemen, that this country is the heart of civil and political liberty, and that the conquest of this country would not only be one of the greatest calamities to the country itself, but would be a misfortune to the whole of the civilised world. A poet, Campbell, who died not long ago, says, in lines describing the fate of Poland, that—

‘Hope for a season bade the world farewell,  
And Freedom shrieked when Kosciusko fell;

but hope would indeed for ever bid adieu to the world, and freedom would die and not shriek, if England were to be conquered. You have for the last two days had bands of music parading your streets, followed by all the healthy-looking children of the place, some toddling along in the ranks who were scarcely able to keep their feet; but that peaceful display has only manifested the joy and contentment of all the people of the town. What would you have

said, however, if these bands had preceded a hostile force—if the armed hosts following the musicians had come to occupy at free quarters every house of your town, and, having occupied every house, to make themselves perfectly free with everything and everybody therein contained? I may be told these are vain apprehensions—appeals made to the fanciful fears of the country simply for the purpose of obtaining the means of adding to the public expenditure. That reminds me of a story which I remember having heard of an elderly lady who lived near Henley-on-Thames, and who, when an invasion was expected by Napoleon Bonaparte, said she did not believe he would ever come, because she had been told in her youth the Pretender was coming, and, as he never came to Henley, she believed Napoleon Bonaparte never would come there either. (Laughter.) Now, I do not quote this story, gentlemen, to throw any reflection upon the intelligence of the elderly portion of the fairer sex, because I remember to have heard that the Duchess of Gordon, in the time of Mr. Pitt, talking to an elderly statesman, was told by him, with regard to something in which he thought he had acted unwisely, ‘Really, Madam, I feel that I am growing an old woman;’ upon which the Duchess replied, ‘I am glad to hear that that’s all, for I really thought your Grace was growing an old man, and that’s a much worse thing.’ (Great laughter.) Now, I say that those men who tell you that because you have had no invasion since the Norman Conquest you never will have one, and that you need not guard against it, are old men. Though they may not be old in years, they are old in imbecility of intellect. All those who are most able to judge of military and naval operations tell you that an invasion is perfectly possible; that it is more possible now than it ever was before, mainly on account of the great change which has been made by the application of steam in naval and military operations; and to tell you that you are safe from invasion now because you were able to prevent it

before, to tell you that you are safe from invasions now without precautions, because hitherto you have prevented it by precautions, is the greatest of all possible absurdities. Why, how happened it that you had no invasion at the time of which the good old lady at Henley spoke? Because you had then a large standing army within the kingdom; you had your whole militia organised, enrolled, and on permanent pay; you had, besides, four hundred thousand volunteers, the whole country was in arms, and the enemy could not have made an effectual attempt; but even then, I believe, and I have been told on good authority, it was only in consequence of the failure of a naval operation, by which the French fleets were to have formed a junction, that an attempt to invade you was not made. The result would have been such as it always will be when Englishmen are armed and prepared; but I say that, if Englishmen are not armed, and are not prepared, they are doing injustice to themselves, and are not showing themselves worthy of those great and inestimable blessings which it has been the will of Providence to bestow upon them."

Mr. Rowcliff then came forward and put several questions, the nature of which will be fully apparent from Lord Palmerston's reply.

"My good friend, Mr. Rowcliff, has reproached me for not coming often enough among you. I must say that he does not appear disposed to make my visits here particularly agreeable to me. (Laughter.) I cannot say that the manner in which he receives me affords much encouragement to cultivate the society of persons of his way of thinking. (Renewed laughter.) Whether Mr. Rowcliff is a Radical, a Chartist, or a Tory, I really cannot say. I believe that all parties may have some reason or other for claiming him. Mr. Rowcliff says that I only told you of the good that Governments and Parliaments have done, and that I have myself done, and that I have not told

you of the bad. Why, God bless me ! it was quite unnecessary for me to do that when he was here. (Loud laughter.) If there was a bad thing to be recorded, to be invented, or to be imagined, I am quite sure Mr. Rowcliff would be the first man to tell you of it. (Laughter, which was increased when Mr. Rowcliff called out 'Question !') Well, Mr. Rowcliff is impatient under this castigation. I will hit lower or higher, just as he pleases (renewed laughter); but he must allow me to hit somewhere. Mr. Rowcliff has asked me what Government I mean to join. Now, that is a question that must depend upon the future; but I will tell him what Government I do not mean to join. I can assure you and him that I never will join a Government called a Rowcliff Administration. (Great laughter and cheering.) Now, gentlemen, do not you imagine, because you deem it very absurd that there should be such an administration, that my friend Mr. Rowcliff is at all of that way of thinking; for I believe I am not far mistaken in the opinion that he will consider everything going wrong in this world and in this country until the Rowcliff Administration shall govern the land. (Loud laughter.) Mr. Rowcliff has raked up old and bygone commonplaces about pensions. He ought to know—because he has no right to talk upon the subject without informing himself about it—that pensions are now extremely limited in amount, and that they are only given for acknowledged public services. All those abuses of sinecures, of inordinate pensions, and of misbestowed pensions, which existed in former times, have been corrected, and the pension list has been enormously reduced. It is true that pensions have not been taken away from those to whom they were granted for life, because that would have been a breach of faith; but future pensions are not granted except upon grounds which Parliament itself acknowledges to be just. Mr. Rowcliff says I voted for the Militia Bill. As I have already explained to you, the material difference between the Militia Bill which I opposed and the Militia

Bill which I supported was, that the former was founded upon compulsory service as the rule, admitting voluntary service as the exception, while the Bill of the present Government, which I supported, was founded upon voluntary service as the rule, and admits of compulsory service as only the remote and contingent exception. The militia now to be raised will be raised by bounty, and, if I have any fault to find with the Act, it is that I think the bounty is rather too high. That, however, I presume, can be no ground of objection to young men who may be disposed to enlist. (A laugh.) My belief is that you will have no ballot, but that you will gain all your men from the spontaneous patriotism of the people, aided by the inducement of the bounty. I do not think so ill of the young men of England as to believe that they will be afraid of twenty-one days' service during the year in the militia. I commanded a regiment of local militia, which used to assemble for twenty-eight days' training, and I knew only one instance of a man who wished to go home before the twenty-eight days were over. He was one of the privates, who came to me and said, 'My lord, I wish you would let me go home.' I replied, 'Why? You have only a week to serve now?' 'Well,' said he, 'the fact is that before I comed here I promised a young woman in my parish that I'd marry her, if so be as I survived the campaign.' (Great laughter.) I replied, 'Heaven forbid that the young woman should be disappointed! Go home and marry her, and tell her the campaign has not been so dangerous as she may have thought it.' (Laughter.) I am convinced that the young men of England will not be afraid of three weeks' campaign in a militia regiment. Mr. Rowcliff has asked me my notions of Parliamentary reform; whether I did not vote against Mr. Locke King's motion; whether I should be prepared to vote for the ballot, for the repeal of the Septennial Act, and for the substitution of triennial, or, as they are sometimes called, triangular Parliaments. (Laughter.) Now, Mr. Rowcliff is a Chartist, and



is for the five or six or any other number of points of the Charter. I am not a Chartist, and I am too old to become a Chartist. (Cheers, and laughter.) I am quite satisfied with the constitution of the country under which I have been born, under which I have lived, and under which I hope to die. (Cheers.) I am for a limited and constitutional monarchy; I am not for a republic. I have seen what republics are in other countries. I have seen that they cannot maintain their ground, and that when you try to establish them you invariably lead the way to a military despotism. I am for septennial Parliaments. A septennial Parliament, practically, is not a Parliament that lasts for seven years, for we all know that the average duration of the Parliaments during the last thirty or forty years has not been more than three or four years. If you establish annual Parliaments you will have the country in a perpetual commotion. Your members of Parliament will not have time to learn their duties, and your business will be ill done. In the same way, if you have triennial Parliaments, during the first year the members will be learning their business, in the second year they will just be beginning useful measures, and in the third year they will be thinking of the Rowcliff's of their respective constituencies (laughter), and endeavouring to shape their course, not for the good of their country, but in order to conciliate the most noisy of their constituents. (Cheers, and laughter.) With regard to vote by ballot—secret voting—I object to it, because I think it at variance with the national character, and with the principle of our constitution. I think a true Englishman hates doing a thing in secret or in the dark. I do not believe that a majority of Englishmen would consent to give their votes in secret, even if the law permitted them to do so; and I think if the law compelled them to do so, it would be a debasement of the national character. But I have a higher objection. I hold that the right of voting is a trust reposed in the elector for the public good. I do not think that a vote is given for the

benefit of the man who possesses it, and that he can take it to the best bidder and get £5, £10, or £20, as the case may be. The vote is given as a trust for the public and for the nation; and I say that any trust reposed in a man for the public good he ought to perform in public. (Hear, hear.) I say, that for men who are charged with the high and important duty of choosing the best men to represent the country in Parliament to go sneaking to the ballot-box, and, poking in a piece of paper, looking round to see that no one could read it, is a course which is unconstitutional and unworthy the character of straightforward and honest Englishmen."

From Tiverton he went to Lewes to attend the meeting of the Royal Agricultural Society. In his speech on this occasion occurred that definition of dirt which has become a household word. The toast which he had to propose was, "Prosperity to the Borough," and, after remarks on its antiquity and its history as dating from the time of the Romans, he spoke as follows:—

"Now, gentlemen, the Romans were great agriculturists, and drew great supplies of grain from this island. But to them was closed that wonderful book of knowledge which the scientific investigations of the present day have opened to you in that mysterious science of chemistry which was then unknown. If ever there was a case in which it was true that knowledge is power, that maxim is peculiarly true in reference to the aids which chemistry affords to agriculture. Allusion has been made to the question of guano, and it has been mentioned, what is perfectly true, that when I held an office which would have enabled me, if it had been possible, to assist the farmer with regard to guano, my endeavours proved fruitless. In fact, the Peruvians were not

more disposed to let us put a price on their guano than the British farmer would be to have a price put upon his corn. (Great laughter.) But, gentlemen, I cannot but think that the progress of chemical science, and the application of that science to practical agriculture, may lead you to something which will render you less anxious and solicitous about this same guano, and that instead of sending to the other end of the world for more manure for our fields, we shall find something nearly, if not quite, as good within a few hundred yards of our dwellings. (Cheers.) Now, gentlemen, I have heard a definition of dirt. I have heard it said that dirt is nothing but a thing in a wrong place. (Cheers and laughter.) Now, the dirt of our towns precisely corresponds with that definition. It ought to be upon our fields, and if there could be such a reciprocal community of interests between the country and the towns, that the country should purify the towns, and the towns should fertilise the country, I am much disposed to think that the British farmer would care less than he does, though he still might care something, about Peruvian guano. Now, we all acknowledge that there are certain laws of nature, and that those who violate those laws invariably suffer for it. Well, it is a law of nature that nothing is destroyed. Matter is decomposed, but only for the purpose of again assuming some new form useful for the purposes of the human race. But we neglect that law. We allow decomposed substances in towns to pollute the atmosphere, to ruin the health, to produce premature misery, to be pestilent to life and destructive of existence. Well, gentlemen, if instead of that there could be a system devised by which those substances which are noxious where they now are should be transferred so as to fertilise the adjoining districts, I am persuaded that, not only would the health of the town populations be thereby greatly improved, but the finances of the agricultural population would derive considerable benefit from the change. I therefore recommend you gentlemen to ponder the maxim that 'Knowledge is power,' and as the

diffusion of the most useful kind of knowledge is one of the main objects for which the Royal Agricultural Society was established, I am persuaded it will tend mainly and most efficiently to the advancement of the interest and the power of the agricultural class of the country."

He returns to town, and sends off a letter to Naples to report what he has been doing, and what was the result of the general election.

"C. G., July 24, 1852.

"MY DEAR WILLIAM,

"My Tiverton election went off very well, and my little speeches there, as well as my speech at the Lewes Agricultural Meeting afterwards, have had much more success and praise than they really deserved. It is a comfort, however, when the world errs on the right side.

"The only thing that everybody, except a few family adherents, now consider impossible is, that John Russell should form a new administration. He has lost immensely in public confidence and consideration. Some of the most sensible of the Whigs are trying to put Lord Lansdowne up as head of the party and the man to form the next administration. That would do, and it seems to me that John Russell as well as I might serve under Lord Lansdowne, but I would certainly not serve again under Johnny, and Johnny, I should think, would scarcely serve under me, at least at present; and he is too considerable a man, with all his faults and failings, to be put on the shelf and

entirely passed by. Lansdowne would, I think, be willing to undertake such a task if he was called upon to do so. The Government seem to have gained by the elections just strength enough to make it impossible to carry, at the beginning of the session, whether it be October, November, or January, or February, a vote of no confidence, and I should expect that no such vote will be attempted; but they have not gained strength enough to carry them through their measures in the session, and what I expect is, that they will be beat upon some of their fanciful schemes for relieving everybody and increasing nobody's burdens. This is too mountebankish to be practicable.

“Indirect overtures have lately been made to me from some members of the Government, but I at once made my excuses, saying, I am well content at present with my present position. Many people, and more than might have been supposed, talk of me as the next Minister, but I do not think that likely, and there would be at once the difficulty about John Russell. If I was Minister I should ask him to take the Foreign Office, and go to the House of Lords to assist Lansdowne, or to lead if Lansdowne should not choose to do so.

“I have only one horse in training this year, and have won four races with him, two of which, however, were only walks over. He is three years old, and likely to win me several more races. He runs next week for the Goodwood Cup, but I doubt his winning,

as he would have to meet some very good horses. He is by Venison out of an Emilius mare that I have had some time.

“ We have lost some good men in this new Parliament, George Grey, Cardwell, Mahon, Grenfell, and several others, but then we have got rid of some bad ones, George Thompson, Urquhart, and the like. I do not reckon Anstey among the riddances, for though he came in to impeach me, he has latterly become one of my warmest friends and supporters. The fact is that Urquhart and Anstey were brought in at the election of 1847 by Louis Philippe’s money, in order that they might be set at me and demolish me if they could. Urquhart’s seat at Stafford, and Anstey’s at Youghal, cost many thousand pounds, and neither of them had any money to throw away; and I happen to know, in a very curious way, that those two and a third man, an ally of theirs, and the editor of the ‘Portfolio,’\* Westmacott, got from Louis Philippe, for their attacks on me, something not short of £60,000 first and last. That same king was a mean

\* The ‘Portfolio’ was started in 1835, by Mr. Urquhart, at that time a Secretary of Legation on leave. Its ostensible object was “to expose the secret designs of Russia and her allies against England;” its real motive was to publish certain despatches of which its promoters had somehow or other obtained possession. The name was adopted in imitation of foreign “brochures,” which, during the last century, appeared from time to time under titles such as “Papiers inédits trouvés dans le portefeuille d’un ministre,” &c. Though its existence was short, it gave some trouble to Lord Palmerston, its managers having taken advantage of Mr. Urquhart’s official access to the department in order to give colour to an audacious attempt to saddle the Foreign Office both with the responsibility and the expense of the publication.

fellow, true son of *Egalité*, and true grandson of the Regent. Good-bye.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

Allusion is made in the foregoing letter to incidents which happened before the period with which this volume opens. Lord Palmerston, in the earlier part of his career, and especially about the time of his vigorous action, in 1840, against Mehemet Ali, in despite of France, had to encounter attacks more venomous and more unscrupulous than often fall to the lot of a public man, however eminent. There went about the country a knot of men, half of them fanatical and the other half silly, who, holding meetings in our great towns, issuing pamphlets, and gaining some of the provincial newspapers, proclaimed the Foreign Secretary as a traitor to his country, and as having sold himself to Russia for hard money. If more recent instances of popular delusion were not too fresh in our minds to permit any excessive wonderment, we might well feel amazed that even a small section of their hearers should have given ear to their assertions. But so it was; and Lord Palmerston, however imperturbable by nature, felt bound to take counsel's opinion as to the propriety of filing criminal informations against the authors of these libels. This course, however, was, on consideration, not adopted; and, indeed, it would have been giving the agitators an importance which

they did not deserve. Yet a short time previously he had been obliged to take before the Court of Queen's Bench the publisher of the 'Albion,' in the columns of which he had been accused of using his official knowledge for stockjobbing purposes; and he obtained from another newspaper, without legal proceedings, an apology for a suggestion that he was concerned in a disreputable mining adventure abroad. He received, therefore, his full share of the shafts directed by political malice during the years while he was making his way to the unassailable position which he latterly occupied.

But, returning to 1852, we find him describing to his brother the state of parties during the pause between the general election and the meeting of the new Parliament:—

“Brocket, September 17, 1852.

“Men seem generally disposed to wait to see what measures the Government propose, and to deal with those measures according to their merits, and I think the chances are that some of those measures will be deemed objectionable, and will be rejected by Parliament. It will then remain to be seen whether such rejection will be considered by the Government a sufficient reason for resigning. The probability is that Lord Derby will not easily take such a hint, but will stand his ground until he is forced to retire. His language is that his is the last Conservative Government, and that after him comes the Deluge.



But if he begins to be beat, he will find it hard to get any fresh troops to join him, and out of his own corps he can draw little additional strength. When he is forced to retire great difficulties will arise. John Russell clings pertinaciously to his former position of Prime Minister, and will not serve under any other chief. On the other hand, the Whig and Liberal party have greatly lost confidence in his capacity as a leader, and he would find it very difficult to form such a Government as would be strong enough to stand. I do not think the Peelites would join him. I certainly would not serve under him again, though I might serve with him under a third person. Thus he would be driven either to take back his old clique of Greys and Barings, of whom the country is tired, or to ally himself with Graham and the Radicals, of whom the country is afraid, and against him he would have all the supporters of the present Government, numbering about 290, the Peelites, about 50, and a certain number of members who would be disposed to look to me, perhaps 20. This would make a majority against him, besides the general impression in the country that he has not the qualities required for a first minister. The way of avoiding these embarrassments would be to place Lansdowne at the head of the Government, but *at present* Johnny will not hear of serving under anybody. It is probable, however, that somehow or other this difficulty may be got over, and that thus a Liberal Government may be formed, supposing always that Derby should

not be able to maintain himself. However, time will show.

“So we have at last lost our great Duke.\* Old as he was, and both bodily and mentally enfeebled by age, he still is a great loss to the country. His name was a tower of strength abroad, and his opinions and counsel were valuable at home. No man ever lived or died in the possession of more unanimous love, respect, and esteem from his countrymen. There have been some excellent articles in the ‘Times’ about him. The first question which arises is, who is to succeed him as Commander-in-Chief? Hardinge and Fitzroy-Somerset† have been mentioned. Fitzroy is senior to Hardinge, and is a fitter man, and as Hardinge is already Master-General of the Ordnance, it seems likely that Fitzroy-Somerset may be the man chosen.

“I have been rather lucky this year on the turf, having had only one horse (Buckthorn)‡ in training, and having won six races with him. Some who have had six horses have only won one race.”

The Liberal party were now looking out for a policy and a leader. Lord John Russell was discredited. Lord Palmerston had given too recent a blow. In a letter, to which the following is a reply, Lord Fitzwilliam suggested the Marquis of Lansdowne as a possible leader, although he alluded to his age as being against him, and referred to declarations made in the House of Lords as to his wish for retirement.

\* Duke of Wellington.

† Afterwards Lord Raglan.

‡ Won the Ascot Stakes. He looked at one moment so out of the race that, during the running, 100 to 1 was offered against him.

Lord Palmerston, as we have seen, had already thought of him as the best man for the post.

“C. G., September 24, 1852.

“MY DEAR LORD FITZWILLIAM,

“Seventy-two is certainly, as you say, an advanced period of life, but if health and faculties are unimpaired, lapse of years can be no objection. Cardinal Fleury was seventy-three when made Prime Minister; and we are now lamenting the loss of a man who continued in the active administration of an important office till the age of eighty-four.\*

“Leave-taking, announced in Parliament, should be construed with reference to circumstances, and they sometimes only mean that the person who pronounces them does not intend again to place himself in the particular and relative position from which he has just been freed. But your previous question—unlike those which are moved in Parliament—is a very practical one. You doubt whether ‘it is desirable at present to overthrow the present Government.’ To this I would add another doubt, namely, whether it is possible to do so? I apprehend that there are in the House of Commons many men who rank as Liberals, and who differ from the supposed principles of the present Government, who, nevertheless, would not join in any vote at the opening of the session, the avowed object of which would be to overthrow the present Government. Their motives, I conceive,

\* Duke of Wellington.

would be : first, that there is no existing party organisation which would at once present the elements of another Government to succeed the present one ; and, secondly, that in such a state of things, the best course to pursue is to allow the present Government to explain their intended policy, and to develop their proposed measures, and to deal with that policy and those measures according to their intrinsic merits. I own that such appears to me to be the best course. If the present Government propose good measures, why should the country not have the benefit of such measures ? If the measures they propose are bad, let them be rejected, and let the Government abide the consequences of their own want of judgment and skill. It is indeed hard to imagine that the Government will be able to make good all the expectations of relief which they have held out to various classes of the community ; and the chances seem to be that they will sustain some defeats when these measures come to be discussed. Moreover, the composition of the Government is not one that promises long duration without material changes. The Government contains two men of first-rate abilities, one in one House, the other in the other—Derby and Disraeli ; but it may be doubted whether the other members of the Cabinet are well equal to sustaining the rude shock of parliamentary conflict through a difficult session. What you say about organic changes is perfectly true. They ought not to be proposed unless they are really needed for the public good, and they should not be launched

by a Government as a clap-trap for fancied popularity without any fair prospect of their being carried.

“I do not myself see any reason why we may not go on very well without any such organic changes. It would, I think, be an improvement (if there would be no obstacle in the detailed execution of such a measure) if the present system of contested registration could be got rid of, and if the poor-rate register were made also the register for the right of voting; and if such a change were accompanied by some small diminution in the qualification for electors, no harm would be done. I should not be surprised if the present Government were to propose some measures of this kind. It would not be out of character for a Government of which one member proposed to give every militiaman a vote, and of which another member, on a motion for Parliamentary Reform, talked very freely about the expediency of emancipating the labouring classes.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

The great frankness of Lord Palmerston's character comes out in the next letter. He remained on perfectly friendly terms with Lord J. Russell, but, as will be seen, he had not hesitated to tell him openly that his confidence in him, as a leader, was shaken, and that he would be unwilling, therefore, to serve under him again. This was all received in good part by the ex-Premier; for offence can never be taken at

an open expression of honest opinion, whether it be right or wrong.

“ Broadlands, October, 1852.

“ MY DEAR LANSDOWNE,

“ The Duke and Duchess of Bedford came to Brocket for a day while we were there ; and as I found from Melbourne that the Duke was desirous of knowing my feelings as to serving in any Government that might be formed by John Russell, I sought an opportunity of a conversation with him ; and as he led to the subject, I spoke my mind to him freely and in detail. I said that my private and personal regard and friendship for John Russell remain unaltered, and that I must always entertain towards him, individually, those sentiments of kindness which one feels for a private friend with whom one has been acting in public life for more than twenty years. But I said that my political confidence in him is gone, and that I would not again act under him as a chief who should be the arbiter of my official position or the guide of my political course. That, as a political leader, he is not to be depended upon : is infirm of purpose, changeable in his views, and perpetually swayed by influences which are known and felt only by their results.

“ So much I said as to my political confidence in John Russell as a Prime Minister. In regard to my own feelings as to a return to my former official dependence upon him, I said that the more and the longer I reflected upon his conduct towards me last year, the

more I felt those sentiments which induced me at the time to write him a note to beg that he would not suppose from the quiet manner in which I took what he had done, that I did not feel that just indignation which his conduct must necessarily inspire."

The letter here goes into details connected with his dismissal in December, 1851, which have already been quoted, and then continues:—

"I said to the Duke of Bedford that the upshot of all this was, that I could not again serve under John Russell, but that I should not object to serve with him on equal terms under a third person. But I said that indeed it seemed to me impossible that, in the event of the present Government falling, John Russell should be able to form a Government; that I do not think the Peelites would join him; and that he would therefore have against him the two hundred and ninety who are reckoned as supporters of the present Government, the forty or fifty Peelites, and a certain number, however small, who are likely to ask what course I should under such circumstances pursue. In conclusion, I said to the Duke that which, indeed, I had stated to him some weeks before—that in the present broken up condition of parties, it seems to me that you are the leader the most likely to reconcile and reunite the sections of the Liberal party, and also to receive support from some moderate men whose present tendencies would lead them to rank as adherents of the existing Government.

“The Duke expressed himself pleased with my personal feelings towards John Russell, and acknowledged the fair manner in which, according to my own view of the matter, I had stated my own case.

“I do not think, however, that he seemed to be of opinion that John Russell shares my conviction as to the impossibility of his now forming another Government.

“Yours sincerely,  
“PALMERSTON.”

Lord Lansdowne, however, pleaded age and desire for repose in reply to those sections of the Liberal party who called upon him to come forward and fill the breach. Upon this Lord Palmerston remarks :—

“Broadlands, October 14, 1852.

“I can easily understand that you should, after many years of ministerial labour and confinement, prefer freedom to constraint, but—

‘When Honour calls, where’er she points the way,  
The sons of Honour follow and obey;’

and if the course of events should render a sacrifice on your part necessary, that sacrifice will, undoubtedly, be made.

“I should not be surprised, however, if Derby’s Government were to have more life in it than people generally imagine. Protection, Derby will openly throw over, and if the measures which he proposes are tolerably good, they will be accepted, and any proposal of a vote of no confidence would probably



fail; and if Derby would recruit a little more debating power from out of his own followers, which may not be impossible, he might be able to struggle on for some considerable time. Dalhousie\* is coming home as soon as the Burmese war is over, and Lord Raglan is to succeed him. Dalhousie would be an acquisition in the Lords, and some of the new Derbyites in the Commons may prove debaters, and may be taken into office. If there was an obvious prospect of forming a good Liberal Government all these resources would be too little for Derby, but if there can be no Liberal Government but one under John Russell, Derby may have a longer tenure of office than was at first imagined."†

The new Parliament met for business on the 11th of November. The dissolution had little altered the balance of parties, so that the Government were still in a minority. The Liberal leaders, as will be seen, had adjusted their internal difficulties, and were prepared to form a Cabinet, if necessary.

"C. G., November 17, 1852.

"MY DEAR WILLIAM,

"I think the chances are that the Government will fall by their measures, if they are measures of any magnitude and importance, because any such measures must involve changes in the distribution of taxes; and though the persons who are to be lightened

\* Marquis of Dalhousie, Governor-General of India.

† To Lord Lansdowne, October 14, 1852.

may like such changes, they who are to be burthened will object, and the measures will most likely be thrown out. If the measures are very small they will disappoint the expectation which has been excited; anyhow, it seems likely that this Government will not last long, and now there is another formation ready to take their place. Lord Lansdowne would consent to be chief if asked by the Queen to do so. John Russell would take office under Lansdowne, and would, moreover, if it were wished, go up to the House of Lords, and I should then be left to perform that honourable but irksome task of conducting the business of the Government in the House of Commons. In that case I should have the Home Office, and Johnny the Foreign. I should, in any case, much prefer the Home Office to going back to the immense labour of the Foreign Office. *J'y ai été*, as the Frenchman said of fox-hunting. The Peelites would form part of such a Government, and we should have the support of a good few of those who are now adherents of the present Government. However, all this is as yet in the clouds: one should not dispose of the bear till the bear is taken and slain, and one ought not to make a Government for the Queen till one is quite sure what her intentions are upon that matter. I think, however, that this Government will sink under its own febleness before Easter.

“The Austrians have distinguished themselves by declining to send anybody to the funeral of the Duke, and I am told that our Queen is very angry with

them. The papers say it is the Emperor himself who took this decision ; and I am told he is quite a fanatic, sleeps on a hard mattress on the floor, stints himself in sleep, and mortifies the body in all ways. This is a pity ; an enlightened and sensible Emperor of Austria would be a great acquisition for Europe, though, to be sure, he would be a novelty. But the Austrians hate England and the English nation, notwithstanding the civil compliments interchanged between the Austrian Government and the Derby Administration when Derby came into office last spring. Well, we can do without them, and I hope they can do without us. It is desirable for their own sakes that they should be able to do so, for help from England they are not very likely to get.

“ Yours affectionately,

“ PALMERSTON.”

The Queen's speech at the opening of Parliament had been very ambiguous on the subject of Free Trade. In the opinion of many it was studiously so ; and it was therefore considered necessary to elicit, without delay, a parliamentary declaration, in order to show to the world that a free-trade policy had been irrevocably adopted. Accordingly, on the 23rd of November, Mr. Charles Villiers moved a resolution which was so worded that the Government could not possibly accept it, and, therefore, had the House adopted it, the Ministry must at once have retired from office. It was, however, not the general wish to turn

out the Government before they had proposed their Budget; so Lord Palmerston came to the rescue, and proposed an amended resolution worded with more regard to Tory susceptibilities. The difference between the two resolutions was, that while they both unequivocally affirmed the doctrine of Free Trade and its permanent establishment, Lord Palmerston's did not compel those who agreed to it publicly to recant the private opinions which, at a former period, they may have honestly entertained. The Government accepted it, and it was carried by a large majority.

This debate finally closed the discussions on Free Trade, which had for so many years proved the subject of controversy in Parliament.

On the 3rd of December Mr. Disraeli, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, introduced his Budget. The principal features were a reduction of the malt tax, which created a large deficit, and a doubling of the house tax, to supply the void. The farmers, expecting something better, did not care about the reduction made in their favour, while the townsfolk did care very decidedly about the increase made at their cost. The Budget was generally condemned, and, in spite of an energetic "whip," the Government were beaten by 19 in a very full House. They accordingly resigned.

END OF VOL. I.



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